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ABSTRACT 
COMMONSENSE UNDERSTANDINGS OF CAUSES OF MOTION 
There are many findings about children's spontaneous reasoning in dynamics. These 
studies suggest that a non-Newtonian framework is used by students across a large age range 
but there is controversy as to whether pupils' conceptions represent systematic mental 
structures or temporary constructions. Ogborn (1985) constructed a theory of common-
sense understanding of motion, which proposes a definite structure of thinking. Unlike 
much previous work, his theory is susceptible to testing. 
This research sets out to test this hypothesis about the content and nature of commonsense 
ideas of motion. After preliminary work using interviews and repertory grids, a formal 
model of the theory was constructed which provided the basis for the collection of data in 
the main study. The adoption of a causal model of motion provided a template for linking 
primitive abstractions such as effort and support in a natural way. 
In order to test a large number and wide age range of subjects (7 - 16 years), a matching pairs 
paper and pencil task was developed for the main study. Subjects were asked to distinguish 
between examples of nine stereotypical motions by comparing the similarity or difference 
of the causes of pairs of motions. It was then possible to test theoretical predictions of the 
comparisons against empirical data. 
The results suggest that people's responses can be predicted by the model but that there is 
an improvement in the correlations with the additon of an animacy correction. An 
independent test was carried out where the animate nature of moving objects was varied 
systematically and it was found that this feature, previously neglected by the theoretical 
account, was an important distinction in subjects' consideration of causes of motion. As 
predicted, the results were similar over a considerable age range, being however better for 
older children than the younger ones. 
Taking account both of these results and of Piaget's description of the sensori-motor period 
of child development, a new version of the model is proposed, and tested against the 
available data. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this opening chapter is to provide an overview of the thesis, and to explain 
the origins of the work. The chapter therefore divides itself into two sections. 1.1 Origins 
of the Research, describes how I became involved in this work. 1.2 Outline of the 
Research, presents a brief plan of the thesis. 
1.1 ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH 
An initial interest in childrens' commonsense ideas about motion began when I was 
studying for a Masters Degree at Chelsea College London, and began working with Joan 
Bliss on a preliminary empirical exploration of Ogborn's (1984) model of a commonsense 
understanding of motion. Bliss (1989) had started to see if this theoretical account provided 
the basis of primary pupils explanations of motion and I became interested in whether 
similar explanations would be found in secondary school pupils' accounts of motion. I 
worked with a group of fourteen to eighteen year olds, some of whom were studying 'A' 
level physics, and found surprisingly enough that most students seemed to use the basic 
premises of the model to describe motion. Although the results were interesting in 
themselves these investigations did not provide any systematic testing of the theoretical 
position. 
A more rigorous testing of the model began when an E.S.R.C. studentship became available 
and I started to work with Jon Ogborn at the London Institute of Education. It is perhaps 
the exception rather than the rule to be involved in testing a model in research in science 
education. In the event, the results of the work were able to suggest areas where the model 
needed elaboration and development. 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH 
Previous research has shown that children have their own ideas about motion, as well as 
about other scientific concepts such as heat, light and electricity. This research has 
accumulated a large body of descriptive data which is not always easy to interpret. It is 
24 
difficult to see how empirically to assess the merits of the various proposals that have been 
made about the nature of such conceptions. This thesis sets out to test a particular theoretical 
hypothesis about the content and nature of commonsense understandings of causes of 
motion. 
Two versions of the model of commonsense ideas about motion were tested in three ways. 
A first version of the model proposed by Ogborn (1985) with ideas derived from Hayes' 
(1979) "Naive Physics Manifesto" was tested in two preliminary ways:- 
1. By using an interview technique. 
2. By using a repertory grid methodology. 
A third and more systematic test was then applied to a formalised version of the model which 
linked the "primitive abstractions" of support and effort within a causal framework. This 
final test used a specially designed comparison task to elicit similarities and differences 
between stereotypical motions as predicted by the formalised version of the model, and 
provides the main body of results for the thesis. Two supplementary tests (using the same 
format as the main comparison task) were carried out to:- 
i. assess the importance of an animacy factor in commonsense understanding 
of motion, and 
ii. clarify the role of motions in which one object carries another. 
The results show that responses can be predicted by the model, but that an animacy feature, 
previously neglected by the model, is an important distinction in the commonsense 
understanding of causes of motion. It also appears that CARRY motions are, as predicted, 
distinct from other types of motion, in that a carried object inherits both its effort and 
support from the carrier. That is, the motion of a carried object is seen as similar to the 
motion of the carrier itself. This result was predicted by the model. 
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The final part of the thesis speculates about how to improve the model, in the light of these 
results and of speculations about how these commonsense understandings of causes of 
motion develop. Thoughts about the infant's construction of ideas about the nature of 
objects and their motion in the sensori motor period, are incorporated into a reformulation 
of the model. A multi-dimensional scaling analysis using this third version supports the idea 
that the model can now predict to some extent the structure of thinking about motion. 
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2. CHILDREN'S LEARNING AND ALTERNATIVE 
CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE 
The purpose of this chapter is to give some insight into the nature and status attributed to 
children's alternative conceptions of physical phenomena. 2.1 Introduction summarises 
how these ideas have been interpreted by a number of researchers. 2.2 Examples of Views 
Children hold in common about physical phenomena illustrates some of these alterna-
tive understandings. 2.3 A view of the nature and status of children's conceptions 
describes one way which has been used to classify studies from different areas of the physics 
curriculum. 2.4 Views about Teaching and learning describes how children's alternative 
conceptions are affected by instruction. 2.5 What is the differences between children's 
knowledge and scientific knowledge? specifies some of these differences. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognised by Science teachers that students regularly experience difficulty 
with certain aspects of the curriculum. Pupils' responses to questions which are designed 
to test understanding rather than factual recall often reveal fundamental confusions and lack 
of comprehension. This means that some of the most successful examination candidates 
have expended time and energy committing factual knowledge to memory, with apparently 
very little understanding of it. 
A common interpretation of the alternative conceptions research (Driver and Erickson, 
1983) suggests that students do not assimilate new ideas uninfluenced by existing ones. 
These studies illustrate that pupils have their own firmly held ideas about many science 
topics, and that it is these notions which they employ to make sense of their classroom 
activities. Watts (1982) refers to these student ideas as "alternative frameworks" rather than 
classing them as "wrong" or "misconceived". Nussbaum and Novick (1981) argue that 
when a student uses a naive alternative framework or preconception to interpret classroom 
experience, he or she may well give this experience meanings which are different from or 
in total conflict with those intended by the teacher. Some would assert that pupils have not 
"misunderstood" the ideas but have "understood them differently" from what was intended, 
resulting in a mismatch between pupils' understanding of science and formal science. 
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2.2 EXAMPLES OF VIEWS CHILDREN HOLD IN COMMON ABOUT 
PHYSICAL PHENOMENA 
There has been a growing interest and a plethora of investigations which support the view 
that pupils have intuitive ideas about natural phenomena. A variety of studies have been 
conducted in such areas as dynamics, gravity, heat, light, density, electricity and many 
others. (For comprehensive reviews and discussion see Gilbert and Watts, 1983, Driver, 
Guesne and Tiberghien, 1985, Osborne, Freyberg 1985, Adey, Bliss, Head and Shayer, 
1989). For example children's ideas about light show three common frameworks:- 
a. Sight comes from the eyes and can 'meet' the light coming from an object. 
b. Light illuminates objects so that they are "lit up" and can then be seen. The light is local 
to the scene and need not travel as far as the viewer. 
c. A reflection is an image on a mirror or surface (and not a process by which light changes 
direction). 
For a more comprehensive review of students' interpretations of optical phenomena see 
Andersson and Karrqvist (1982). 
In the field of electricity, it appears that many pupils subscribe at some stage to a sequential 
model of direct current flow, Shipstone (1982). The relative positions of a bulb and 
resistance in series would affect the brightness of the bulb if a pupil were working with such 
a model. It would, therefore, be anticipated that the bulb's light would be weaker if the bulb 
were placed after the resistance in the circuit, because the current would be less by the time 
it reached the bulb after the effort of struggling through the resistance. 
Although the evidence for these prior beliefs is abundant, it is often difficult to find any 
general patterns which account for their nature. Not only is it not known where such ideas 
come from, but there is also disagreement as regards to their structure and permanence. 
Should these ideas be regarded as children's 'theories', or just as their passing fancies? Thus 
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while the research illustrates a good deal about what children think, much less is understood 
about why they think it. 
2.3 A VIEW OF THE NATURE AND STATUS OF CHILDREN'S CONCEPTIONS 
There are a variety of views taken about the nature and status of the alternate conceptions 
that pupils hold. They have been described by Helm (1980) amd Lawson (1989) as 
misconceptions and by Novick (1980) as preconceptions. The term "alternative concep-
tions" has been used by Driver and Easley (1978) while Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham 
(1982) refer to them as "children's science". The theoretical perspective of the researchers 
concerned largely determines their choice of nomenclature. 
Gilbert and Watts (1983) have attempted to classify a number of studies from different areas 
of the physics curriculum in terms of their relation to the term "concept". They have chosen 
to place studies into three major groups which take different meanings for the term concept. 
The first group encompasses the "classical" view of concept; where all instances of a 
concept share common properties and these properties are sufficient to define the concept. 
The investigations of force by Helm (1980) and Za'rour (1975) have been classified as 
being of this kind. The notion of misconception lies within this classical viewpoint and 
Za'rour equates mistakes and misconceptions with erroneous beliefs about force. 
Another group takes an "actional" view of concept, in which concepts are seen as active, 
constructive and intentional. From this point of view, there is little distinction between a 
concept and a theory. Of the many studies placed in this group, children's notions are 
commonly thought of as "alternative frameworks", (Gilbert and Watts 1983, Osborne 
1985). 
The final category is the "relational" view of concept, a stance intermediate between the two 
above. Studies such as those undertaken by Champagne et al (1981) investigating force and 
Duit (1981) looking at children's notions about energy have been included in this group. 
Gilbert and Watts identify the reason for these basic discrepancies of view taken about the 
nature of the research as the pre-paradigmatic character of present research. At any rate, it 
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is clear that the initial theoretical stance taken has had a large influence on the way the results 
of otherwise similar researches have been interpreted. 
2.4 VIEWS ABOUT TEACHING AND LEARNING 
Much of the evidence which supports the claim that children have intuitive ideas about 
natural phenomena stems from a "constructivist epistemology" (Driver 1983, Pope and 
Gilbert 1983), and various groups of research workers have been particularly concerned to 
apply some of Kelly's notions and to develop techniques consistent with his approach in 
order to explore both school children's and undergraduates' constructs or concepts in 
science. 
The constructivist view of knowledge as represented by Kelly's "Constructive Alternativ-
ism" suggests that people understand themselves and their surroundings by constructing 
tentative models which are evaluated in terms of their predictive power and control of 
events. This constructivist view of knowledge leads to the opinion that teachers should be 
concerned with the investigation of pupils' ideas, that children's viewpoints should play a 
role within the teaching/learning dialogue, and that pupils should be led to reflect upon their 
construction of the relevant aspects of reality. 
Although there is still some conceptual and methodological clarification needed in the 
identification of student concepts, what effect can these notions have on the pupils' 
acceptance of formal science? Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham (1982) suggest three ways 
in which students' frameworks may interact with classroom teaching. These are: 
i. The blank mind approach - where children readily and easily adopt the formal 
science they are taught (not a tenable position!) 
ii. The frameworks held are displaced by effective instruction. 
iii. The students' framework is resistant to change. 
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Data obtained from 'interview about instances' techniques (see chapter 3) suggests five 
possible outcomes from children's science reacting with school science. One of these 
outcomes is intermediate to those mentioned above, and is referred to as "the two-
perspective outcome", in which the teacher's science view is rejected as a personal model 
but the teacher's science may be learnt by rote. Posner and Hoagland (1981) suggests that 
students may compartmentalise their knowledge, "claiming that the problem is a physics 
problem and therefore does not have anything to do with the real world". (A similar incident 
occurred during the course of my own investigations when a sixth form pupil was asked 
whether the speed of an object would change travelling downhill. The reply given was "Oh, 
that's physics. I can't remember any of my physics now".) It is possible for pupils' 
knowledge to run parallel with school science knowledge without any dissonance. 
Driver and Erickson (1983) contend that the type of content or nature of the subject matter 
will affect the type of interaction that will take place between children's science and formal 
science. They suggest that topics such as heat, temperature and mechanics, which are areas 
where the pupil has access to much previous sensory information, will result in more stable 
frameworks, which will be more resistant to change. Pope (1982) believes that many 
students may be "turned off" science because of the perceived gap between the content of 
science lessons and their own world views. 
More recent discussion has focussed around particular curiculum development projects. 
Lawson(1989) views children's ideas as misconceptions and regards their failure to reason 
scientifically as a lack of logical reasoning ability. He adopts a Piagetian position and offers 
a method of change based on Piaget's theory of equilibration in his theory of science 
instruction. 
Driver (1989) takes a different view and believes that children's ideas are not misconcep-
tions but alternative conceptions. She believes that children construct their own knowledge, 
a view which is not at variance with Piaget. However, Driver rejects a Piagetian basis, but 
herself provides no alternative theoretical framework for promoting conceptual change. 
She believes children's own beliefs should be elicited prior to science instruction and so a 
process of "cognitive conflict" ensues during instruction. In this way the children are 
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encouraged to see the inadequate explanatory power of their own personal models and are 
encouraged to adopt a scientific perspective. Solomon (1989) however, comments on the 
Clisp project's way of promoting conceptual change: 
"It seems to be expensive of both time and spirit to try so hard to bolster up ideas by 
clarification and exchange only to knock them down by arranging subsequent conflict 
situations." 
diSessa (1988) argues against cognitive conflict as a way of changing children's intuitive 
ideas . His view is that moving to a physicist's view of reality involves "building a new and 
deeper systematicity" which cannot be provoked by a pedagogical strategy of cognitive 
conflict. He proposes that this strategy is appropriate only if one believes that commonsense 
ideas are structured, so that subjects' intuitive ideas need to undergo a theoretical change 
which can be induced by confronting the intuitive theory with counter arguments. 
2.5 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PUPILS' KNOWLEDGE AND 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE? 
There is a large difference between commonsense notions and a scientific description of the 
world, so that the two need to be bridged. Before such a bridge can be constructed the 
differences between the pupils' knowledge and scientific knowledge need to be clearly 
understood. Some of these general differences are illustrated in table 2.1 and are discussed 
below. 
1. Differences in the construction of the knowledge 
Both scientific and commonsense knowledge are social constructions but the social group 
which constructs scientific knowledge is totally different from and works in a different 
manner than the ordinary community. Scientists decide on what sorts of theories will be 
accepted as scientific knowledge through the publication of articles, peer review and 
citation. It is Ziman (1978) who clearly defines this position. 
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"The goal of science is to achieve the maximum degree of consensuality. Ideally the general 
body of scientific knowledge should consist of facts and principles that are firmly 
established and accepted without serious doubt 	 The consensuality of such systems is 
tested by such strategies as the attempted confirmation of predictions or by the discovery 
of marginal phenomena that might prove inconsistent with accepted theories. It is important 
to realize that much of the research literature of science is intended theoretically - to 
persuade other scientists of the validity of a new hypotheseis or to shatter received 
opinion." 
Table 2.1: Differences between Scientific and Commonsense Reasoning 
SCIENCE COMMONSENSE 
1. Critical consensus Solidarity 
2. Explain in new terms Account for in current terms 
3. Deal with particular areas and 
well defined fields 
Everything 
4. Systematic criticism Ad hoc method 
Systematic 
methodology 
(bricolage) 
5. Prediction (general) Prediction (particular) 
6. Frozen, technical, precise Live, non technical, fluid 
language and definition language and definition 
7. Taught Picked up 
8. Understanding explicitly in 
terms of laws. 
Understanding tacit 
9. Causality is a relation between Causality is a chain of 
system variables actions of objects 
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2. Differences in terminology 
Driver, Guesne and Tiberghien (1985) suggest that children's science differs from scien-
tists' science in that young children are concerned with constructs which follow directly 
from everyday experience and are not concerned, like the scientists, with conceptions which 
have no physical reality, such as potential energy. Thus science introduces novel technical 
terms, where commonsense uses old and familiar terms, to explain the world. 
3. Science deals only with knowledge within a well defined area 
The process of science is to study a particular phenomenon which has definite properties 
which can be isolated, reproduced in time and space and whose behaviour can be predicted. 
Predictions in science are described in terms of experimental laws and theories. Because 
they aim at exactness, and generalising, scientific accounts are highly restricted in their 
application. By contrast, commonsense is satisfied with rougher, adaptable rules of thumb, 
so as to deal with a wide range of phenomena. 
4. Differences in methodology 
Commonsense is not so systematically and rigorously tested as is formal science. Cohen 
and Manion (1985) suggest that the layman bases ideas on haphazard events and uses them 
in a loose uncritical manner ... "When he is requested to test them he does so in a selective 
manner, often choosing only that evidence that is consistent with his hunches and ignoring 
that which is counter to them". They hold that the scientist however constructs theories 
carefully and systematically. 
5. Science predictions are more general in nature 
Science sacrifices 'experiential' descriptions for the sake of abstract universality. While 
children focus on limited aspects of given structures and as Driver et al (1985) assert, 
interpret phenomena in terms of absolute properties or qualities ascribed to objects rather 
than in terms of interactions between elements of a system. For example, some children 
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chose an iron container to keep ice cold for as long as possible because of the specific 
properties of iron (e.g. it is a solid, or it is naturally cold): they tended not to think about the 
problem in terms of the interaction between the ice and the container and the ambient air. 
6. Differences in language 
Cohen (1978) suggests there is a difference in the use of language. In everyday usage, there 
is a vague diversity of meanings attached to given words, so that popular language is not well 
adapted for the purposes of rigorous reasoning. "It not only makes contradiction possible 
by the use of the same term to denote entirely different things on different occasions, but two 
perfectly compatible views may seem contradictory unless we have a specially developed 
language which enables us to make the proper distinctions between them and thus reconcile 
them." 
7. Taught versus picked up knowledge 
The idea that commonsense ideas are not taught in the sense of scientific notions is illustated 
by the prevalence of the same sorts of ideas found in children's thinking across wide ages 
and countries. 
Driver el al (1985) comment: 
"There are a number of ideas which are quite prevalent and influence children's thinking 
about a range of situations. One of these more dominant notions is the association made 
between the action of a force and resultant motion. Not only does this idea appear in 
pupils' interpretations of the motion of objects in their everyday world, but we have also 
seen evidence that the idea influences their thinking in other areas. In the case of fluids, for 
example, we have seen how pupils tend to consider pressure in one direction only - the 
direction in which some 'action ' is applied. Problems pupils have in appreciating the 
intrinsic motion of particles may also stem from their belief that motion requires a force to 
maintain it." 
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8. Explicit versus tacit knowledge 
Both commonsense reasoning and scientific understanding is active in nature. Both types 
are concerned with a choice between different courses which are open to an individual to 
obtain a predicted and desired result. One of the characteristics of living things is that their 
actions are directed towards the future but with commonsense all this is hidden in the process 
of life but becomes plain and explicit in the pursuit of scientific laws. 
9. Differences in use of causality 
The layman's concern with such relationships is loose, unsystematic and uncontrolled. The 
chance occurence of two events in close proximity is sufficient to evoke a causal link 
between them. Science however drops the popular notion of cause and effect in its effort to 
formulate abstract universal laws. It therefore seeks a mathematical formulation of 
invariant relations, from which the numerical results of measurement can be deduced. 
Driver et al (1985) suggests that commonsense thinking follows a linear causal sequence 
and cites the following example: 
".... in considering a container being heated, they think of the process in directional terms 
with a source supplying heat to a receptor; whereas, from a sicentific point of view, the 
situation is symmetrical with two systems interacting, one gaining energy the other losing 
it. In mechanics, as we have seen, pupils tend to think of a force, or action, producing an 
effect such as motion; the reciprocal nature of the forces acting (i.e. Newton's third law) is 
not easy to appreciate from this perspective since it requires pupils to abandon this 
sequential way of thinking with its 'preferred' direction." 
Table 2.1 has summarised some of the differences between commonsense and scientific 
reasoning. It must be remembered however that commonsense forms the basis from which 
scientific reasoning develops. The interesting question is how commonsense notions 
develop? Ziman (1978) suggests:- 
36 
"The fundamental continuity and coherence between the sense of everyday reality acquired 
in childhood and the reality of the scientific world picture is not an illusion. Science uses 
the same mechanisms as in the growing child - sensori motor coordination of observation 
and experiment, pattern recognition and the mental transformation of images, communica-
tion with a world of 'others' and tests to select consensual conceptual schemes - not merely 
to implant this sense of reality into its practitioners but also as a means of acquiring uniquely 
faithful knowledge of the material domain. Despite numerous mistakes and misconcep-
tions, the child constructs a picture of his immediate world that is fundamentally reliable and 
worthy of belief. It is difficult to deny the same qualities - and possible defects - to the picture 
of a much wider world created by the larger social instrument of science." 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
To summarise, both children and scientists have ideas about how and why the world works 
and the actual meanings of scientific terms but the pupil's ideas and meaning can be quite 
different from those of the scientist. Hence the empirical data suggests that childrens ideas 
should be taken seriously in their own right and investigated more fully with a view to 
producing a new range of pedagogical strategies which would encourage conceptual 
change. 
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3. A REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN DYNAMICS 
There are three sections in this chapter. The Introduction describes the controversy 
surrounding the interpretation of commonsense ideas about motion. Then A Review of 
some Research in the Field of Dynamics gives a detailed account of selected work in the 
area, while the final section, Conclusions, summarises the various positions taken about the 
nature of the knowledge which contributes to a commonsense understanding of motion. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The common features of causes of motion, which is the focus of interest here, found by many 
studies employing different methodologies, seem to be that:- 
i. Motion needs a force to start it off and, 
ii. Motion stops when this force wears out, 
These ideas can be found in subjects' explanations of motion across a number of nationali-
ties and over a wide age range. It is also clear that these ideas are not easily changed by 
formal physics tuition (Viennot 1979a). 
Researchers however do not agree about how commonsense ideas about motion arise or 
should be understood, and consequently interpret their results in different ways (see chapter 
2). Five different investigations are considered below, to illustrate some of the current 
controversial issues in this field, particularly as to whether it is possible to look for some 
more general knowledge structure in everyday thinking about motion. 
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3.2 A REVIEW OF SOME RESEARCH IN THE FIELD OF DYNAMICS 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The five studies below are divided into three groups, according to the methodologies they 
use to probe subjects' understanding of motion. These are:- 
i. 	 paper and pencil questionnaires. 
ii. research on actions (student's actions rather than propositional knowledge is 
tested), and 
iii. 	 the interview about Instances technique, 
Different aged subjects with differing amounts of physics tuition were studied and these 
details together with the theoretical perspective of each piece of research are summarised 
in table 3.1. 
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1. 
PAPER 
AND 
PENCIL 
QUESTION-
NAIRES 
a.  
Paper and 
pencil 
questionnaire 
set in a 
traditional 
physics 
format. 
b.  
Questionnaire 
set to test 
understanding 
of every-
day motions. 
Table 3.1: A summary of major features of selected pieces of research in dynamics 
MAIN 	 TECHNIQUE THEORETICAL SUBJECT RESEARCHER 
RESEARCH 	 PERSPECTIVE TYPE 
METHOD 
Students 
spontaneous 
reasoning 
different 
to physicists 
and can be 
characterized 
in some way. 
Adopting a 
methodology 
which could look 
for evidence of a 
more general 
abstract 
coherent 
theory of 
commonsense 
thinking 
about motion. 
Late 	 Viennot 
secondary (1977) 
and 
under- 
graduate 
physics 
students. 
Secondary Vasconcelos 
school 	 (1987) 
pupils, 
Science and 
Arts 
Undergraduates 
and Biology 
and Physics 
G.C.E. 
students. 
2. 
RESEARCH 
ON ACTIONS 
a.  
Subjects 
interacted 
with a computer 
game called 
TARGET. 
They had to 
control the 
movement of a 
dynaturtle on 
the screen. 
b.  
Subjects asked 
to push and drop 
objects in order 
to hit certain 
targets. 
People have 
their own 
"Intuitive 
Physics" -
making use of 
psychological 
primitives to 
understand 
world. 
Subjects 
have a 
systematic 
intuitive theory 
of dynamics. 
11-12 year DiSessa 
olds and (1980) 
under- 
graduates. 
Under- McCloskey 
graduates. (1983) 
3. 
INTERVIEW 
ABOUT 
INSTANCES 
Pupils asked to 
talk about pictures 
of different pre-
selected concepts. 
All interviews 
taperecorded. 
Students concepts 
of force, gravity 
and friction are 
different to 
physicists as they 
construct their own 
ideas about physical 
reality. 
7-19 years Watts 
(1983) 
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3.2.2 Paper and Pencil questionnaires 
3.2.2.1 A Questionnaire study using standard physics examples 
A questionnaire study undertaken by Viennot, (1977) was designed to examine the intuitive 
aspects of students thinking about force, energy and motion and to describe and formulate 
that thinking in order to improve the teaching of dynamics. The questions were constructed 
to avoid dependence on mathematical skills and concerned the trajectories of balls and the 
oscillation of springs. They were only chosen after a preliminary exploratory phase when 
ideas for test items were collected from interviews and teaching experience. The test 
information was presented both diagrammatically and descriptively. Diagrams were drawn 
in a traditional physics manner with velocities and vectors clearly marked. The questions 
therefore had a similar flavour to those presented in a traditional academic physics test. 
The results showed a high frequency of similar responses among the large number of 
students tested, which were at variance with "expert"physicists' views. There was also little 
variation between samples of students tested. Viennot found that students used a small 
number of kinds of concept of force. She was able to describe them, and to propose a model 
for when they were used. 
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Table 3.2: Viennot's Model of spontaneous reasoning in dynamics summarising 
the properties of the "Force of Interaction" and the "Supply of Force" 
ENTER 
Nature of problem 	 No 
Is the motion directly 	 F(act) 
known as initial 
information? 
YES 
Nature of situation: 
Are (Fs) and 	 Yes 
EITHER 
	
Interaction 	 V in the 	 F(act) 
in a 	 Yes 	 same 
Galilean 	 direction 
frame? 	 or both 
zero? 
	
No F(s) 
`Driven 
Motion' 
	
Yes 
(acceleration 	 F(i) 
OR 
	
imposed 
externally)? 
OR 	 `Apparent 	 Yes 
motion'? 	 F = 0 
F(act) = Force of Interaction. F(s) = Supply of Force. F(i) = Inertial force 
The model as shown in Table 3.2 describes two types of Forces namely - the 'Force of 
interaction' and the 'Supply of Force'. Table 3.3 summarises the nature and property of 
these 'forces'. 
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Table 3.3: Different notions of "force" and the characteristics associated with them 
by students 
Typical 
Formulation 
Physical 
Nature 
Local- 
ization 
Model 
Force of 'Force acting Orientated Function of F(act)=ma 
interaction 
F(act) 
on the mass' (vector- 
ial?) 
position a=acceleration 
`Supply of 'The force of Mixed A property F(s) = av 
force the mass' scalar- of the 
F(s) vector. 
Force - 
whole 
motion: 
energy 
confu- 
sions 
spatio-
temporal 
delocaliza-
tion 
Inertial 'Inertial Orientated Occurs at F(i)=-ma(e) 
force force'; (vector- an instant: a(e)=exter- 
F(i) 'Inertial ial?) temporal nally 
reaction' localiza- 
tion 
imposed 
accelera- 
tion 
Viennot's model distinguishes between two types of 'force' as well as inertial force which 
are all concepts recruited to explain motion. 
1. Force of interaction 
Viennot describes the "force of interaction" in the following way "This notion is talked 
about as the force acting on ... [the mass] '. It is taken to be sufficient to explain motion when 
the force acts in the same direction as the one in which the motion occurs". This notion of 
force is applied when no intuitive data is presented in a problem concerning motion. 
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2. Supply of Force 
A"supply of force" is used to explain motion where there is no immediate visible cause, for 
example a ball flying through the air after it has left the thrower's hand. The cause has now 
passed into the moving body and students refer to 'the force of the mass'. Viennot concedes 
that with this motion it is not clear whether students actually think of a force per se or are 
imagining something closer to energy. She suggests, "This notion, part Vector and part 
Scalar, is reminiscent of the notion of 'impulse' in ordinary language and of 'impetus' in 
pre-Galilean dynamics". 
Viennot concluded that students use these different notions of force depending on the 
questions asked. What is interesting to note is the context dependent nature of the responses 
made by the students. The same effect has also been found by Larkin and Rief (1985) when 
they examined the differences between novice and expert physicists' responses to particular 
problem solving exercises. Although Viennot set out to describe students' spontaneous 
reasoning in dynamics, the design of the questionnaire was such that it could have persuaded 
the students to formulate their responses in school-like terms. Her model of student 
reasoning has a scientfic perspective. It does not necessarily capture the nature of 
spontaneous reasoning about "everyday" situations, despite the fact that she also proposed 
that the scheme used by students is widespread and self consistent. Viennot's work was one 
of the earliest studies in this field and has contributed to the recognition of the type of 
difficulties students experience when studying dynamics. Despite the importance of her 
systematic investigation into spontaneous reasoning and the production of a model of 
thinking about motion Viennot's work only points the way towards the building and testing 
of models of everyday conceptions about motion. 
3.2.2.2 Questionnaire probing subjects ideas about forces in 'everyday' type motions 
The second study to be discussed was developed in response to the diversity of results which 
had arisen from the previous research in dynamics. Vasconcelos' (1987) theoretical position 
was that students' intuitive or commonsense ideas are structured, and that these ideas can 
be elicited from students by means of a questionnaire if it is designed to probe their 
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understanding of ordinary motions. The situations chosen for the students to explain in 
terms of forces were kicking, jumping, falling, throwing and rolling movements. Students 
were also asked to describe the forces present when a number of objects were at rest. In 
this way she proposed to obtain a better understanding of students' "spontaneous 
reasoning" than previously achieved with Viennot's (1977) study. 
Vasconcelos conducted the survey with subjects from the secondary school age range 
through to undergraduate and postgraduate level. Some of these students had received 
formal physics tuition and so she was able to identify differences between students with and 
without physicsteaching. Vasconcelos described the ideas associated with forces in the 
following way:- 
"Impulsive forces are present when situations involving kicks or throws are presented. 
Once the motion has been started, there is a force along the direction of the motion. This 
idea is shown by a majority of pupils with no physics teaching and persists over some years 
of formal instruction. Pupils do not usually consider a downward force in the direction of 
gravity but this idea increases with the amount of Physics teaching. Forces of resistance 
are rarely mentioned by arts students, and even with formal physics tuition only frictional 
forces between masses are usually considered; air resistance is a force generally dis-
counted". 
Subjects were also asked to describe the forces associated with a number of objects at rest 
such as objects on the ground, on a table, on a sloping surface and hanging by a string. Forces 
of gravity and of support were neglected by subjects who had not received any recent Phys-
ics tuition. There was only a substantial increase in the use of forces of gravity and of 
support with physics undergraduates. In general, the students' view was that there was no 
force present at all for objects found at rest as opposed to the physics picture of the presence 
of two opposed forces. 
It appears that objects which are at rest and are supported do not need forces to maintain their 
position, and in addition ideas of resistance to motion (i.e. notions of friction) only start to 
appear after some physics tuition. Only then is gravity considered more frequently. 
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Vasconcelos' work has given more detailed information about the differences between a 
commonsense understanding of motion and that of the physicist's view of reality. Her study 
highlights the "co-existence of intuitive and 'acquired' (and `accepted') notions within 
school instruction" and suggests "that physics teaching, at least up to the end of its 
compulsory level, does not change students' previous notions very much". Vasconcelos 
study illustrates a need for further clarification of the nature and content of students' 
intuitive ideas about motion. 
3.2.3 The computer as a tool for assessing children's ideas in dynamics 
diSessa's (1981b, 1986) theoretical position is that people have their own "Intuitive 
Physics" which is learned from experience in the world. He wished to investigate these ideas 
through students' actions rather than probing their propositional knowledge, so one of his 
empirical studies (1981a) used a computer game called Target to test pupils ideas about 
moving objects. The students had to direct a `dynaturtle' (which obeyed Newton's Laws) 
to hit a target. Most of the students, aged between 11 and 12 years, had no formal physics 
training but had previously been given tuition in the computer language LOGO (four hours 
a week for eight weeks). The data diSessa collected were computer records of the games the 
children played, with extra notes containing their individual comments and details of any 
intervention made by the observer,throughout the games sessions. 
His main findings were that the subjects expected the dynaturtle to move in the direction it 
was last pushed. This is in keeping with other reported work that motions take place along 
the direction of the force. He called this the 'Aristotelian corner strategy' and found that 
students were very surprised and perplexed when it did not work, and were also reluctant 
to abandon the idea. He also reported that even M.I.T. freshmen, after a Physics course, had 
used the same strategy as the younger children. 
diSessa explained these results in terms of the nature of the physical world, where the effects 
of friction lead to behaviour which supports Aristotle's view and denies Newton's 
conceptions, so that intuitive and classroom physics are disconnected in the child's mind. 
He has more recently (1988) given a fuller account of this unconnected intuitive knowledge 
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about motion which he has described as a number of 'p-prims' (short for phenomenological 
primitives). Some of these are reproduced in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Table of p-prims as suggested by diSessa (1988) 
Name 	 Key Attribute 	 Prototypical Circumstance 
 
Ohm's Law 	 Agency (also 	 Pushing a box with variable 
"resistance") 	 effort on different surfaces 
Force as a mover 	 Violence 	 A throw 
Continuous force 	 Steady effort 	 A car engine propelling a car 
Dying away 	 Fading 	 Sound of a struck bell 
amplitude 
Dynamic balance 
	
Conflict 	 Equal and opposite competing forces 
 
Overcoming 	 "Success" 	 Greater force overcomes weaker 
 
diSessa suggests that these phenomenological primitives can be understood as simple 
abstractions from experience, which are felt to need no explanation. He argues against 
McCloskey's view that they possess a theory-like structure, see also (3.2.4). 
An interpretation of diSessa's p-prims is that they could be connected within a causal 
framework. He himself defines causality with his "Ohm's law" p-prim. This he declares 
to be the "most fundamental and pervasive p-prim" . (It is curious that he has adopted a 
scientific nomenclature for such a basic conceptual unit). Ohm's law consists of an agent 
exerting some effort to achieve a result through some resistance. The ingredients he has 
specified for this primitive describe a causal mechanism which resembles the experiential 
gestalt of causation as described by Andersson (discussed in section 6.1.1.2). 
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Two more p-prims which he calls "Force as a mover" and "continuous force" are regulated 
by "Ohm's Law". In my opinion, he uses these extra p-prims to make a distinction between 
two different types of effort. "Force as a mover" denotes an external source of effort as 
found in a throw, while the cause of "continuous force" is found from within the moving 
object itself e.g. a car engine propelling a car. It seems that these extra 'p-prims' fit within 
a causal framework where they distinguish agents of motion by the differences between the 
sources of force or effort they provide. 
His arguments about "dynamic balance" and "overcoming" involve students' ideas about 
gravity, and he recruits these particular primitives to explain falling. With "dynamic 
balance" the student assesses which of the forces is the stronger. One force is in the upward 
direction, in the case of a ball thrown into the air, while the second force acting on the ball, 
in the downward direction, ie gravity. When gravity is perceived as the stronger force, the 
ball falls to the ground. This type of reasoning implies that gravity is an agent of motion and 
that all movement must have some cause which is supplied by an agent. The primitive of 
dynamic balance therefore appears to be to do with the attribution of cause rather than 
another unconnected component of intuitive reasoning. 
3.2.4 Theories in action 
McCloskey's work (1983) led him to suspect that intuitive beliefs about motion play a role, 
not only in people's thinking about hypothetically moving objects, but also in their 
interaction with moving objects. These intuitive beliefs "appear to be grounded in a 
systematic intuitive theory of motion that is inconsistent with fundamental principles of 
Newtonian mechanics". In order to systematically investigate the relation between beliefs 
and actions McCloskey devised two types of tasks to see if intuitive ideas about motion 
might influence how high school and college students performed the tasks. 
One of the tasks was to investigate through actions intuitive beliefs about the motion of 
dropped objects. The other task was to investigate subjects' ideas about circular motion 
when they were asked to push a small object across a table so that it would pass through a 
90 degree segment of a circular ring planted on atable. (See Figures 3.1 and 3.2.) 
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Figure 3.1: McCloskey's Action Experiment with a dropped ball 
BALL DROPPED by a running person continues to move forward 
at the same speed as the runner. The forward motion combines with 
a steadily accelerating downward motion to produce a parabolic tra-
jectory (A). Intuitive beliefs about the motion of objects do not al-
ways correspood with physical reality. The author sad his colleagues 
asked college students where a ball would land if it were dropped bs 
a walking person. Only 45 percent of the students knew the hall would 
tray el forward as it fell. Forty-nine percent thought the ball would fall 
straight down and land directly under the point where it was released 
18k 6 percent thought the ball would move backward as it fell (C). 
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Figure 3.2: McCloskey's Action Experiments with circular motion 
CIRC1 . 1.AR 1 N1 	 IVS, according to the impetus theory, is impart- 
ed to all object when the object is moved in a circle. Hence the impe-
tus theory incorrectly predicts Mai a hall whirled at the end of a string 
w dl continoe to follow a cur) rd path if the string breaks. Actual!) the 
ball will nurse in a straight hoc aloog a tangent to its original circu- 
lar path. het...mono; at the instaot the string breaks. life)-one percent 
of the college strident, who were asked to draw the path of the 11.11 
:filer the string breaks sketched the path correctl) heir!. Thirt) per- 
cent, I 	 thought circular motion vs mild persist arid the path 
would he ,armed lirgrog '19 percent 1{310 other incocrerl tc.poli•es. 
SOS1E PEOPLE. INTERACT WITIII NIOVING OBJECTS as if the 
objects could be given circular impetus. A 90-degree segment of  
ring was painted on • table, and experintental subjects were given • 
small "puck" w ith • ball bearing that would citable it to roll smoothly 
scram the table. The subjects were asked to push the puck up to one 
edge of the ring segment and release it; the task was to snake the puck 
cross to the other side of the segment wittiest tosehiati earrai 
idea. Tweeley-live percent of the subjects trial the strallegy at the 
left: the) loosed the puck in ail arc, apparently in the mistaken belief 
that the object would continue to tray el in • curved path silt moved 
through the ring segment. The broken line, which represents the path 
of the puck after it was released, shows that this strategy invariably 
tailed. Sixty-seven percent of the subjects applied the correct strate-
gy that is shown at tin right: they aimed the peek ea se to take adrow 
tag. of Its etraleld-lies injeciery Ogee it was released. The rowel,- 
lag eight portant of the 11114414111 Med other aemeeeteadul sereectia• 
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In the first task undergraduate students were asked to walk across a room and while they 
were walking to drop a golf ball so that it would hit a target marked on the floor. Only 45% 
of the students acted as if they knew the ball would travel forward as it fell. 49% acted as 
if the ball would fall straight down and land immediately below its' point of release while 
6% acted as if the ball would move backwards as it fell. 
In Task 2, 25% of the subjects moved the puck in a curved path before releasing it, appearing 
to believe that it would continue to curve after release and so would follow the arc of the ring 
segment, and indeed were surprised when the puck failed to curve. 
McCloskey suggests that the undergraduates viewed circular motion as not being funda-
mentally different from motion in a straight line. Both forms of motion are generated by 
imparting the appropriate impetus to an object. However a pupil working with a Newtonian 
framework would realise that for an object to move in a circle, it must be acted on constantly 
by an outside force that tends to deflect the motion from linearity. 
McCloskey also asserts that his theoretical position can also account for the intuitive belief 
that a carried object falls straight to the ground, when it is dropped. He draws this conclusion 
from subjects explanations about why some objects do not automatically acquire impetus. 
Subjects said that objects only acquire impetus when they are pushed or thrown but not when 
they are carried. There is therefore no impetus to send an object forward when the carried 
state stops and so it just drops straight down to the ground. There is however an alternative 
interpretation for this belief. It could be assumed that there is only one force, namely gravity 
acting on a falling object, which acts only in the downward direction. This means that the 
belief that an object falls straight down to the ground without travelling forward at all could 
just be another example of people believing that an object travels in the direction of the force 
acting on it. Another interpretation is also possible, for this commonsense understanding of 
motion, which is that falling is simply caused by a lack of support. 
McCloskey's methodology is an important and useful contribution to our understanding of 
subjects' intuitive ideas in dynamics. He believes there is some structure to these intuitive 
notions. His studies suggest that students' errors are systematic, and he remarks that their 
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intuitive theory bears a striking resemblance to the pre-Newtonian theory of impetus (an 
idea previously proposed by Viennot). His technique has removed problems of mathemati-
cal manipulation, interpretation of graphical data and diagrams from the understanding of 
the problem. There are however difficulties in adopting an historical model to describe 
spontaneous reasoning in dynamics, in that the model does not account for all the different 
responses found in the literature. A fuller critique of the use of historical models is given 
in section 4.2.2. 
3.2.5 Employing an Interview about Instances technique 
Another set of studies set out to investigate the differences between the ideas students have 
from those of the physicist, about certain concepts such as force, gravity and friction. 
Osborne and Gilbert (1979) and Watts (1983), developed their own methodology, the 
Interview-About-Instances technique, to probe students' everyday conceptions about 
motion. Their technique consisted of tape-recorded discussions with pupils using a series 
of picture-cards each of which depicted a one-word concept which the researcher wished 
to investigate. 
The following questions were used in conjunction with the pictures to gain insight into the 
children's conceptions. 
"Do the situations represent examples of your concept of force?". 
"Why do you say there is a force here?". 
"What would your example of force be?". 
In order to discover what pupils everyday knowledge was like, secondary school pupils with 
no physics tuition or very little formal physics teaching were chosen. The analysis attempted 
to interpret what the students understood about a particular word concept. It was found that 
the language that the chicken used to describe these concepts was not that of the physicist. 
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The children's ideas of force were applied more in an everyday sense, as illustrated by the 
following example of a man pushing a car which has broken down. Children explain that 
there is a force acting in this situation because the man 'is forcing the car'. Subjects adopted 
a human perspective when describing force, for example they saw no forces acting on a 
riderless bicycle. 
The researchers concluded that children have their own everyday meanings for Physics 
terms which are acquired before any Physics teaching, and that these meanings vary and 
can be contradictory. Although Watts sees these results as children's individual attempts 
to make sense of the world, he also identifies a number of common ideas. With respect to 
the notion of Force, Watts (1983) identified eight different alternative frameworks which 
can be summarised as the following three ideas: 
a. Constant motion requires a constant force (similar to diSessa's p-prim 'force as a 
mover'). 
b. The amount of motion is proportional to the amount of force. (Similar to diSessa's 
p-prim called 'Ohm's Law'). 
c. Forces are to do with living things. 
A number of meanings of gravity were also reported, including:- 
i. A force which requires a medium to act through (usually the air). 
ii. Gravity is different from weight. 
iii. Gravity is the result of the air pushing down. 
iv. Gravity increases or decreases with height. 
One of the problems with this technique, identified by Osborne and Gilbert themselves, is 
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the difficulty of selecting a representative set of examples for each concept. The principal 
question is: How many pictures of different actions are needed to sufficiently explore the 
boundaries of each concept? It is more likely that older subjects will be able to generalise 
about the essential qualities of each concept and will need to discuss fewer examples, while 
younger children could well focus on irrelevant details. Gilbert and Watts tried to overcome 
the last problem by presenting the children with very simple matchstick drawings, free 
of any extraneous detail. 
The studies using the Interview about Instances technique tried to capture the essence of 
certain concepts connected with motion but were not trying to see how these ideas were 
connected to each other. The results of the studies give us some characteristics of forces 
which do not contradict other evidence but this does not help us to see a pattern of reasoning 
beyond the given explanations. One interesting idea is that for younger students the notion 
of force is connected with living things. This raises the question of the connection between 
animacy and motion, and whether such a connection is only found with young children. 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Researchers agree that students have their own ideas about how and why things move, which 
are different from a physicist's view of reality. However there are differences of opinion 
about how these alternative ideas should be described. Viennot does not believe that spon-
taneous reasoning in dynamics is similar to a scientific account of reality. She does propose 
however that this type of reasoning is structured in a similar way to a scientific 
understanding of motion and indeed characterises spontaneous reasoning in the form of 
"scientific laws". 
Vasconcelos does not share Viennot's opinion and proposed that a deeper understanding of 
students' ideas about motion could be achieved if these ideas were not formalised in 
scientific terms. McCloskey compares everyday ideas to those found in history and uses the 
Impetus Model as an explanation of the nature and structure of everyday ideas about motion. 
He does nevertheless agree with Vasconcelos and Viennot that commonsense explanations 
have some theoretical structure. 
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diSessa argues the case for phenomenological primitives to explain motion, while Watts 
stresses the importance of ordinary language in his description of childrens' conceptions. 
These positions are all reflected in the methodologies chosen to investigate everyday 
understandings of motion. Fundamental assumptions about the nature of this knowledge are 
also made by the researchers when interpreting their results. These can be listed as follows:- 
1. The ideas are learned from experience (Watts). 
2. The ideas are consistent and can be structured and described as a model or a 
theory (McCloskey). 
3. Commonsense notions are not structured but people construct an understanding by 
making spontaneous and shifting parallels among phenomenological primitives 
(diSessa). 
4. Viennot offers no fundamental explanation but suggests that the knowledge used 
depends on the types of questions asked and is therefore context dependent. 
5. Vasconcelos supports the view that commonsense knowledge is highly structured, 
but does not hold that it can be adequately explained by a historical model. She 
takes a more psychological view point arguing that "ever present" forces such as 
gravity and friction are taken for granted and are not needed to explain everyday 
motions. 
It is difficult to see how to empirically test the relative merits of each of these positions. The 
following chapter argues for the construction of commonsense models of thinking about 
motion, which are open to test, to answer more specific questions about the nature and 
content of a commonsense understanding of motion. 
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4. THE NEED FOR MODELS OF THINKING ABOUT DYNAMICS 
This chapter is in five sections. The Introduction poses questions about what would be 
involved in building and testing models of a commonsense understanding of motion. The 
second section Previous characterisations of commonsense ideas explains how these 
ideas have previously been described and the questions which such classifications raise. 
The third part, The need for a closer look at the nature of mental representations in 
dynamics suggests that investigation of models of thinking in dynamics might lead to the 
testing of the hypothesis that pupils' conceptions represent systematic mental structures. 
The fourth section, Building a Model of Thinking in Dynamics looks at Ogborn's model 
of commonsense ideas about motion while the final section Testing the model explains why 
this theoretical account is a good candidate for further examination and so why it provides 
the main focus of investigation for this thesis. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are a variety of questions which need to be distinguished, in order to consider what 
would be involved in proposing or testing a "model" of thinking about motion. 
The first level of discussion concerns the nature of knowledge about motion itself and is 
focused around the following questions:- 
1. 	 a. Is a commonsense understanding of motion structured and internally 
consistent? If so- 
b. What would be the units or primitives of such a structure? 
c. What holds the pieces of the structure together? and, 
d. How do such commonsense ideas develop? 
A second level raises questions of a more general nature. 
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	2. a. 
	 Are there more generalised thinking schemes at the root of such models? If so:- 
b. What would these general schemes look like? 
c. Do they provide any clues about the construction of an ontology of 
commonsense? and, 
d. What sort of information could be obtained about the strength and stability 
of students' beliefs from testing such models? 
Although some of the above problems have been discussed in the past, the different answers 
that have been given have remained at the level of opinion or pre-supposition. One line of 
advance would be to propose and test a model of thinking about commonsense ideas of 
motion. Such a model has been suggested by Ogborn which, unlike much previous work, 
is susceptible to testing. 
4.2 PREVIOUS CHARACTERISATIONS OF COMMONSENSE IDEAS 
4.2.1 Children's ideas are non-Newtonian in nature 
Some research findings (Clement 1982 and White 1984) suggest that there are two major 
differences between Newton's model of reality and a commonsense understanding of 
motion. 
1. Children expect motion to take place in the direction of the force and, 
2. Frictional forces are not taken into account in a commonsense understanding of motion. 
The purpose of this discussion is not to comment upon these ideas in detail (see Chapter 3) 
but is to illustrate the limitations this type of characterisation of children's intuitive thinking 
about motion. Classifying children's ideas as non-Newtonian only illustrates some of the 
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differences between a commonsense understanding of motion and a scientific model. It 
does not give an account of all the empirical data or of how these commonsense ideas could 
have arisen. It does not attempt to answer questions about:- 
1. the nature of this commonsense knowledge, 
2. how we start to understand a world of still and moving objects or, 
3. how this commonsense knowledge could be investigated further. 
4.2.2 The use of Historical models to describe commonsense reasoning 
In order to make sense of the large amount of empirical data collected about children's ideas 
in dynamics, some researchers have adopted the use of historical models to try and capture 
more of its flavour. The type of "misconceptions" found in student thinking have been 
compared by Clement (1982) to ideas discussed by Galileo, while Champagne (1983) has 
suggested that the learners' ideas are more Aristotelian in nature, as have Driver and Easley 
(1978). Saltiel and Viennot (1984) have compared subjects' understanding to the impetus 
theory, a view also adopted by McCloskey (1983) and Sjoberg and Lie (1981). 
i. The Aristotelian model 
What sort of evidence has contributed to the classification of pupils ideas as Aristotelian? 
One would expect to find a number of Aristotle's postulates present in children's explana-
tions of motion, but researchers have mainly drawn on the presence of two notions as 
sufficient reason to describe the thinking as Arisototelian. These two ideas are:- 
a. Motion needs a force and 
b. Motion takes place in the direction of the applied force. 
(The elicitation of these notions has been described in chapter 3). 
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Any more complete comparison of children's ideas with Aristotelian thinking, however, 
presents problems. The latter is far more sophisticated than children's intuitive understand-
ing of motion, and not all the elements of the theory are found in subjects' explanations. 
Aristotle's kinematics utilises Euclidian geometry to provide an abstraction of the space in 
which motion takes place. Motion is analysed using notions of space (position and change 
of position) and time. Wartofsky (1968) comments upon Aristotle's abstraction of the 
exertion or force of motion in the following way. 
"By delimiting itself to position and change of position, the geometric-kinematic descrip-
tion eliminates also all reference to the effort of motion,all the experience of exertion or 
direction. It retains them only by introducing another mathematization of experience, in the 
arithmetic concept of time, as itself constituted of identical units, in additive sequence, such 
that two are twice as long as one, and four twice as "long" as two". 
In my opinion Aristotle's theory does not have the strong place for force (effort) attributed 
to it by those who compare children's reasoning to it. Aristotle, in his theory, also described 
the nature or form of objects and suggested that all things tend to maintain themselves in 
a state which is in accordance with their form. Aristotle however recognises that objects can 
be moved from their natural position, these types of movements then being conceived of as 
`violent' motions. This idea can be illustrated by considering the example of a rock thrown 
into the air. Its initial ascent is caused by a violent motion but once the force of displace-
ment stops then natural motion takes over. This can be described as the force which returns 
the rock to its natural condition of rest. There is no strong agreement in the literature that 
children are reasoning in terms of natural motions which return objects to a state of rest. 
ii. The Impetus model 
One of the problems with comparing children's ideas with impetus theories is to know 
which version of Impetus theory to use. Saltiel and Viennot (1985) question the utility of 
the comparison made between historical models and commonsense ideas, firstly because 
the models do not account for all the different responses found in the literature and 
secondly, because a better understanding of children's ideas has not been achieved using 
this type of account. 
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An important issue is raised however, by comparing commonsense ideas to past scientific 
models. Can a commonsense understanding of motion be described as a structured entity? 
McCloskey (1983), who has favoured the use of Impetus theory to describe a naive 
understanding of motion, takes a strong position about the structured nature of this 
knowledge. 
"We show that ... people develop on the basis of their everyday experience remarkably well-
articulated naive theories of motion. Further we argue that the assumptions of the naive 
theories are quite consistent across individuals. In fact, the theories developed by different 
individuals are best described as different forms of the same basic theory". 
4.2.3 A-historical view 
diSessa (1988) argues against McCloskey's use of the Impetus model to describe "intuitive 
physics". He believes it to be a misleading representation, and that "intuitive physics" is a 
fragmented collection of ideas, with none of the commitment or systematicity that one 
attributes to theories in the history of science or in professional practice. 
In my opinion, commonsense reasoning about motion is not as disconnected as diSessa 
proposes because:- 
i. there could well be a causal structure underlying diSessa's phenomenological 
primitives as argued in section 3.2.3, and 
ii. thinking about causes of motion has provided a first step towards formalizing a 
commonsense model of motion (see Chapter 6). 
4.3 THE NEED FOR A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NATURE OF MENTAL 
REPRESENTATIONS IN DYNAMICS 
Both Guidoni (1985) and Hewson (1985) have taken the case of dynamics to raise issues 
about the nature of more generalised thinking schemes. Although both were concerned with 
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the problem of promoting conceptual change in students' thinking they express very dif-
ferent views about the structure of commonsense knowledge. Guidoni supports diSessa's 
position, believing that the backbone of natural thinking is made up of such prototypes as: 
i. A spring. 
ii. Falling. 
iii. A trigger. 
Guidoni's ideas make more explicit than does diSessa how reasoning with prototypes could 
be involved in conceptual change. He suggests that these prototypes "have the task of 
stabilizing and making coherent our cognitive approach or to (way-of-looking-at) a given 
context". He also compares thinking with prototypes to analogical reasoning. 
Hewson, on the other hand, argues that before a person is prepared to trust, react to or depend 
on knowledge, the knowledge must meet certain criteria. He suggests that these are:- 
1. Internal consistency. 
2. Generalizability. 
Hewson comments upon the fact that in the area of dynamics people do not spontaneously 
generalize from experience to a Newtonion view and for him the interesting question is 
whether this is due to a failure to generalize or to some other cause. He proposes that it is 
through the construction and testing of models of thinking that these types of questions can 
be answered. 
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4.4 BUILDING A MODEL OF THINKING IN DYNAMICS 
4.4.1 What is a model? 
What features should a model of thinking contain? How is a model different from a number 
of descriptive generalisations chosen to represent the empirical data? The strength of a 
model or theory lies not just in its ability to describe knowledge in a certain domain but in 
its ability to illustrate the way in which that knowledge is arranged. An important 
methodological advantage of building a model is that it is open to test. The essential 
preliminary questions are:- 
1. What elements can be used to describe the knowledge? 
2. What is to be meant by the arrangement of the knowledge? 
4.4.2 Models of commonsense understanding of motion 
It is not surprising that there are not many models of "everyday" thinking in dynamics which 
are available for testing. There is however another discipline, apart from science education, 
which has been interested in how things move in an "everyday" sense, namely Artificial 
Intelligence. It was the influence of Hayes Naive Physics Manifesto (1979) which led to 
the development of Ogborn's (1985) theory of commonsense understanding of motion. 
These two models are described below. 
4.4.2.1 Hayes' ideas about "everyday knowledge" of motion 
Hayes wished to devise a computer program which could reason about the world in a natural 
way and chose to attempt to construct a formalisation of "everyday knowledge" in the 
physical world. Hayes suggested that many of our intuitive ideas about motion are derived 
from what it feels like when we move things for ourselves; including such activities as 
pushing, pulling, lifting, etc. 
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The elements he used to describe motion were the five ways in which motion could be 
initiated. These were:- 
i. Falling 
ii. Pulling or pushing 
iii. Moving by itself 
iv. Sliding 
v. Rolling 
He also made a distinction between movement that requires effort such as throwing a ball, 
and events which do not require effort and can just happen, such as an object falling. 
Hayes used mainly predicate logic, in a computable form, for his formalisation. He selected 
two distinct ways of describing motion. These were by:- 
a. Displacement, where there is a change in position of the object, and 
b. Trajection, where the object follows a pre-determined path. 
4.4.2.2 A synopsis of Ogborn's sketch for a model of commonsense ideas about motion 
Ogborn (1985) drew on and added to Hayes's ideas. The theory set out to explain why 
particular conceptions of motion arise rather than others in our everyday understanding of 
motion. It is proposed (following Piaget) that the origins of these ideas could have been 
unconsciously achieved before the development of language and are derived from internal-
ised action schemes. 
In this first formulation of the theory there were four basic concepts used to describe motion. 
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Two of these related terms are support and falling. Falling is considered as a natural 
motion, since a cause is not required for it to continue. A support needs strength or effort 
(or both). The ground is the ultimate support and cannot break, whereas water or air can 
provide partial support. 
The model also suggests that movement is conceptualised as taking place either on the 
ground or in the air above the ground, since all objects need some type of support unless they 
are falling. It suggests also that motions which travel in the vertical direction should be 
distinguished from those along the horizontal direction. 
The two other basic concepts are change of place and path. The kinds of motion which can 
be distinguished by change of place are objects which are passed or pushed such as a plate 
or a pram while objects which are moving alone (such as a ball thrown in the air) can be 
located by their path and not the place where they happen to be at any instant. 
The model proposes that the world is viewed filled with stationary objects which require a 
force to set them in motion, all motion apart from falling requiring effort. Perpetual motion 
is not possible because these forces eventually wear away or run out. 
Since falling is seen as a natural motion, gravity is not considered as part of the basic theory 
but as a later refinement which is incorporated into the basic scheme as a rationalisation of 
free fall. A "law" of falling states "that having started to fall, things fall more rapidly the 
higher up and the heavier they are". 
Motions can be distinguished by their source of effort. Three possible sources are postulated 
by the theory:- 
i. Effort of another agent on the object 
ii. Effort generated by the object 
iii. Effort of the present motion of the object. 
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The structure of the model generates some interesting points about the nature and content 
of such models. At this stage the model is still in a generalised descriptive form. It is not as 
yet formalised, so the arrangement and relationship of the primitive elements is not totally 
clear. However motions can be determined from the type of support and effort that initiate 
them. One important objection to the model as it appears in this form (other versions are 
described in sections 6.2.1 and 12.3) is that it only describes the motion of single objects 
moving alone or together, which is more reminiscent of a Newtonian description of motion 
rather than a commonsense one, where objects are often found together and form part of one 
another. The model also neglects to mention the role of stopping forces, such as impacts, 
in a commonsense undertanding of how motion ceases. 
4.4.2.3 Discussion of the model 
Are there any other features from everyday experience that need to be considered? A list 
of logical opposites spring to mind:- 
i. Up and down 
ii. To and from 
iii. Fast and slow. 
Should the model have something more to say about these notions? Are they distinctions 
which should be included and would be found if the model was subjected to empirical test? 
Although the model states that ideas about motion are formed from early actions, this 
mechanism is not made explicit. The model also fails to mention any distinction between 
movements of animate and inanimate things. Piaget suggests that the young child's world 
is full of living forces and that movement is conceived in terms of "life and will, activity and 
spontaneity". 
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Piaget concluded that:- 
1. Young children confine the use of force to bodies that move by themselves. 
2. Force is described as activity/motion in general but is particularly associated with 
useful activity. 
3. Force arises out of the actions of carrying and being carried. 
4. The notion "strong" indicates a capacity for movement. 
Finally, should such a model have something to say about the role of language? As 
Wartofsky (1968) suggests: "Our culturally inherited ways of talking about motion form 
part of that complex of perceiving and judging which shapes our experience to our thought 
as much as it exhibits the way in which our thought has been shaped by our experience". It 
is only through testing the model that the issues raised above about the structure and content 
of a commonsense understanding of motion can be addressed. 
4.5 TESTING THE MODEL 
Ogborn's selection of the specific primitives of SUPPORT, EFFORT, PLACE and PATH, 
exposes the model to test. These primitives should be found at the root of many explanations 
and justifications of motion and should appear relatively independently of context, if the 
model is generalizable and internally consistent. 
The model not only makes predictions about the causes of motion but also predicts which 
types of motions are reasonable and possible and distinguishes these from crazy or 
impossible movements. Comic strip characters for example can run off a cliff top and 
continue to run in mid air before they eventually fall to the ground. This is an impossible 
action in real life because, as the model suggests, as soon as an object loses its support it 
falls to the ground. However, the cartoon joke works because the model sees birds as 
providing support through their own effort and there is the possibility that running in mid- 
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air might provide enough support for the man but in fact this method of support does not 
work and the man falls to the ground. 
The theoretical account provides a good general framework with which to examine 
commonsense ideas about motion. It allows a number of reasonably sharply posed 
questions to be asked about the content of the model and about the methodology which 
could be used to test the model. 
la. Are these the right primitives for a model of this nature? 
The model gives different motions similar explanations, for example running is 
similar to flying in that they both use internal effort. Do people view these 
motions in this way? 
lb. Are there other terms which are not mentioned by the model such as animacy, 
speed and types of stopping forces? 
lc. Will such commonsense explanations be found across a wide age range of 
subjects? 
2a. What sort of exploratory tool could be used to discover responses not anticipated 
by the model? 
2b. The model's primitives form part of a tacit understanding. What is the best way to 
probe such tacit knowledge? 
2c. Since the model is about understanding motion in a commonsense way then 
everyday type motions should be used for any investigatory study. In what form 
should these motions be presented to the subjects? 
An interview approach suggests itself as a first step towards answering the above questions. 
Since an apriori theoretical position is being tested the questioner should have a clear idea 
of the questions to ask and of how to phrase them, but this format also allows enough 
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flexibility for some questions to be determined by the subjects' answers. In this way 
provision is made for the subject to give unexpected answers, and further questioning can 
proceed to expose areas of thinking unanticipated by the model. 
A preliminary testing of the model ought then to try to answer the following questions. 
1. Are the main primitives of the model present in subjects' explanations of motion? 
2. Are there any important pieces of the model missing? 
3. Do the ideas predicted by the model appear across a wide age range of subjects? 
Two different methods were used in the preliminary testing of the model. These were - 
1. An interview and 
2. A repertory grid study. 
The use of these two methods is discussed in chapter 5. The results of the investigations 
allow one to address the questions raised above. The importance of this type of empirical 
data is that it is derived from the testing of a strong theoretical position: 
"One goal of all theory construction (and its testing) 
is the discovery of the deeper reality underlying appearance". 
(Carey 1985) 
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5. PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL WORK ON STUDYING 
A COMMONSENSE MODEL 
This chapter is in four sections. The Introduction describes reasons for choosing two 
different methodologies for the preliminary testing of a commonsense model of dynamics. 
The second section, Investigating a commonsense model of motion with 11 - 14 year olds 
with an interview study, not only gives an account of the results obtained from this study 
but also comments upon the usefulness of the methodology. The third part, Investigating 
a commonsense model of motion using a repertory grid technique, discusses the 
repertory grid technique and its contribution to the testing of children's commonsense 
understandings of dynamics. The final section, Comparison of Repertory Grids and 
interview techniques to study commonsense understanding of dynamics, contrasts the 
two methodologies as tools for probing tacit knowledge. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter argued for the need for models of thinking in dynamics and discussed 
Ogborn's proposal (1985) for "understanding students' understandings of motion". This 
chapter reports pilot work on testing this proposal with two different methodologies to see:- 
1. How well the theoretical position survived the testing. 
2. Whether there are areas of children's thinking about motion which have not been 
addressed by the model. 
The first pilot study used a clinical interview technique with a small group of 11 - 14 year 
olds. It follows from a previous investigation undertaken with a group of 14-18 year olds 
(Whitelock 1985), and the present findings are compared with this study, later in the 
chapter. This methodology was originally developed by Bliss (1984). The approach 
adopted was to conduct a number of individual interviews focused around a series of events 
illustrated in children's comics. These were chosen because they provided pictures which 
enabled the subjects to discuss "taken for granted" notions about every day movement. 
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A second group of interviews with 11 - 14 year olds was undertaken because it was 
considered important to talk to a number of younger children who had studied very little 
physics. This additional data would then provide a more complete picture of pupils' naive 
notions about dynamics in the secondary school age range. It would therefore be possible 
by comparing the results from the two age groups to see if commonsense understanding of 
motion changes with school science teaching and to identify any ideas which are more 
permanent than others. 
The second empirical study reported here was conducted to experiment with a repertory 
grid technique, to see how well it could be used to investigate ideas about motion, 
particularly because it might allow a more systematic and extensive testing of the model. 
5.2 INVESTIGATING A COMMONSENSE MODEL OF MOTION WITH 11-14 
YEAR OLDS WITH AN INTERVIEW STUDY 
5.2.1 Description of pupils interviewed 
A small number of in depth interviews were carried out with a group of 11 - 14 year old pupils 
who had experienced different types of science instruction. The first and second year pupils 
were following a combined science course consisting of five lessons per week while the 
third year pupils attended separate Physics, Chemistry and Biology classes. (A total of six 
lessons per week). See Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1: Description of science courses studied by the pupils who were interviewed 
AGE NAME OF PUPIL AND SCIENCE COURSE FOLLOWED 
11-12 years S.P. 
H.M 
First year Combined Science 
12-13 years K.D. 
A.W. 
Second year Combined 
Science 
13-14 years 
M.L. 
D.J. 
Separate Biology,Chemistry and Physics courses 
followed (All compulsory) 
5.2.2 Methodology 
The subjects were given four differerent comic strips taken from the following popular 
comics - The Beano, Beezer, Dandy and Topper. The interview material, i.e. the comics, was 
selected because characters from comic strips can be involved in a lot of action which is 
often fantastic or ridiculous and the movements illustrated are often parodies of more natural 
actions. In this way it was possible to test ideas expressed in the model without teaching 
them or suggesting any terms of the model itself. In addition, since comics are read by many 
younger children, their characters need very little introduction and are remembered by older 
pupils and even adults. The strips chosen described the adventures of the cartoon characters 
- Beryl the Peril, Ginger, Fred the Flop and Plug. (Copies to be found in appendix I). These 
characters were selected because their activities displayed a large number of different types 
of movement per cartoon strip. 
The subjects were first asked to describe what was happening in each of the comic strips 
and then questioned about the feasibility of the actions of these cartoon characters in real 
life. They were also required to elaborate upon their explanations; for example, when a pupil 
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suggested that an object would need more force to move it in the way depicted in the comic 
strip, he/she was requested to tell the interviewer more about the force mentioned. 
5.2.3 Results 
Analysis of transcripts 
All the interviews were tape recorded and the subsequent transcriptions were analysed by 
noting the frequency of responses described by an apriori category system as previously 
used by Whitelock (1985). This category system was constructed to see if the main 
premises described by the model were used by subjects in their everyday explanations of 
motion. It was designed to see what sorts of ideas about the effort or force required for 
motion were actually used by the children. Did they utilize the notion of place and path of 
motion in their explanations? Were ideas about support and falling used systematically and 
was gravity omitted from such explanations? Other ideas not included in the model such 
as the nature of materials, stopping motions and the notion of intention were also included 
in the category system to see if they would be offered as explanation of everyday movement. 
The analysis was therefore devised to check the completeness and correctness of the 
theoretical model. 
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Table 5.2: Frequency of anticipated responses found in each category/comic strip 
The frequency of anticipated responses found in each category/comic strip is illustrated by 
table 5.2. By anticipated responses are meant those which fitted the category system. 
CATEGORY 	 FREQUENCY OF CATEGORY 
(FOUND IN COMIC STRIPS) 
Comic 
Strip 
Fred 
Comic 
Strip 
Plug 
Comic 
Strip 
Beryl 
Total 
Frequency 
2 
2 
5 
3 
2 
5 
5 
9 
9 
1 5 12 
1 17 2 35 
3 11 
2 
2 
2 1 9 
3 2 T 24 
0 
1 3 
1 1 1 6 
2 4 13 
I 1 6 13 
7 1 20 
0 
6 
6 7 1 26 
4 4 
1 3 
2 8 
a 6 2 5 15 
0 2 0 3 
8 4 5 17 
10 1 2 18 
18 5 7 35 
Comic 
Strip 
Ginger 
1. SUPPORT & FALLING 
a. General notion of support 	 3 
b. Strength of support 	 3 
c. Partial support (air) 	 2 
d. Falling (loss ofsupport) 	 1 
e. Things fall faster the higher 	 6 
up they are or the heavier they are 
TOTAL 	 15 
2. MOTION 
a. Requires effort (if no gravity) 	 8 
b. Place 	 2 
c. Path 	 2 
d. Effort needed larger - 
	 6 
the larger the object etc. 
TOTAL 	 18 
3. FORCES 
a. Force as energy 
b. Force as effort 	 2 
c. Force creates motion 	 3 
d. Force used up in keeping 	 7 
things going 
TOTAL 	 12 
4. GRAVITY 
a. Force pulling down 	 12 
b. Used up in keeping things down 
	 0 
c. Gravity makes thingsgo farther 	 6 
and makes speed falling 
TOTAL 	 18 
5. STOPPING MOTION 
a. Impact stops motion 
b. Running out ofenergy /force 	 2 
c. Impact can hurt 	 6 
d. Friction can stop or hinder motion 
TOTAL 	 8 
6. NOTION OF INTENTION 
1 
7. MATERIALS 
a. Strength 	 5 
b. Type/Name ofsubstance from 	 5 
which the material is made 
TOTAL 	 10 
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5.2.4 Were the major components of the model present as judged from the 
number of anticipated responses recorded from the pupil interviews? 
The major components of a commonsense understanding of motion were present in the pupil 
responses. They perceived falling as a motion which occurred through lack of support. The 
support needed to be strong and made of the correct material otherwise it would break and 
the object it was supporting would fall. Some subjects emphasised the fact that adequate 
support needed to be beneath an object, as with brackets below shelves, more air under the 
wings of a bird and the need for air molecules to be stacked one on top of the other. Objects 
underneath provide support for those above but the question of the ultimate support 
remained unanswered. The theory proposes that the ground should be seen as the ultimate 
support (see 4.4.2.2). 
Subjects reasoned that lighter objects fall more slowly than heavier ones, but that the latter's 
descent can be slowed down if the air can be gathered together in some way to provide a 
support. Subjects used this type of explanation when describing the function of a parachute. 
However, when they were asked to explain what caused the parachute's eventual landing, 
if the air was keeping it up, they realised they had met a contradiction in their reasoning. 
Some pupils then suggested that during the descent the air had somehow left the parachute 
while others felt the air could not simultaneously exhibit the two properties of holding 
something up while also letting it fall and used the notion of gravity to explain the 
parachute's eventual landing. 
The model of commonsense ideas suggests that gravity is an optional extra to the core notion 
of falling which is described as a motion caused through a lack of support. Ideas about 
gravity should therefore be adjusted to fit in with the pupils' central expectations about 
falling. This study suggests that children do not need to explain falling in terms of gravity 
and agrees with the model's proposition that this notion is not a core concept of 
commonsense understanding. For example when explaining the descent of a person in a 
parachute Howard (11 years) explains that air is an important factor in preventing falling 
because with his way of thinking the air provides a source of support and only a lack of 
support is needed to cause falling. The notion of gravity is an unnecessary factor: 
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"Well if you want to go up you need to have the air, you have to capture the air to go up but 
if you're going down you have to sort of push it away". 
The subjects agreed that all other types of motion apart from falling required an effort of 
some sort. Terms like "force" and "effort" were often used interchangeably. Their 
explanations suggest that forces are needed to create and sustain motion but that these 
forces or effort have to "run out" or disappear for the motion to stop. This can occur with 
impacts which suddenly stop motion. However, some impacts can create more force and 
thus further motion as in re-bounding. The model also suggests that effort can be used to 
change the path of an object including stopping and starting it, while motion using the effort 
of the motion will have a path of predetermined shape. Both these ideas were expressed 
by the pupils during the course of the interviews. 
A persistent notion throughout the age range was that all motion apart from falling needed 
a force to start it. The 11 - 14 year olds experienced greater difficulty than the 14 - 18 year 
olds in describing the concept of "Force" as a generalised term which included ideas of effort 
and energy. They clearly stated that humans provided some source of "go" to make a ball 
move and that this "go" wore away as the motion progressed. They more readily used the 
idea of pressure to describe the push of things e.g. gravity pushes things down so it exerts 
a pressure. "I put pressure on the ball to make it move" etc. Pressure was used in a 
commonsense way and not applied in its scientific form. However the 11-14 year olds 
clearly expressed the idea that an increase in the speed of a motion will increase its force e.g. 
Fred had more chance of breaking down the door with his battering ram if he ran as fast as 
he could with it towards the door than if he walked with it. 
The two basic notions of support and falling were used by all the pupils. They agreed that 
objects need support and without support will fall. However,whether the ground is seen as 
the ultimate support has not been fully investigated. The pupils' responses seem to suggest 
that it is viewed as the only type of natural and non-problematic support. 
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5.2.5 How well can the model account for what each pupil said? 
Introduction 
This section focusses on the responses recorded from the pupil interviews which were 
unanticipated and could not be directly coded into the category system by the model and 
category scheme. As there is a problem of interpretation of children's responses in terms 
of the theoretical premises with these particular examples they are looked at in more detail 
not only to investigate the completeness of the model but to assess the appropriateness of 
this technique as a probe for testing a model of commonsense thinking. 
The following example illustrates the problem of interpretation of pupil responses. Stuart 
(11 years) confounds the notion of force and pressure. He says himself that it is a difficult 
concept to talk about. 
I. So hitting with pressure is important? 
P. Yes. 
I. Can you explain to me again what pressure is, I am not quite sure? 
P. It's like, well it's hard to explain isn't it, more than the normal pressure it's at be-
cause it's not really any pressure at all really. But if you get push against something 
hard that's pressurising it, putting pressure on it. 
The commonsense model uses the blanket term of EFFORT to describe the "go" of things 
unless they are falling and the analyst has to decide whether thepupil's explanations in terms 
of force or pressure are used in the same way as EFFORT in the theory or are being applied 
in some other sense. 
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Discussion of unanticipated responses 
i) Forces 
a) Heat as a lifting force 
The notion of energy is not used synonomously with the concept of force by the 11-14 year 
olds. However, Howard (11 years) does mention that heat provides a force - a pushing force. 
I. Yes. I mean just here on earth, if you want something to stay up in the air what do 
you have to do, can you do that? 
P. Make it lighter than air. 
I. Lighter than air. Is there anything lighter than air? 
P. Air balloons stay up with hot air in. 
I. Yes but are they lighter than air? 
P. Not really, no. 
I. So how do they work then? 
P. Well it must be the heat pushing them upwards. 
I. So what would the heat do? It must be something to do with the heat, but what does 
the heat do? 
P. Well heat goes upwards. 
This is an example which could not be coded in the category system, and is not mentioned 
by the commonsense model. 
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b. Increasing a force 
The original version of the commonsense model of motion said nothing about how a force 
can be increased. What intuitive ideas do pupils have about the factors which increase a 
force? 
Howard realised that if you increase the mass you can increase the force since heavier 
things dropped on a ceiling will bring the ceiling down. 
I. So anyway Dad gets really upset because she is being so naughty and she gets her 
pogo stick out and what does she do? 
P. She bounces along upstairs and makes a hole in the roof. 
I. Do you think that's feasible? 
P. No I don't think it would. 
I. Could she make the ceiling come down? 
P. Yes if she had a really heavy thing. 
This example illustrates an increase in heaviness associated with an increase of force and 
subjects also associate increase in speed with a bigger force. However, both variables are 
not used together. The chosen form of explanation appears to be context dependent and 
suggests the factor that is perceived to have the greatest influence in each situation. This 
raises the important question of how pupils decide what is important, and what sort of rule 
system they use. 
78 
ii) Gravity 
Gravity was used less frequently by the 11 - 14 year olds who had not received any formal 
science teaching about gravity and motion, than in the previous study with 14 -16 year olds, 
in keeping with the model's predictions. An interesting additional idea appeared about the 
usefulness of gravity. Subjects suggested that it keeps objects in place and in the upright 
position. Karoline explains: 
I. Can you imagine gravity in any way? 
P. I think a lot of things would be a lot harder without gravity. I think we take it for 
you know, we expect it really, with staying on the ground and staying on the desks 
and that. But if we didn't have it things would be a lot harder because everything 
would be floating and you wouldn't be able to keep them down in anyway 	  
P. I would say that its like an invisible force on the um, and it pulls you and its all sort 
of like near the ground and it pulls you down and keeps you up, it keeps you upright. 
The younger pupils used the idea of gravity less often than the 14 16 year olds to explain 
falling, which fits withthe model's position that it is only an "optional extra" to the core of 
commonsense ideas. 
iii) Impacts 
The category was included to try to see what types of impacts were regarded as capable of 
preventing the continuation of a current motion i.e. what sort of situations stop movement. 
The subjects' responses fell into two groups. Some classified impacts as increasing the 
speed of a ball and causing a continuation of motion while others felt that the same impacts 
stopped motion. 
The following excerpts illustrate these types of reasoning. 
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Karoline aged 12 years thought that an impact should increase the speed of a ball because 
a hard surface is better than a soft surface to bounce against. She sees the soft surface as 
absorbing the force. 
P. I think it gets faster as it keeps hitting things. 
I. What about going up here to Dad's head? 
P. I don't think that's very fast because it's got quite a long way to jump up, so I don't 
think it's very fast, I don't think it would hurt very much. 
I. So what would make the ball stop? 
P. If it stopped hitting all these surfaces and that, making all this force come into it. If 
it was just left on its own and the force came out of it. 
I. So hitting things gives balls more force? 
P. I think so yes. 
Darren aged 13 explains why he thought impacts decrease the speed of a ball. 
P. It goes into the picture or the mirror and smashes that, then it falls onto the flower 
pot and knocks it over then it hits a glass of water or something and knocks it over 
onto her dad's trouser and hits her dad on the head. 
And later - 
I. It would just stop would it? 
P. It would fall down and it wouldn't bounce as high as it got on there. 
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I. Why's that? Why do you think it wouldn't bounce up so high? 
P. Because the gravity is pushing it down so everytime it bounces a little bit lower 
than the last time but this one bounces higher sometimes. 
It is interesting to note that both these accounts preserve one of the basic premises of the 
model that all things need a force to move them and that during the motion this force will 
wear away unless it receives some more force. 
Two different views exist about the nature of impacts with a bouncing ball which can be 
summarised as follows:- 
1. A person provides a force on a ball and if the ball hits a hard surface the surface can 
enhance the force on the ball or prevent the loss of force from it. If the surface is soft 
it will absorb the force. The generation of these types of explanations emphasises 
the material and type of surface which the ball hits and neglects the subsequent 
direction of motion. 
2. However another view exists about impacts, that every time a ball hits a surface it 
loses some of its force. 
5.2.6 Model and data: match or mismatch? 
One of the primary objectives of the study was to elicit pupils' descriptions and explanations 
of motions and to determine whether the propositions of the commonsense model were 
reflected intheir responses. It appears that many of the fundamental notions of the model 
are used across the secondary school age range. However, only a restricted number of 
situations were looked at in this work and so the research needs to be extended to a wider 
range of instances comparing and contrasting many different types of motion. In addition, 
the sample was very small. 
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There are some interesting differences in the level of explanation obtained from the different 
ages tested. The older pupils' descriptions of motion emphasised more general features and 
they tended not to assess the particular features of a situation. They called less frequently 
upon the type of material to explain the notion of support. (A fuller description of the results 
obtained from the whole secondary age range tested is reported by Bliss, Ogborn and 
Whitelock (1989) and is found in Appendix XI). The model suggests that gravity is an 
optional extra; one would expect its use to be seen more frequently with the older pupils, 
and this is the case. Energy is a term used by the older subjects instead of force. These latter 
observations could well be the product of further exposure to more scientific notions which 
then blend into the commonsense understandings. 
5.2.7 Methodological Comments 
The advantage of this methodology was its flexibility as an exploratory tool. Pupils' ideas 
could be explored as they were spontaneously generated and the discussions which 
elaborated upon features illustrated in the cartoon strips in terms of real life situations gave 
some valuable insights into the children's ways of thinking about motion. The model 
describes its premises in the form of generalisations which people should have generated 
in order to understand motion. The use of these generalisations was more difficult to assess 
with this methodology since only a restricted number of instances were investigated. 
This technique allowed the differences in pupils' explanations to be compared with the age 
group tested and although this study reveals,in contrast to earlier work (Whitelock 1985), 
that the younger pupils did not readily generalise, it does seem that the primitives of the 
model i.e. support and effort, can be found at the root of children's explanations. The 
methodology gave a further insight into children's ideas about gravity and impacts with the 
interesting observation that one of the basic premises of the model was preserved during the 
discussion about impacts, namely that motion needs a force, which can be lost. Although 
some of the technique's shortcomings have been discussed, this methodology proved to be 
a good first probe for elicting children's tacit understanding of motion. 
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5.3 INVESTIGATING A MODEL OF COMMONSENSE IDEAS ABOUT MOTION 
USING A REPERTORY GRID TECHNIQUE 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this further piece of pilot work was not only to explore the use of another 
technique for probing pupils' tacit understanding of motion but also to provide a more 
systematic testing of the model. The information was collected to aid the formalisation of 
commonsense ideas about motion and to guide the choice of an investigatory tool for the 
main study. 
5.3.2 Methodology 
The repertory grid technique is derived from Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. The 
theory runs counter to the behaviourist views of its time and suggests that man is actively 
engaged in making sense of the world in which he lives. The metaphor of man as a "personal 
scientist" is used to describe the activities in which the individual is engaged, such as testing 
hypotheses and evaluating experimental evidence, in order not only to understand the 
individual's environment but to predict and control events in it. 
The theory proposes that everyone has a certain number of constructs by which they 
evaluate the phenomena that constitute their own world. These phenomena relate to 
elements such as people, events, objects or even ideas. Kelly suggests that constructs can 
be defined in terms of bipolar adjectives or phrases. An example of a bipolar construct 
elicited in the present study would be "something moving an object" versus "the object 
moves on its own". 
Several variations of the repertory grid have been developed and used in different areas of 
research since Kelly's original 'Role construct grid test' and it is the flexibility of the 
technique which has made it an attractive tool for counselling, psychiatric work, and more 
recently for educational research. Kelly himself suggested that the grid was merely a means 
of communication through conversation to try and understand how a person thinks and feels 
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about a particular topic through a set of constructs. 
Kelly'sposition, as someone primarily concerned with individual therapy, was that both 
elements and constructs should be elicited from the individual. However in his theory he 
does argue that people do have similar ideas and areas of agreement in their understanding 
of everyday life. He describes these overlaps of ideas as the commonality of constructs. The 
model of commonsense ideas about motion suggests that a framework of notions of Effort 
and Support are used to make sense of motion and it follows that motions with similar types 
of Effort or Support should be grouped together and be seen as similar to one another. 
The repertory grid technique can be used in one of three ways to study a persons' 
understanding of any universe of discourse:- 
a. Elements and constructs can be elicited from the individual. 
b. The elements are given while the constructs are elicited. 
c. Both elements and constructs are given and the subject is left to match them together. 
The above variations lend themselves to different types of problems: 
Case (a) lends itself to individual diagnosis, and to such questions as how well a person 
understands or makes sense of a particular situation. It is suited to exploratory work and 
does not require the researcher to declare any strong hypotheses prior to its administration. 
In case (b) the methodology is guided to some extent by a theoretical position through the 
selection of elements. This approach is appropriate for testing an apriori theoretical position 
without revealing it to the subject. It allows areas of common understanding to be identified. 
The final variation of this technique is to give subjects both elements and constructs. This 
is a good method if the researcher wishes to look at different patterns of perception in a 
framework already understood. 
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What variation would lend itself to the further testing of children's commonsense under-
standing of motion? Method (b) was chosen since constructs could be elicited from the 
pupils about how alike or unlike they perceived the causes of different motions to be. The 
pupils' constructs could then be matched with constructs predicted by the model and also 
to see whether there were some constructs used by the pupils which had been omitted by the 
theoretical account. 
The elements were predetermined by the researcher and consisted of fourteen pictures of 
different motions (see Appendix II). These are shown in Table 5.3 below and represent the 
following groups of motions:- 
a. Motions on the ground or in the air. 
b. Falling motions. 
c. Autonomous motions. 
d. Motions where the source of effort was external. 
In this way the elements provide a representative coverage of the area of investigation. The 
elements also needed to be familiar physical objects so that they could be construed by the 
subjects without difficulty. Fourteen elements were thought a sufficient number to be 
discussed in an hour and to provide an adequate number for analysis. Easterby-Smith (1980) 
in his discussion of the design of a grid recommends twelve elements as a satisfactory 
number and warns against the use of less than six or seven if any quantitative analysis is to 
be done. 
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Table 5.3: The elements chosen to depict different types of every day motions 
Element Motion depicted on card 
El Bowls 
E2 Beryl running 
E3 Police car 
E4 Footballer 
E5 Beryl on pogostick 
E6 Sliding 
E7 Kite 
E8 Aeroplane 
E9 Man with battering ram 
El° Bird 
Ell Arrow moving up 
E12 Bouncing ball on head 
El3 Arrow moving across 
E14 Drainpipe snaps 
Pictures of the elements used can be found in appendix II. 
The constructs were generated by presenting each pupil with the pictures of the fourteen 
elements in the form of cards. They first looked at the motion of each card to see if they 
understood the action described in each picture. They were then told that the reason for the 
research was to investigate their ideas about why things move and were asked to pick out 
two cards which moved for a similiar reason and then one that was very different. They gave 
the reason for their choice and placed the remaining cards in one or other of the categories. 
Another category was also created for any motions which did not fit into the chosen 
construct. They were asked to repeat this exercise until no more constructs could be elicited. 
This is the classical approach to generating constructs, that is, to elicit them from triads of 
elements. This procedure tends to produce two contrasting poles for the construct, and not 
opposites. The difficulty with requesting "opposites" is that it often produces logical 
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opposites rather than opposites in meaning. The maximum number of constructs obtained 
during the course of the interviews was twelve, the minimum being ten. 
The whole interview was tape recorded and a grid completed for each pupil. A sample grid 
is illustrated in Figure 5.1 the others are found in Appendix III, and rates the elements with 
a numerical score per construct. The score is from one to five. A five point rating scale is 
shown below: 
Not at all alike 	 Average 	 Very much alike 
I 
  
1 
	
2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
Bannister (1968) comments on the advantages of the rating form of the repertory grid and 
suggests that it offers the subject greater latitude in distinguishing between elements than 
that provided for in the original form proposed by Kelly. 
5.3.3 Descriptions of pupils interviewed 
Four sixth form pupils (average age 17 years) were interviewed. Two were arts 'A' Level 
students while the others were studying science 'A' Levels. 
A further four pupils were in their first year of secondary education at a comprehensive 
school and had an average age of 11.5 years. This group followed a combined science 
course. As this was only a pilot study, in order to assess the suitability of the technique for 
eliciting commonsense ideas, the extremes of the secondary school age range were used. 
5.3.4. Looking for patterns of constructs in individual grids 
The repertory grid technique was used not only to elicit tacit knowledge but also to see if 
the constructs used by each pupil and between pupils of different ages were those predicted 
by the theoretical model. 
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Figure 5.1 : MZ5Ul5ed Repertory Grid 
Name of Subject: 1st year 	 Number of Grid: 4 
FODEIi mu, 4 
Constructs 
1. Running 
Person moving something 
3. Moving something because there 
is a reason 
4. rovinv fast 
S. Motion across 
6. Notion which hits something 
7. Gravity helps movement 
8. Person using a force to make 
something move 
9. Movement on the ground 
10. Movement in/on something 
Constructs 7 and 10 reversed 
- standing still 
- person being moved by something 
- being taken by surprise 
- moving not so fast 
- motion upward 
- motion which does not hit soiwthino 
- gravity does not help 
- moving on its own 
- movement in the air 
- movement not in/on something 
ittR.4.4,102ts ak dubber modem auz, no4t (A10e6 >/ (4440 ruxiao) 
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Table 5.4: Allotting Elements to Constructs using the Rating Form 
An example grid of a 1st year pupil 
Elements 
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. 
Running/standing 
still 
1 5 3 5 4 4 2 3 5 4 1 1 1 3 
2. 
Person moving 
something/person being 
moved by something 5 3 1 5 5 1 5 1 5 3 5 5 5 1 
3.  
Moving something because 
there is a reason/ 
being taken by 
surprise not 
intentional 5 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 
4.  
Moving fast/moving 
not so fast 1 5 5 5 2 4 1 5 5 1 5 5 2 4 
5. 
Motion across/motion up 5 5 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 3 
6.  
Motion which hits 
something/motion 
which does not 
hit something 5 1 1 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 
7.  
Gravity helps movement/ 
gravity does not 
help movement 4 4 5 3 1 1 4 5 1 5 4 1 1 1 
8. 
Person using a force 
to make something 
move/moving on its own 5 5 1 1 5 1 1 3 5 1 5 5 5 1 
9. 
Movement on the ground/ 
movement in the air 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 5 1 3 5 5 1 
10. 
Movement in/on 
something/movement 
not in/on 
something 1 1 5 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 
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Code for elements in figure 1 above: 
1. Bowls 
2. Beryl running 
3. Police car 
4. Footballers crash 
5. Beryl on pogostick 
6. Sliding on rug 
7. Kite 
8. Aeroplane 
9. Fred/battering ram 
10. Bird 
11. Arrow across 
12. Beryl bouncing ball on head 
13. Arrow up 
14. Drainpipe snaps (Fred) 
Each individual grid was analysed with the computer program FOCUS (Shaw and Thomas, 
1978) to identify the relationship between the constructs for each subject. The FOCUS 
program looks for different patterns and identifies the major groupings of constructs in the 
repertory grid. It is based upon a cluster analysis where the strongest associations in the 
matrix are found and a series of hierarchical groups of constructs are then built. It sorts the 
constructs so that those which have the closest relationship are closest together in order. The 
original grid is therefore reorganised by the "relatedness" of constructs and elements. 
In order to demonstrate how the main patterns of each grid are identified by the FOCUS 
program an example of a Focused grid of an 11 year old pupil, S. D. is discussed below. (See 
figure 1). 
The program identified three clusters of constructs for S.D.'s grid, which are grouped in the 
following way:- 
Cluster 	 i. Contains the constructs 10, 2, 8 and 3 
ii. Contains the constructs 9, 5, 7 and 7 
while cluster 	 iii. Includes only the constructs 4 and 1. 
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In the first cluster, the sub-cluster of constructs 10, 2, 8 and 3 have in common the notion 
of an agent acting on something or carrying something. Cluster two includes the constructs 
9, 5, 6 and 7 which describe falling motions connected to ideas of gravity, along with up and 
down movement and motion which hits something. The third set of constructs which are 
only weakly linked i.e. at the 35% level, include ideas about the speed of motion. 
There are similarities between the degree of relatedness of elements as perceived by the 
different age groups of pupils tested. Direction and source of effort of motion and 
differences between animate and inanimate motion were the main criteria used by the 
eleven year olds to distinguish motion, while the seventeen year old pupils added a further 
feature, of difference which separated motion taking place on the ground from that in the 
air. 
5.3.5 The most common constructs elicited from the subjects 
The FOCUSed grids helped to show how the individual pupils construed the given elements 
(see appendix HI). To identify common trends, constructs with similar labels were grouped 
and FOCUSed together to discover how close they actually were in meaning. Table 5.4 sum-
marises the constructs which were grouped in this way. It shows the frequency of constructs 
with similar labels, and investigates how close they are in meaning by looking at the 
similarity in their pattern of elements. 
Two of the most frequently elicited constructs were concerned with the notions of 
SUPPORT and EFFORT. Both these ideas were predicted by the theoretical model. With 
respect to SUPPORT, subjects differentiated between motion taking place on the ground 
from movement in the air. They mentioned properties associated with travel in the air such 
as lightness. The wind was also considered to be a cause of motion. Movements were also 
contrasted by their source of effort and subjects not only discriminated between an internal 
and external force but also between animate and animate motion. The latter distinction 
had not previously been mentioned by the model. The third most frequently and closely 
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linked distinction, again omitted from the theoretical account, concerned purposeful or 
deliberate motion as opposed to accidental or uncontrolled action. Sliding/slipping/falling 
were seen as examples of accidental movements. 
Other constructs identified by this method were as follows:- 
i. The direction of the motion - distinctions made betwee movement in the 
horizontal and vertical direction. 
ii. Speed of motion. 
iii. Impacts causing motion to stop. The seventeen year old pupils mentioned 
friction as a means of stopping movement. 
iv. "Carry-type" motions i.e. objects which are moved in or on another object. 
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Table 5.5: Constructs with similar verbal labels FOCUSed together 
GROUP NAME OF 	 NUMBER OF 	 % SIMILARITY 
CONSTRUCTS 
	 CONSTRUCTS 	 IDENTIFIED BY FOCUS 
FOUND WITH 	 PROGRAM 
SIMILAR 
VERBAL LABEL 
1. Internal versus external force 
producing motion 
7 4 at 55% 
all at 39% 
2. Speed linked with 
shape of moving object 
Shape aids motion/shape 
does not aid motion 
6 
4 
5 at 55% 
all at 30% 
Results suggest these were two 
separate groups of constructs 
concerned with speed of motion 
and shape of moving object 
3. Movement in air versus 
movement on the ground 
9 5 	 at 65% 
7 	 at 50% 
4. Wind assisted motion versus 
non wind assisted motion 
11 7 at 60% 
9 at 50% 
5. Moves across versus moves up 7 4 at 60% 
all at 40% 
6. Gravity and motion 5 4 at 60% 
all at 55% 
7. Purposeful/deliberate motion 
versus accidental motion 
7 6 at 55% 
8. Purposeful motion linked with 
motions towards something versus 
motion away from something 
10 6 at 55% 
9. Controlled purposeful motion 
versus non-controlled motion 
10 8 at 55% 
10. Stopping motions versus 
continuous motion 
5 2 at 85% 
3 at 50% 
11. Movement in or on 
something versus 
movement on its own 
4 2 at 90% 
3 at 50% 
all at 45% 
12. Internal versus external force 10 8 at 50% 
13. Light objects moveeasily versus 
heavy objects do not move easily 
13 8 at 50% 
14. Rolling versus 
bouncing motions 
3 2 at 30% 
No real linkage 
15. People moving versus 
people staying still 
4 2 at 40% 
No real linkage 
16. Motion needs a fuel versus 
motion does not need a fuel 
3 2 at 20% 
No real linkage 
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5.3.6 What did the repertory grid technique reveal about the commonsense model of 
motion? 
In order to assess what this methodology has revealed about the commonsense theory of 
motion, three questions need to be answered. 
1. Are the major components of the model present? 
2. Do any new ideas arise, which were not previously mentioned by the theoretical model? 
3. Are some pieces of the model missing when this technique is used? 
Let us now consider these questions:- 
5.3.6.1 What were the most frequently elicited constructs which were predicted by the 
model? 
The theoretical model predicted that motions should be distinguished by the type of effort 
used to produce them. The subjects responded in this way by separating motions produced 
by the object itself from those started by another object. Pupils also distinguished the 
difference between motions taking place on the ground or in the air, which is also a basic 
premise of the theory, concerned with the notion of SUPPORT. 
5.3.6.2 Were any new constructs elicited which were not predicted by the model? 
The activity of classifying elements with reference to two poles allowed new ideas which 
were not covered by the model to be revealed. 
These were:- 
i. 
	 Differences between animate and inanimate motion. 
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ii. Accidental/purposeful motion. 
iii. Conditions for stopping motion. 
iv. Speed of motion. 
v. Bouncing/rolling motions seen as different to other motions. 
5.3.6.3 What constructs as predicted by the model were not elicited from the pupils 
with this technique? 
Falling motions were not seen as different to other motions in terms of lack of SUPPORT 
or EFFORT. The pupils gave some indication of difference but this was in terms of 
direction. They distinguished changes in motion between up and down. There was only 
one falling motion placed among the elements and that was a burgular falling from a broken 
drainpipe and this fact could explain a lack of classification of Falling motion. 
There was no mention of objects moving due to the effort of the motion. The theoretical 
model suggests that effort is preserved within an object, once given by an agent. This effort 
sustains the object's independent motion until the effort is used-up or runs-out, e.g. as in 
a ball thrown into the air. The thrower gives the ball effort which is used up as it travels 
through the air. As soon as the effort is extinguished the ball drops or falls immediately to 
the ground. This omission could be due to the lack of examples whose motion could be 
explained in this way. Only four of the fourteen examples could be considered as moving 
in that manner. 
The fact that certain constructs did not appear, poses an interesting problem. These 
omissions could be due to a methodological problem in the choice of elements or might be 
an indication that these constructs are not important features of a commonsense understand-
ing of motion. 
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5.4 CONCLUSION 
The Repertory Grid study formed a second phase of the preliminary testing of a common-
sense model of motion and suggested that the major components of the model were present. 
The model's prediction that "motions have a preferred direction" and that motions can also 
be distinguished by their source of effort was given further support. However, any idea 
about the effort of the present motion of the object was not forthcoming in this investigation 
although it was found in the interview study. 
The most important distinction not in the model was that of animate/inanimate motion. The 
other features such as rolling/bouncing, and speed of motion were less important findings. 
In order to see if these type of actions could be included in a basic set of commonsense 
actions, upon which all sets of motion could be based, the model needs to clarify the 
characteristics of different motions more fully. Ideas such as rolling and bouncing need to 
be considered since any commonsense theory of motion should predict the sort of motions 
which people naturally use in order to make comparisons. 
The repertory grid methodology provided a suitable and useful technique for the explora-
tion of pupils' commonsense understanding of motion. It may also provide a useful tool 
to promote a change in commonsense ideas. This methodology elicits the subjects' own 
personal constructs, which are then available for discussion. Areas where commonsense 
reasoning provides insufficient explanation may be made explicit, when the pupil might be 
more willing to 'take on board' a less naive and more scientific view of how the world works. 
5.5 COMPARISON OF REPERTORY GRID AND INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES 
TO TEST COMMONSENSE UNDERSTANDING OF MOTION 
The first methodology employed was the clinical interview and from this work a variety of 
notions were identified connected with movement. Similar ideas were found in all the 
pupils tested whose ages ranged from 11 to 17 years. Three kinds of EFFORT were 
discovered as necessary causes of motion. These were:- 
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i. Effort needed to initiate motion. 
ii. Effort needed to maintain motion or used up in motion. 
iii. Exchange of effort. 
The pupils talked about the notion of support in terms of its strength or lack of it. The 
outcome of lack of support resulted in a motion commonly known as falling. 
Other ideas of gravity and impact were mentioned. Gravity was described as a force that 
pulls things down or as something that is used in keeping things down. The strength of 
impacts was mentioned in terms of either the material of which the object was made or the 
speed of the moving object. 
The interview study did not however identify certain constructs which the repertory grid 
technique revealed. These were differences between animate and inanimate motion, the 
identification of bouncing and rolling as classes of motion and ideas connected with the 
speed of the movement. 
The repertory grid technique proved to be a successful means of exploring a model 
constructed of generalisations. The methodology required subjects to make such generali-
sations in order to classify the given elements in a very explicit manner. There is a dis-
advantage with this technique, in that it is not easy to probe ideas in depth if a large number 
of constructs for computer analysis are to be elicited within a reasonable time scale, since 
attention has to be sustained on the grid elicitation process. It is also difficult within the 
repertory grid interview format to follow up interesting or unusual feature as they arise. 
Another way of testing a model with this technique would be to have both elements and 
constructs predetermined. Then more rigorous "across person" comparisons could be made 
and the commonality of ideas within the group more easily assessed. The interviewer could 
concentrate more completely upon the level of reasoning and the types of explanations used 
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Table 5.6: Comparison of Repertory Grid and interview techniques to study 
commonsense understanding of dynamics 
FEATURE OF 
METHODOLOGY 
METHODOLOGIES 
INTERVIEWS REPERTORY GRIDS 
1. Appropriateness Good first Provided more 
for phase in exploratory tool. systematic testing of 
research. the theory. 
2. Information Notions of support. Motions in air or 
obtained. Three kinds of on ground. 
effort. Only 2 present. 
Impact. Impact. 
Gravity. Gravity 
Not mentioned. Animate/Inanimate. 
Not mentioned. Conditions for stopping. 
Not mentioned. Bouncing and rolling motions. 
Effort of the motion. Not mentioned. 
Same ideas expressed As theory predicted 
throughout age many constructs were 
range tested expressed by both 
1 1 - 16 years. 11 and 17 year olds 
but animacy emphasised 
more by 11 year olds. 
3. How close did As fuller Although easy to check 
each technique explanations given the classifications 
come to the it is easier to predicted by the 
pupils' common- check pupils' model not so easy to 
sense reasoning? reasoning. confirm the reasoning. 
4. Allows further Yes More difficult. 
exploration of 
interesting new features. 
5. LABELS and Easier to check Need to be aware that 
meaning. labels used and similar construct 
meaning by further means a similar 
probing. construct label with 
a similar pattern. 
6. Readily lends itself Can be done Yes. 
to statistical with difficulty. 
comparison of 
age groups. 
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to classify motions in a commonsense manner. However, the difficulty is then that subjects 
would be instructed in a "commonsense model of motion" by the process of investigation. 
However both techniques suggest that the model's primitives of Effort and Support are used 
to explain different types of motions across the secondary age range, so that these primitives 
need to be preserved within any model. These two investigations offered different ways 
of probing a commonsense understanding of motion by seeing if subjects agreed with and 
replicated the terms of the model. The results of these studies informed the choice of 
research instrument for the main study as discussed in Chapter 7. 
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6. FORMALISING A MODEL OF COMMONSENSE UNDERSTANDING 
OF MOTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the formalisation of a model of commonsense 
thinking about motion. 6.1 Towards a formal model of commonsense understanding of 
motion discusses the role of causality. 6.2 A causal model of motion illustrates the 
construction of the causal model through a series of systemic networks. 6.3 Conclusion 
describes how the formalized model lends itself to testing. 
6.1 TOWARDS A FORMAL MODEL OF COMMONSENSE UNDERSTANDING 
OF MOTION 
In the interests of further clarification, and as a step towards further testing of the model, the 
construction of a FORMAL account of a commonsense understanding of motion suggested 
itself as an appropriate second stage of this research. Therefore Jon Ogborn, Joan Bliss and 
myself began to formulate the model of commonsense reasoning as a systemic network 
(Bliss, Monk and Ogborn (1983)) using the results of the preliminary studies as described 
in Chapter 5. 
6.1.1 The role of causality in building a formal model of a commonsense understanding 
of motion 
In order to build a formal version of the commonsense model of motion, it was important 
to look for some underlying pattern in the construction of the "primitive" abstractions and 
to explore the possibility of identifying a common framework which pupils might use to 
make sense of a world made up of objects which can be made to move in a number of 
different ways. As suggested in 4.4.1, it is not only the elements or primitives but also their 
arrangement that is required to define a model. Therefore, any commonsense model of 
motion needs to clearly explain the link between EFFORT and SUPPORT, and if possible 
to suggest how these notions could develop. 
A model based on an analysis of causation seemed appropriate. A number of researchers 
suggest that an understanding of causality is central to our ability to deal successfully with 
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the complex world in which we live. For example Michotte (1963) has proposed that we 
tend to seek causal explanations or impose causal interpretations on events in space and time 
regardless of their underlying relationships. 
Bronowski (1969) also suggests that the idea of cause and effect has taken a powerful hold 
on our minds. He says:- 
"We have the greatest difficulty in freeing ourselves from its compulsion, even when we 
are thinking through scientific problems with conscious care. And unconsciously, we fall 
back on it at every turn. This has become our natural way of looking at all problems". 
According to Piaget (1928), one of the important steps in development is the ability to 
recognise cause and effect relationships. In his description of the sensori-motor period 
Piaget proposes that the notions of causality, object time and space are constructed through 
the child's action on and experience of the world and that causality appears in its most 
rudimentary form during this period. At the beginning, this understanding is limited to the 
most direct sorts of physical causality such as an infant dropping a toy from his high chair 
and causing it to fall, or pulling a string on a musical toy and causing it to play a tune. 
Wartofsky (1968)in agreement with Piaget, proposes that one of the most basic notions that 
we have about causality is that of action. There are several features of action which imme-
diately suggest themselves:- 
i. Human action involves a feeling of effort. 
ii. Action involves some motive or intention or something for which we need to give 
a reason. 
iii. Actionis achieved by physical contact. 
The implication is that causality and action are tightly interwoven from early experience. If 
this is correct then it is reasonable to expect ideas about causality and motion to be similarly 
linked. 
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6.1.1.1 A Philosophical approach to causality 
Although causality presents itself as a "good glue" for our model of motion it is helpful to 
look briefly at the concept of causality itself before the details of a causal model of motion 
are discussed. 
Philosophers have been wrestling with the problem of trying to find a definition of causality 
for centuries. One of their approaches has been to describe causality in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. A sufficient condition is one whose presence guarantees that the 
outcome will occur, that is, a condition that can never be present if the outcome does not 
occur. For example, in a commonsense understanding of motion a lack of support is a 
sufficient condition for an object to fall. On the other hand a necessary condition for some 
outcome is one that must always be present for the outcome to be present. That is, a condition 
whose absence will prevent that outcome. An example of a necessary condition is when 
support is necessary for a PUSH or WALK type motion to take place. Just the presence of 
the ground or similar support does not ensure that these types of motion occur. However, 
we know that if a PUSH or WALK motion has happened then a support of some sort is 
present otherwise a FALLING motion would have occurred. 
Another view of causality, which seems much closer to our everyday natural-language sense 
of the meaning of cause, proposes that a cause should be defined as an "incident or action 
which, in the presence of those conditions that usually prevail, make the difference to the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of the event". (Copi 1978). Schustack (1988) suggests that 
this definition "captures more of the psychological sense of cause". For example if eleven 
year olds are asked to classify pictures of different motions according to similar causes (as 
in the repertory grid study, see 5.3.2), subjects tended to group animate motions as similar 
because animate objects have control over their motion and not just because they have an 
internal source of motion. Real people walk about for a reason such as moving across a room 
to open a window or shut a door. There is some purpose to their action. However, moving 
for a reason or a purpose cannot strictly be considered as a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for a WALKING motion to take place, if the philosophical definition above is 
used. 
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There are other problems in applying the philosophical definitions of necessary and 
sufficient cause to people's normal causal reasoning. Schustack (1988) proposes that they 
neglect the "critical processes of generating or identifying candidate causes (causal 
hypotheses)". 
An appreciation of a commonsense understanding of natural phenomena requires not only 
an analysis of sufficient or necessary conditions of cause but also more detailed information 
about the agent of cause. This understanding can then be compared to a scientific account 
of the world to see how it differs from it. 
6.1.1.2 Views from the Alternative Conceptions literature about the role of causality 
in commonsense thinking 
Driver, Guesne and Tiberghien (1985) edited a collection of papers describing secondary 
school children's ideas over a wide range of natural phenomena. Their editorial comment 
set the individual pieces of reported research within a general perspective, which included 
as a feature that children's everyday explanations of change follow a linear causal sequence, 
(see also section 2.5). Driver et al suggest: 
"They (children) postulate a cause which produces a chain of effects as a time-dependent 
sequence. This tendency to think of explanations in terms of preferred directions in chains 
of events mean that pupils can have problems appreciating the symmetry in interactions 
between systems". 
Andersson (1986) proposes that the alternative conceptions literature could be understood 
in a more unified manner if the findings were interpreted within a causal framework. He 
suggests that the common core of pupils' explanations of phenomena in such widely 
differing areas of science, as temperature, heat, electricity, optics and mechanics, is that of 
an "experiential gestalt" of causation. The idea of the experiential gestalt was taken from 
the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in which they postulate that ideas of causality are 
deeply rooted in language as well as in early experience. 
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Andersson postulates that "we use the experiential gestalt of causality all the time to control 
our actions and to comprehend what is happening in the world around us". The main features 
of the gestalt are "an agent which directly with its own body or indirectly with the help of 
an instrument, affects an object. The introduction of the notion of instrument helps to 
describe a causal chain. An example Andersson uses is as follows: 
"The child (agent) throws a snowball (instrument) to knock the cap (object) off his friend". 
He suggests that in order to broaden the scope of the investigation and the analysis of 
children's alternative frameworks, this research needs to look at the notion of causality in 
conjunction with the content of students conceptions. 
This discussion has briefly reviewed current opinion about the role of causality in 
commonsense reasoning and presented some of the arguments for proposing that the 
primitives of EFFORT and SUPPORT can be linked within a causal framework. In the 
following section the formalisation of the causal link is made explicit. 
6.2 A CAUSAL MODEL OF MOTION 
Causality suggests itself as the glue which holds the pieces or primitives of a "structured 
understanding of motion" together. These primitives have been identified as SUPPORT and 
EFFORT whose characteristic features were outlined in section 4.4.2.2. 
The notions of support and effort are the central and most important primitives of the model. 
They are also the basic premises which distinguish this model from any other model and 
therefore any formalism chosen to present the model must be able to represent them and their 
connection with other ideas. 
The formalism chosen was that of a systemic network since it could display a structure of 
categories revealing their interdependencies to any required level of delicacy. A systemic 
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network should also produce a definable degree of difference between motions which can 
then be tested. It was hoped, in addition, that the formalism would also lend itself to a later 
translation into a Prolog program. 
A causal model of motion is presented below. This is the version of the model developed 
prior to the design of the matching tasks (see Chapter 7). Since the collection of the empirical 
data ideas about the model have changed and another version is proposed in Chapter 12 and 
tested against the available data. 
The first network (Figure 6.1), suggests that in order for any type of motion to take place 
there must be a cause, which can be circumstantial or be specific to the object. 
Figure 6.1: A causal model of motion described by a Systemic Network 
agent 
from itself 
consumable 
non consumable T control 
active 	  
L initate 
by nature 
— Caused 
Causes 
— Circumstantial 
_ 
Specific to 
 
object 
[
inherited 
absence of 
prevention 
— None 
Figure 6.1 describes two types of circumstantial causes; inherited and absence of preven-
tion. The former cause specifies how one object can be moved by inheriting its cause of 
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motion from another moving object; i.e. the cause is not specific to the object alone. An 
example of this type of motion is that of carried objects moving together, such as a person 
taking a cup and saucer to the sink. In real life some objects are always seen together and 
are found to move in groups and form part of one another. This new theoretical qualification 
answers one of the criticisms of the earlier version of the model (see 4.4.2.2) which only 
describes the motion of single objects found alone or together. 
The other type of circumstantial cause is Absence of prevention which is a special type of 
causation where it is the nonexistence of a certain agent which would have prevented the 
motion if present, that is seen to be the cause of motion. This category allows a lack of 
support to act as a cause of movement, to account for falling. Objects are seen to fall when 
nothing supports them. 
The other distinction on the second BAR of Figure 6.1 is a cause which is specific to the 
object. This is an overall category for entrance into a BRA in which there are three co-
occurring sets of options. 
i. Agent/from itself. 
ii. Consumable/Non consumable. 
iii. Active/by nature. 
Agent causes occur where an event is seen to happen through the specific action of an agent 
on another object whereas "from itself" causes are cases seen as an pbject causing its own 
motion. 
The consumable/non consumable distinction is used to describe the "power of causation" 
and differentiates between causes where this power is used up or is seen as a permanent 
attribute of the cause. For example an object can be supported through its own effort. e.g. 
a bird flying into the air. This effort is used up during the course of the action and so is classed 
as consumable,whereas a statue is supported on a pillar by the strength of the material in the 
pillar itself, which is a non-consumable cause. 
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The Active/by nature distinction differentiates between events which are said to happen 
naturally from those which are made to happen. An example of a natural cause is that of 
a ball falling. It will continue to travel unaided until it stops "naturally". This type of cause 
occurs when there is no intervention either from the objects themselves or the agents during 
the course of the event. If asked why a "natural type" action happened the response might 
be "because it happened". 
The active option describes a type of intervention which is needed to inject some sort of 
activity into a situation or series of events to make things begin. This activity can just start 
things off as denoted by a further differentiation called initiate. An example of an active 
initiate motion is that of a person throwing a ball into the air. Whereas an active control type 
motion can be illustrated by the example of a person pushing a pram. Here the source of 
effort is external and applied continuously to the moving object. 
The causal network of motion makes explicit the notion that all types of movement need 
some sort of cause. When a cause is absent then there is no motion and the status quo is 
maintained. The network acts as a template for a more formal description of the "primitive" 
abstractions of SUPPORT and EFFORT as shown below (figures 6.2 and 6.3). 
The support network (figure 6.2) differs from the preliminary causal model (figure 6.1) in 
the following way: 
i. It is a simpler description. 
There are only two possible types of causes of support which are by agent and from 
itself. 
ii. When a cause of support is absent the status quo is not maintained as regards to 
motion and falling occurs. 
iii. The support network (Figure 6.2) omits certain distinctions made by the causal 
network (Figure 6.1). These are: 
a. No consumable/non consumable distinction and 
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b. No active/by nature distinction. 
iv. When support is given by the object itself it can be established in one of two ways: 
a. through effort - ie a bird supports itself throughthe the effort of flying. (This 
is a consumable support). 
b. through motion - a ball remains in the air through its own motion before it 
falls to the ground. 
Figure 6.2: Network for support 
— Cause absent falls 
Support — 
  
[
Circumstantial 
Inherited 
From itself 	  
   
— Cause present 
   
— Effort 
   
    
     
      
_ Motion 
The motion network (figure 6.3) differs from the main causal model of motion (figure 6.1) 
in only one respect; the omission of a non consumable source of effort. The model thus 
asserts that it is impossible to have continuous motion (except falling) without using up 
effort. 
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Figure 6.3: Network for motion 
— No cause 
By thing itself 
By agent 
By effort 
By motion 
State/ nature 
Consumable 
Motion 	 — Not supported 
— Cause 
— Supported 
6.2.1 Model of a commonsense understanding of causes of motion as described by a 
systemic network 
Since the theoretical model proposes that the two notions of support and effort are the 
essential ingredients of a commonsense understanding of motion the causal networks of 
support and effort were combined into one common network as shown in figure 6.4 below. 
It is this latter model with its predictions about everyday motions and their relationship to 
one another which provided the basis for the main investigation of this thesis. This final 
network describes the relationship between different types of support (i.e. the ground or a 
similar substitute, the air or self-support) combined with different sources of effort 
(essentially own effort or the effort of an external agent) which give rise to a number of basic 
cases of motion. These are the paradigm cases of the networks which are defined as 
"stereotypes". The stereotypical motions have a particular configuration of features and one 
testable aspect of the model is to see how well it actually characterises the differences 
between the stereotypes. 
The network paradigms define the "stereotypes". These will be used in later empirical work 
for which picture examples of each were used, these being named below, (see Chapter 7). 
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Fig. 6.6: Combined Network of Support and Motion 
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The stereotypes are:- 
i. CARRY 
The carried object inherits the support and effort of the carrier. The carrier motion can be 
any of the other kinds. 
Picture examples:- People in train and Pole carried by man. 
The CARRY examples chosen above represent CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD type 
motions. A CARRY PART-OF might be the hair of a girl moving as she is walking along 
the road. 
ii. STAND 
There is no action and so no effort is present. Support is supplied by the ground or a 
substitute. Examples:- A television set standing in a room, lamppost. (This case was not 
tested). 
iii. WALK 
The ground or a substitute is the support while the effort comes from the object itself. This 
object can be animate or inanimate in nature. This is a controlled motion which means the 
effort is maintained and can be changed throughout the motion. Therefore the course of 
action is not inevitable and can be controlled. 
Picture examples:- Animate - Bull and Man. 
Inanimate - Car and Lorry. 
iv. PUSH 
The ground or a substitute, is the support while the effort is external to the object but applied 
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constantly throughout the duration of the motion. Push or pull actions are both included, as 
the model does not distinguish between whether the source of effort is in front or behind 
the moving object. This is another example of a controlled motion. 
Picture examples:- Haycart and Pram. 
v. ROLL 
The ground or its substitute provides the support while the effort is applied externally to the 
object and does not come from itself. The difference between a ROLL and a PUSH motion 
is that the source of effort is applied only at the start of the motion and not throughout its 
duration. 
Picture examples:- Bowl and Hoop. 
vi. FLY 
The action takes place in the AIR and the source of effort is internal to the object which can 
be animate or inanimate in nature. The effort is continuous and provides a controlled 
motion. 
Picture examples:- Animate - Bird and Bee. 
Inanimate - Aeroplane and Helicopter. 
vii. JUMP 
This action takes place in the AIR but the source of effort is internal to the moving object 
itself and takes place only when the motion begins. 
Picture examples:- Girl and Horse. 
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viii. THROW 
This action takes place in the AIR and the object stays up for a period and then falls to the 
ground. The source of effort is external to the object and is only applied at the beginning 
of the action. 
Picture examples:- Ball and Football. 
ix. FALL 
No effort needed caused by lack of SUPPORT. 
Picture examples:- Man from broken drainpipe and Bomb from aeroplane. 
x. FLOAT 
The air forms the support of these light objects and is also its source of EFFORT i.e. the wind 
makes these objects move. 
Picture examples:- Balloon and Clouds. 
The ground is regarded by the model as fixed and immovable. There is no possible cause 
for it to move. (Exceptional circumstances such as earthquakes lie outside the system). If 
anything else is fixed to the ground e.g. a house or a lamppost, then this object too will lack 
the possibility of motion. 
Things which do or can move are distinguished as objects. The model proposes that pieces 
of a scene are recognised as one object when all the parts of that same object move together. 
The individual pieces of an object are attached to each other, or the object is held by another 
object The conditions for a single object at rest are defined as follows: 
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a. Lacks being fixed so could move. 
b. Requires some sort of support (without support, it falls). 
There are however objects which lack being fixed, are not visibly supported by another 
object, yet are not falling e.g. a bird or an aeroplane. These objects must therefore have the 
special property of being able to hold themselves up - this being achieved through EFFORT. 
There is a part of the network which establishes whether a thing under scrutiny belongs with 
or goes with other objects. When objects move together it is reasonable to expect to find 
them as part of/fixed, to/carried, by/resting, on/other things. This part of the network defines 
two further cases of movement by distinguishing the two possibilities:- 
1. The object is fixed to the carrier,when support and motion are integrated. 
2. The object rests on or in the carrier, when support and motion are differentiated. 
In other words some CARRIED objects move as part of the carrier (e.g. the arms go with 
the body) whereas other carried objects only rest on the carrier (e.g. the saddle of a horse.) 
This category raises some interesting questions about the recognition of objects since the 
model assumes that all the pieces of an object must move together for it to be considered as 
one object. 
This introduces a further link between motion and support, in that parts can be supported by 
wholes, these being important features which need to be considered in the genesis of the 
notion of the object itself and in the elucidation of the role of action in the development of 
this concept. 
The model emphasises the fact that the course of certain movements can be changed or 
controlled during their duration. The effort to move the object is produced constantly 
throughout the motion such as in WALK and allows the path or speed of the motion to be 
changed. This is in contrast to a ROLL type motion where the effort is only present at the 
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start and a rolling object's path is determined by its source of effort. This distinction is found 
in figure 6.4 for the motions of WALK, FLY and PUSH. This distinction is later referred 
to as a CONTROL/TIME difference (see 7.2.5). 
This version makes a distinction between motion produced by own effort from that of the 
effort of an external agent. However if one examines the stereotypical case of WALK,which 
uses own effort, in reality this paradigm includes both animate and inanimate examples such 
as people and cars. Whether this version of the model should have catered for this finer 
distinction is a question which can only be answered by subjecting the model to test. 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
The previous informal model suggested that movement is conceptualised as taking place 
either on the ground or in the air. The formalized version makes this distinction even clearer 
by making explicit the differences between movements on the ground and in the air. It is 
because this later model differentiates basic motions with respect to a number of features 
that one testable aspect of the model is the degree of difference between motions. Another 
is the extent to which people agree that examples placed in the same category by the model 
are indeed similar. 
This formalised model with clearly defined stereotypical motions, not only allows 
different sorts of questions to be asked about commonsense causes of motion but also 
suggests a methodology which could be used to probe this understanding. The questions 
this model raises includes: 
1. Do people actually group motions as the model predicts and is this a natural way to 
explain motion? 
2. Do people rate the differences between stereotypical motions as similar to those 
predicted by the theoretical model? 
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3. If the ideas about the causality of movement and the nature of objects which are the 
basis of this model are formed in early childhood, will primary school children 
recognise the differences between motions as predicted by the model? 
4. What sort of methodology could be employed to answer the above questions? 
Given the stereotypes,with examples of each, a matching task suggests itself as a possible 
methodology where subjects, over a wide age range, could be asked to compare pictures 
of representative examples from the nine stereotypical motions (STAND, a non-motion, 
would be omitted) and to rate the difference between these motions. Their responses could 
be compared directly with the theoretical predictions and so provide a test of the model. A 
fuller discussion of why a task of this nature was developed for the main study is given in 
section 7.1.2. 
If this type of methodology is considered as a possible means of testing the model then the 
first three general questions raised above can be more sharply defined:- 
1. Do people recognise the differences between stereotypical motions in the way 
proposed by the model? 
2. Does this occur over a wide age range? 
3. If there are differences between the model's predictions are the differences system-
atic with the age groups tested? 
4. Are there any pieces of the model still missing? 
5. Do children differentiate between animate and inanimate motion more strongly than 
suggested by the model? 
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6. Can the role of CARRY be investigated in more detail to see if an object is recog-
nised as one object if all its pieces move together? 
These issues provided important considerations in the design and choice of the instrument 
for the main study, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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7. DESIGN OF THE MATCHING TASKS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used in the main study. The first 
section How can the model be tested? discusses different methods of testing tacit 
knowledge. The second, Design of the Matching Tasks, discusses the design and 
construction of the final questionnaires. The third section Description of the three 
separate Matching Tasks specifies the contents of each test. The fourth, Sample, 
describes the different groups of students involved and discusses the sampling process. The 
final section, Administration, describes the timing and the manner in which each matching 
task was given. 
7.1 HOW CAN THE MODEL OF COMMONSENSE IDEAS ABOUT MOTION BE 
TESTED? 
7.1.1 Introduction 
The model of commonsense ideas about motion aims to explain or give a reasonable account 
of what most people think about movement. It provides a number of testable hypotheses 
about tacit conceptions of motion, in particular by specifying a number of stereotypical 
motions (figure 6.4). More importantly, the model defines the differences between these 
motions. 
7.1.2 What would be an appropriate task to test the model? 
Possible methods of testing a theoretical account of tacit knowledge fall into three major 
categories. These can be differentiated by the responses they ask subjects to make when 
explaining motion:- 
1. Do people produce the same terms as the theoretical account? 
2. Do people agree with the account given by the model? 
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3. Do people make judgements in accordance with the model's predictions? 
The techniques which match the above classification are - 
I. Interviews - using explanations as a source of data. 
2. a. Repertory Grid Technique - using given constructs as a source of data. 
b. Making use of a number of explanations of motion based on the theoretical account 
and asking pupils if they agree with these explanations. (A computer model could 
be used in this way). 
3. A paper and pencil task could be designed to test the model's predictions about 
similarity or difference between different motions. The subjects could be asked to 
compare pairs of motion, presented as pictures, and to say how different they thought 
they were by selecting from a choice of predetermined responses. 
The appropriateness of each technique for use in the main study is discussed below. 
1. Interviews 
An interview methodology produces a number of children's explanations about motion. 
These explanations need to be compared with the theoretical account and the researcher has 
to judge whether the children's specific disclosures about motion can be interpreted in terms 
of the model. This is not so straight forward as first appears because the children could be 
using the terms of the model such as EFFORT and SUPPORT but not using them in a way 
predicted by the model. This means that they are using the terms just as ordinary words and 
not the strict sense defined by the theoretical account. For example EFFORT described by 
the model as the "go of things" and can be used to account for any type of force which makes 
things move. Children might only use the term EFFORT to talk about animate forces yet 
recognise that some sort of "EFFORT" is needed for any type of motion to take place. On 
the other hand the children may never use any of the terms or nomenclature of the model, 
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throughout the course of the interview, but they may nonetheless explain motion in a manner 
which is consistent with the model. In either case it must be recognised that there is a long 
chain of inference between the subjects' explanation and the categorisation of the data for 
analysis. A way to overcome this particular problem would be to "put the model to the 
children" first and then note their response. However, there is the difficulty with this latter 
technique of the researcher suggesting the model to the children. It would then be difficult 
to determine whether the spontaneous responses of the subjects had really been captured. 
The interview technique provides a good first test of the model (see Chapter 5.2) in that it 
provides an appropriate vechicle for exploring children's ideas. However, there are too 
many obvious objections for it to be used for a test of a well specified model, nor can it be 
used for interviewing large numbers of subjects across a wide age range. 
2a. Repertory grids 
The three ways in which knowledge can be elicited with this method have been previously 
discussed in section 5.3.2. Giving both constructs and elements to the subjects is the only 
technique that would serve in this instance and its use has three obvious objections:- 
i. The subjects are being taught the model. 
ii. It would be a too time consuming methodology with which to test a large number 
of subjects and 
iii. The problem of interpretation of data persists. 
2b. A computer model of the theory has been written in Prolog which produces explanations 
of motion. It would be a challenging but nonetheless time consuming exercise to develop 
an interview with this type of model to see whether subjects agree with the types of accounts 
of motion that the computer produces. Again the problems of interpretation and suggestion 
still remain with this technique. 
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3. Questionnaire 
A paper and pencil matching task is certainly one of the most attractive choices to test the 
theoretical model. Such a matching task would ask subjects to judge the similarity of 
different motions as proposed by the model. Their responses could also be checked against 
the theoretical predictions in a quantitative way. The technique would be simple to 
administer to a large sample size and age range. This method, with its large number of 
comparisons has the advantage of making it difficult for the subject to consistently try to 
"guess what is wanted". This technique overcomes many of the problems associated with 
the other methodologies such as inference and suggestion and provides a good test of 
whether people do actually group motions as the model predicts. It would also be possible 
to ascertain then whether the model actually represents a natural explanation of motion. 
However, there is a disadvantage with this tool in that it does not collect any evidence re-
garding the subjects' reasons for choices. 
7.13 A synopsis of reasons for choosing a Picture Paper and Pencil Task 
The main practical reasons for conducting a survey with a questionnaire:- 
a. More subjects could be tested within the time available, which allows for the possibil-
ity of testing over a wide age range. 
b. The data would not be purely qualitative in nature, but will allow quantitative analysis. 
c. Pictures could be used to represent the motions, one of several preferences being ticked 
to indicate similarity of the causes of motions. This technique would impose less verbal 
demands upon the subjects and could more easily be used by younger pupils, i.e. those 
of primary school age. 
d. This design would allow identical tests to be given to a wide age range of pupils i.e. 7 
- 16 year olds, ensuring that the results from several age groups could readily be 
compared with one another. 
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e. The interpretation of the question is left to the individual. Thus the model, apart 
from selecting the cases presented,is in no sense revealed to the subject. 
7.2 DESIGN OF THE MATCHING TASKS 
7.2.1 Introduction 
Three separate matching tasks were devised to test the model The main task, Matching Task 
1 was the main one and was specifically designed to test systematically every possible 
comparison between the nine stereotypical motions. The condition known as STAND 
which described objects at rest was omitted from the tests. There was no space in the main 
task to test more fully the role of ANIMACY and the status of CARRY and so two subsidiary 
tasks were devised to test these other factors. Although three separate tasks were used they 
were designed in a similar fashion. These general aspects are described below while the 
individual differences between questionnaires are discussed later. 
7.2.2 General description of the Matching Tasks 
All three Matching Tasks consisted of an A5 landscape booklet with the instructions on the 
front cover and all bore the title "REASONS WHY THINGS MOVE". Each consecutive 
page contained pictures of two different motions which needed to be compared. Underneath 
the pair of pictures was the response box to be completed by the subject, who had to indicate 
whether the reasons why the two things move were very alike, a bit alike, a bit different or 
very different, by ticking the appropriate place. An example page is shown in Figure 7.1 
below. This format was chosen since during trials it was found that the subjects preferred 
to indicate their choice of comparison per pair of motions on the same page, where the 
pictures were drawn and not on a separate answer sheet. They felt they could too easily lose 
their place in a test which was fifty questions long. 
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e 	  
Figure 7.1: Sample page from Matching Task Booklet 
I. Reasons for things moving  
The go-cart moves 	 The tin can moves 
The reasons why the two things move are 
 
very alike 
a bit alike 
a bit different 
very different 
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The second page, which contained the first pair of comparisons, was the same for each task. 
It contained a training example of pictures; which was not part of the actual test but was 
inserted as an example which could be done with the teacher's help, to make clear the nature 
of the task. 
The two different pictorial examples of each motion were used alternately throughout each 
task. The pairs of comparisons after being systematically selected were then placed in a 
random order for the final construction of the booklet. This ordering is documented in 
appendix V for each task. 
7.2.3 Pictures to represent the nine stereotypical motions 
It was decided to include some replication, by using two examples of each stereotypical 
motion. A set of general criteria were needed to make the final selections and to decide upon 
the presentation of each diagram in the booklet. These were as follows:- 
1. Each picture needed to be a clear case of one stereotypical motion. 
2. The source of EFFORT needed to be easily recognised. 
3. The source of SUPPORT should be clearly drawn and the state of the ground should 
be apparent, these being important features of the theoretical description. 
4. The background features which set the scene of the action must be minimal but clear. 
5. A label would be needed upon which to focus the action. 
6. The pictures should describe reasonable everyday motions. 
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7.2.4 Selection of activities to be represented diagrammatically for each stereotypical 
motion 
Table 7.1: Pictorial examples chosen to represent the stereotypical motions in 
Matching Task 1 
STEREOTYPICAL MOTION EXAMPLES CHOSEN TO REPRESENT MOTION 
CARRY People in train and Pole carried by man 
WALK - animate Bull and man 
inanimate Car and Lorry 
PUSH Haycart and Pram 
ROLL Bowl and Hoop 
FLY - animate Bird and Bee 
inanimate Aeroplane and Helicopter 
JUMP Girl and Horse 
THROW Ball and Football 
FALL Man from broken drainpipe and 
Bomb from aeroplane 
FLOAT Balloon and Clouds 
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The CARRY examples chosen above are different from each other which is not the case 
with the representive examples of the other eight stereotypical motions. This is because 
CARRY is a more complex motion and objects can be carried IN or HELD-BY the or form 
PART OF the carrier (see figure 6.4). The CARRY-IN/HELD examples proved to 
represent more realistic motions which would be easier to test in the main task and since 
CARRY is a more complex motion than the other eight it deserves special investigation in 
a separate task where its different facets can be examined in more detail (see 7.3.6). The 
example of passengers in a train is chosen to represent a CARRY-IN motion while a man 
holding a pole provides an example of a CARRY-HELD motion. The details of a separate 
Matching Task for CARRY are described later in Section 7.3.6. 
7.2.5 Predicting differences between the stereotypical motions 
In order to assess the differences between each of the stereotypical motions a simpler 
description based on the network and using its primitives of support, effort and control/ 
time was used as is shown in Table 7.2 below. (Later, more elaborate schemes were used). 
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Table 7.2: Differences of support, effort and control used to differentiate the classes 
of motion 
CLASS 
OF 
MOTION 
SUPPORT EFFORT CONTROL/TIME 
FLY Itself - effort Other + 
FALL None None - 
FLOAT By air None - 
THROW None (motion) Other - 
WALK Ground Own + 
JUMP None (motion) Own - 
ROLL Ground Other - 
PUSH Ground Other + 
CARRY Support other Other - 
The differences between the nine classes of motion can now be numerically scored from the 
above table. This is illustrated by the examples of Throw and Fly. The support is different 
in each, since a flying object supports itself by effort while a thrown object has no support. 
There are also differences in effort. The flying object supplies its own effort while the 
thrown object has no effort of its own it is only provided by an external source of effort. 
Control is also dissimilar. Flying objects have their effort in the present and are controlled 
while thrown objects do not control their own motion. This leads to three differences 
between the two stereotypical motions. Each class of motion was compared with each other 
in this way and the differences were translated into a numerical score as shown below. 
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1 = no difference 	 3 = 2 differences 
2 = 1 difference 
	 4 = 3 differences 
(It would have been better to score these 0, 1, 2, 3: the above system was used because my 
spread sheet would not count numbers of zeros). 
The theoretical predictions between the classes of motion were constructed in this way and 
are summarised in table 7.3 below. 
Table 7.3: Differences between classes of motion depicted by numerical score 
FLY FALL FLOAT THROW WALK JUMP ROLL PUSH CARRY 
FLY 
FALL 
FLOAT 
THROW 
WALK 
JUMP 
ROLL 
PUSH 
CARRY 
1 4 
1 
4 
2 
1 
4 
4 
3 
1 
2 
4 
4 
4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
1 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 
4 
2 
1 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
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The basic distinguishing concepts which were used in the network to differentiate motion 
were those of SUPPORT, EFFORT and CONTROL and these were given equal weightings 
when constructing the theoretical scores. This was the first attempt at translating the 
differences between motion as described by the network into a numerical score and there 
was no reason not to assign equal values to the primitives. At this stage an animacy factor 
was omitted until the position was further clarified with Matching Task 2. 
One of the weaknesses of the model is that it does not mention the relative importance of 
the primitives used to describe motion. This thesis attempts to investigate what this might 
be and whether any more descriptions are necessary if motions are to be grouped in a 
commonsense way. However, if the theory survives under these conditions then it would be 
a good first test and would support a view that it is not totally wrong! 
7.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE SEPARATE MATCHING TASKS 
7.3.1 Matching Task 1 
The main task consisted of 1 training example and 49 comparison pairs of pictures for 
examination and included three types of comparisons. 
These were:- 
i. Comparisons of different members of the same class of motion. 
ii. Comparison of the nine different classes of motion with each other. 
iii. Comparison of animate and inanimate members of the classes of motion of 
WALK and FLY only. 
The latter comparison was included because the pilot study and repertory grid work had 
suggested that pupils would attribute difference based on animacy. This was therefore a first 
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attempt to investigate the above phenomenon, which would be given further and fuller 
analysis in Matching Task 2. 
The children were asked to rate the differences between the motion on a four point scale. 
This scale was used for all the Matching Tasks. Pairs of comparisons, using the two 
replications of each motion alternately, were systematically selected, and then re-arranged 
in random order. 
7.3.2 Description of Matching Task 2 (Animacy Test) 
A separate task was designed to test the notion of animacy. It made three animacy 
comparisons for each of the nine stereotypical motions. These included:- 
Inanimate motion with inanimate motion. 
Animate motion with animate motion. 
Inanimate motion with animate motion. 
These three different comparisons were tested for each stereotypical motion which made a 
total of 27 comparisons. (See Appendix V for order of examples in booklet). 
7.33 Description of Matching Task 3 (Test of role of CARRY) 
Matching Task three was developed to investigate more fully the role of CARRY in the 
commonsense model of motion. This task was designed to make comparisons between carry 
motions and their corresponding stereotypical motion to test whether the motion of the 
carried object is seen to move in the same way as the carrier of the same object. It was also 
intended to see if the comparison of different carry pairs would be seen similarily to the 
comparison of the corresponding stereotypical pairs e.g. would CARRY FALL and 
CARRY FLOAT be seen to be similar to FALL and FLOAT? 
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The sets of comparisons were constructed in the following way. 
In the notation below X denotes one type of sterotypical motion while Y represents a 
different stereotypical motion. 
i. Comparison of CARRY-IN identities 
a. CARRY X CARRY X 
Two different pictures of an identical CARRY motion were compared to each other. 
E.g. CARRY FLY with CARRY FLY 
b. CARRY X CARRY Y 
Two different CARRY motions were compared. 
E.g. CARRY FLY with CARRY FLOAT 
ii. Comparison of CARRY-IN identities with equivalent and different stereotypical 
motions 
a. CARRY X - X 
A CARRY-IN motion was compared with its equivalent 
single stereotypical motion. 
E.g. CARRY FLY and FLY 
b. CARRY X - Y 
A CARRY-IN motion was compared with a different single stereotypical motion. 
E.g. CARRY FLY and FLOAT 
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iii. Comparison of CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD motions 
A CARRY-IN motion was compared with its identical CARRY-HOLD motion. 
E.g. CARRY-IN FLY and CARRY-HELD FLY. 
The carry task tested only the following five motions, FLOAT, FLY, WALK, PUSH and 
FALL. This test did not include ROLL, JUMP and THROW motions. The reasons for this 
decision were as follows. It was difficult to find realistic examples of ROLL, JUMP, 
THROW. Objects rolled or thrown rarely carry anything in reality. It was perhaps 
unfortunate not to have tested all aspects of the model in this case - but at least some 
comparisons were possible. Possibly a simple matching task is not the way to compare 
compound motions, because of the difficulty of knowing what to attend to. This difficulty 
was compounded when CARRY-PART OF comparisons were thought about for inclusion 
in this task. What features of the object should the subjects focus on when a CARRY 
PART-OF comparison was needed? For example with a JUMP should it be the mane of a 
horse. Could the fingers of a person participating in a WALK type motion count? The real 
difficulty here is that if the part of the object does not move independently then it cannot be 
attended to as an object and if it does move more independently then you cannot draw the 
subjects attention to it. In the end CARRY-PART OF comparisons were omitted from the 
investigation. This difficulty highlights the problem of trying to investigate CARRY in 
the same format as the other tasks. In fact with this design two comparisons need to be 
made between the pairs of given examples: those of the carrier and the carried. 
CARRIED objects can be carried IN or HELD-by the carrier. It was too difficult to 
systematically vary all the CARRY IN and the CARRY-HELD comparisons, since the 
recursive nature of CARRY escalates the number of examples to be compared which would 
produce too many items for the subjects to consider within a reasonable time span. 
All these comparisons gave rise to a total number of 41 examples (in addition to the first 
training example) and these were then placed in a random order for the final version of the 
test booklet, as shown in Appendix V. 
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7.4 SAMPLE 
7.4.1 Introduction 
The research was designed to see whether the commonsense model provided a reasonable 
account of everyday thinking, and whether these commonsense ideas about dynamics 
persisted with age and physics teaching. Therefore for the main part of the study which 
would be examined with Matching Task 1 the population tested needed to include subjects 
covering a wide range age and physics background. This was done by selecting:- 
a. The youngest possible primary children able to be tested with this methodology. 
The youngest were seven years old. 
b. An older group of primary school children who would still not have any formal 
physics training. Ten year olds were chosen. 
c. A group of secondary school children who had received some integrated science 
instruction: twelve years of age. 
d. A group of secondary school pupils' who had selected to follow a physics course to 
`0' level. These were fourteen years of age. 
e. A group of sixth form students who had chosen to study different subjects, some of 
whom were following an 'A' level Physics course. All of these pupils' would have 
studied at least one science subject to '07C.S.E. level but not necessarily physics. 
7.4.2 Description of the sample used for Matching Task 1 
Ten groups two each of (a) to (e) above were given Matching Task 1. They were taken from 
four different schools in Hertfordshire, chosen because the researcher had easy access to 
them and they had agreed to provide pupils for more than one test. Two Junior Mixed Infant 
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Schools (designated with letters A and B) and two all-ability secondary schools participated 
in the experiment (given letters C and D in the following tables). 
Table 7.4: Table describing science curriculum followed by the four schools taking 
part in the research 
SCHOOL SCIENCE CURRICULUM 
A General science taught as part of whole curriculum 
B General science taught as part of whole curriculum 
C Integrated science taught for the first two years. Pupils took 
separate Physics, Chemistry and Biology classes in the third year 
and then choose at least one of these to study to `0'/C.S.E. level. 
D Combined science taught for the first three years. Pupils then 
choose to follow individual science subjects or took a combined 
science exam course. 
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Table 7.5 summarises the main features of these groups. 
Table 7.5: Table describing schools and pupils participating in Matching Task 1 
Group School Age School 	 Current No. 	 No. 	 Total 
(years) Class 	 Science of 	 of 	 No. of 
Teaching Boys Girls 	 Students. 
1 A 7 Infant 	 General 7 	 13 	 20 
2 B 7 Infant 	 General 20 
3 A 10 Junior 	 General 9 	 11 	 20 
4 B 10 Junior 	 General 13 	 7 	 20 
5 C 12 Second 	 Integrated 
year 	 Science 
15 	 12 	 27 
Secondary. 
6 D 12 Second 	 Integrated 
year 
	
Science 
14 	 14 	 28 
Secondary. 
7 C 14 Fourth 	 Physics '0' 
year 	 Level 
9 	 20 	 29 
Secondary. 
8 D 14 Fourth 	 Physics '0' 
year 	 Level 
11 	 9 	 20 
Secondary. 
9 C 16 First 	 Mixed 'A' 
year 
	
Levels 
16 	 4 	 20 
Sixth/ 
Secondary. 
10 D 16 First 	 Mixed 'A' 
year 	 Levels 
12 	 8 	 20 
Sixth/ 
Secondary. 
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7.43 The sample used for Matching Task 2 
Schools A and C were used for this test, only two age groups being tested. These were seven 
and 16 year olds, it having been decided to test the extreme ages. A smaller sample was used 
because if the animacy effect was as prevalent as suggested then it should be found both in 
the youngest and oldest pupils tested. These groups are not identical to groups one and nine 
used in Matching Task 1 above. 
Table 7.6: Table summarising the main features of the groups used to test Matching 
Task 2 
Group 	 School 	 Average School 	 Current 	 No. No. Total 
Age 	 Level Course 	 of of No.of 
(years) 	 Boys Girls Students 
11 	 A 	 7 	 Infant General 	 14 16 30 
12 	 C 	 16 	 First 	 Mixed 'A' 	 18 	 9 	 27 
year 	 Levels 
Sixth/ 
Secondary. 
7.4.4 The sample used for Matching Task 3 
Schools A and C were used for this test and three separate age groups tested, 7, 12 and 16 
years of age. The seven and twelve year olds were not the same groups as tested previously. 
However the sixteen year olds were the same group as tested in Matching Task 2 i.e. group 
12 was used twice. 
The extreme ages were tested plus one group which fell in the middle. Three groups were 
chosen because it was thought that the seven year olds might produce different answers to 
the other groups because of their egocentricity. 
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Table 7.7: Table summarising the main features of the groups used to test Matching 
Task 3 
Group School Average School Current No. 	 No. 	 Total 
Age Level Course of 	 of 	 of 
(years) Boys Girls Students 
13 A 7 Infant General 12 	 18 	 30 
14 C 12 Second 
year 
Integrated 
Science 
13 	 17 	 30 
Secondary. 
12 C 16 First 
year 
Mixed 'A' 
Levels 
11 	 21 	 32 
Sixth 
Secondary 
7.5 ADMINISTRATION OF TASKS 
Each task consisted of a booklet with an identical general format and all the pupils 
completed them in the same way. However the administration of the tasks with infant and 
junior pupils was more structured. The instructions were read aloud to the pupils and they 
were asked to comment upon anything they did not understand. The first example was 
worked through together with the pupils and later the picture captions were read aloud to 
them as they completed each example to avoid any difficulties which some children had 
with their reading. 
The secondary school pupils read the instructions themselves but were also asked to 
comment upon anything which they did not understand. The first example was worked 
through with them so they were clear about what to focus on during the questionnaire but 
they completed all the examples at their own pace as they had no difficulty reading the 
picture captions. The Tasks occupied between thirty and fifty minutes. 
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The survey was administered in three phases. The main study i.e. Matching Task 1 was 
administered in June 1987, Matching Task 2 in October 1987 and finally Matching Task 3 
(the CARRY task) in November 1987. 
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8. ANALYSIS OF MAIN MATCHING TASK (TASK 1) 
This chapter presents the analysis of Matching Task 1. It divides itself into seven sections, 
8.1 Introduction describes the aims of the task. 8.2 Methodology of Analysis reviews the 
techniques used to assess how well the empirical data fitted the model's predictions for this 
and the subsequent other two tasks. 8.3 Comparison of theoretical and empirical data, 
reports the match between the model's predictions and the results from Matching Task 1. 
8.4 Discussion of scatterplots, shows where the results from each age groups tested differ 
from the theoretical predictions. 8.5 What is the consistency of response?, summarises 
the similarity and variability of judgements found between the different ages. 8.6 Possible 
causes of mismatch between empirical data and theoretical predictions, identifies 
potential problematic pairs of comparisons and recalculates the correlations with those 
examples removed to see how these particular examples interfere with the model's 
predictions. 8.7 Conclusion summarises the main findings from this questionnaire. 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Matching Task 1 was designed to systematically test children's ideas about the differences 
between the nine stereotypical motions described by the model and to compare the 
children's responses with the predictions made by that theoretical model. Five different age 
groups were tested and so the results are presented for each of these separate ages (7, 10, 12, 
14 and 16 years) together with a mean value for the whole sample. 
8.2 METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS 
The main aim of the analysis for Matching Task 1 (and the other two Matching Tasks 
described in Chapters 9 and 10) was to answer the following questions:- 
i. How well does the empirical data fit the predicted values? 
ii. What similarity is there between the responses of the different ages tested? and 
139 
iii. How much variation is there, at each age, in the judgements of similarity of pairs? 
Although there is some variation within the individual chapters the main types of analysis 
used for each task, to answer the above questions, were similar:- 
i. Rank correlations to judge the theoretical predictions against the empirical data. 
ii. Wilcoxon signed ranks test of 
a. The mean values - to judge similarity of responses between ages and 
b. The standard deviation divided by the maximum standard deviation - to judge 
variability of responses. 
The final conclusions which can be drawn from the results of all three Matching Tasks are 
discussed in Chapter 11. 
This chapter also speculates about the distinctions the children are making which were not 
indicated by model, and could account for the observed differences between the theoretical 
predictions and the pupils actual replies. 
In order to assess how well the empirical data fitted the predicted values it is important to 
see if the pupils put the pairs of motions into the same groups as suggested by the model. 
Since Spearman's rho is based upon ranks it has two special properties. It is less affected 
by outliers or extraordinary values than the ordinary correlation coefficient. The rank of the 
largest value depends only on the sample size and not on the magnitude of that value, so the 
value can be arbitarily large without altering rho. 
Spearman's rho also remains the same even if x or y are transformed by a monotone function 
e.g. the ranks of log (theoretical value) will be the same as the ranks of "theoretical value". 
Values of rho can vary from -1 to 1. If value of rho is near 1 or -1 then the conclusion is not 
that there is a linear relationship between x and y but there is a monotone relationship 
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between them. If rho is near zero then there is no evidence for a monotone relationship. 
Rank correlations were preferred to Pearson correlation because the scale of the predictions 
is at best ordinal. In fact, the Pearson correlations never differed markedly from the rank 
correlations. Scatter plots showing empirical ratings versus theoretical prediction, together 
with their rank correlations, are given, for each age group. 
The Wilcoxon signed ranks test were used to investigate:- 
i. The similarity of judgement between the ages tested, and 
ii. The variability of these judgements. 
The standard deviation divided by the maximum standard deviation was used to assess the 
variability of judgements. The maximum possible standard deviation with mean m, on a 
scale 1 - 4 was calculated as follows:- 
maximum standard = J (m-1)(4-m) 
deviation 
The advantage of the Wilcoxon test over a t test for the purpose of this analysis is that it is 
not legitimate here to use an interval scale but the ordering of the scores is justifiable. 
8.3 COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL DATA 
Correlations were calculated both including and excluding the comparisons of members of 
the same sterotypical motion, i.e. the identities. This was done to gain some information 
about the role the identities play in the fit between theoretical and empirical data. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that children will recognise members of the same class of motion as 
more similar than pairs from different classes of motion and the predictions may fit better 
here even if the predictions between different classes of motion do not fit the theoretical 
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predictions so well. Therefore the inclusion of identities will probably contribute a large 
part of any agreement between theoretical and empirical data. (See table 8.1 below.) 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 below illustrate the shape of the two idealised scatterplots to be 
expected when:- 
a. a correlation is found which is due only to the inclusion of identities and 
b. a correlation is found which is not just due to the inclusion of identities. 
Figure 8.1: Idealised Scatterplot of a correlation which is due only to the inclusion 
of identities 
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Figure 8.2: Idealised Scatterplot of a correlation which is not just due to the inclusion 
of identities 
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Table 8.1: Correlations with theoretical position; comparison of 'identities' have been 
included and excluded (n = 49) 0= 36) 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 	 Sixteens 
Rank 	 Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
With 
Identities 
Without 
Identities 
0.680 
0.292 
0.620 
0.318 
0.655 
0.278 
0.750 
0.513 
0.720 
0.406 
0.698 
0.344 
The correlations, including identities, are reasonably large (0.62 to 0.75), indicating a 
substantial agreement between the model's predictions and children's judgements. It 
appears that the correlations are rather higher for the two oldest groups (14 and 16), and 
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rather lower for the younger children. Removing the identities reduces all the correlations, 
(0.28 - 0.51). The best match is for the fourteen year old group, and the worst for the twelve 
year olds. As above, correlations for the older children remain higher than those for the 
younger children. Appendix VI reports the children's actual responses to Matching Task 
1. The theoretical predictions with which these actual results were compared are found in 
Chapter 7. 
8.4 DISCUSSION OF SCATTERPLOTS 
8.4.1 Introduction 
Scatterplots of empirical versus theoretical values are discussed in relation to the correla-
tions to identify the sources of the correlations. The scatterplots are given in figures 8.3 -
8.8 and include the identities. 
The scatterplot produced by the mean scores of the total population is discussed first to look 
for a general pattern produced by the data as a whole. Specific problems are then illustrated 
with respect to all ages and then to particular age groups tested. 
8.4.2 Scatterplot of the mean scores of the total population sampled 
As expected from the correlations the scatterplot is generally fitted by a line of positive 
slope. The identities account for most of the positive correlation, because when they are 
removed, much less difference is seen between the separation of items within columns three 
and four. 
It seems that children did regard as very similar motions predicted by the model to be 
`identical'. However, the predictions of differences between non-identical sterotypes are 
much less good. One possible reason for this may be that the model does not take animacy 
into account - note that animate/inanimate comparisons identified on the plot, tend to 
occupy discrepant positions. Another noticable discrepancy is ROLL, THROW which are 
seen as more similar than predicted. 
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FIG.8.5 SCATTERPLOT OF FOURTEENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF FIRST FORMALISED VERSION OF THE MODEL. 
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FIG.8.6 
	 SCATTERPLOT OF TWELVES' MEAN SCORE AGAINST 
THEORETICAL SCORE OF FIRST FORMALISED VERSION 
OF THE MODEL. 
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FIG. 8.7 SCATTERPLOT OF TENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETOCAL 
SCORE OF FIRST FORMALISED VERSION OF THE MODEL. 
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8.4.3 Problems found in the scatterplot of the mean scores of the total population 
sampled 
The identities are not as closely grouped as might be expected. In fact their values range 
from 0.2 - 2.8. There are a number of factors which could explain these unpredicted 
differences:- 
i. The role of animacy 
The difference between animate/inanimate comparisons of WALK, WALK and FLY, FLY 
are greater than predicted by the model but these particular examples were introduced into 
Matching Task 1 because it was thought that animacy differences between moving objects 
would introduce another distinction between movements as yet not made explicit by the 
commonsense model. 
ii. The selection of examples to represent CARRY 
The CARRY difference is greater than the perceived difference between identities of the 
other sterotypical motions. This is not such a surprising result as at first appears since the 
examples chosen to represent CARRY in this task were CARRY-IN and difference in 
animacy and so of the identities these were in theory the most different. The model suggests 
that CARRY is a complex motion in the sense that a carried object inherits both the support 
and motion from the carrier and requires further clarification. The role of CARRY is tested 
more fully in Matching Task 3 and is reported later in chapter 10. 
iii. Subjects discriminating between accidental and purposeful action 
The FALL identity comparisons too do not match well with the theoretical predictions. The 
examples chosen to represent FALL; were a man falling from a broken drainpipe and a 
bomb dropping from an aeroplane. Some secondary school children suggested why these 
two examples should be viewed differently. They explained that a man does not normally 
intend to fall off a drainpipe and so his motion was considered to be accidental. On the other 
hand, a bomb is deliberately dropped from an aeroplane and so its motion is intentional. 
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Among the examples which were ranked with a theoretical difference of 2.0 (i.e. those 
which appear in column two of the scatterplot) the ROLL THROW comparison was seen 
as closer than its predicted value. In fact the children perceived less difference between the 
ROLL THROW comparison than the PUSH PUSH, FLOAT FLOAT and WALK WALK 
(animate) pairs of motions. This result could be explained by the design of the matching task 
itself. The questionnaire required the children to focus upon the reasons why two given 
objects move. It could be that with the ROLL and THROW comparisons the children fo-
cussed only on the source or origin of these motions, which both require an external source 
of motion. The pictures focus on the beginning of the motion and the thrown ball is seen 
only travelling in the upward direction. In each case the cause of ongoing motion is iden-
tical. Each ball is given a force from an external agent. This force or effort is used to propel 
the ball forward, whether it moves in the air or on the ground. The ball comes to rest when 
the force runs out in either medium and it could well be that differences in support are 
ignored by pupils for this example. 
There are a number of comparisons, a PUSH JUMP, FLOAT FLY and three THROW pairs 
of motions, which were seen as closer than predicted by the model, while there are some 
JUMP and FLOAT comparisons where the differences were larger than predicted by the 
theoretical model. This result suggests that there could be problems with the theoretical dif-
ferences predicted between JUMP, FLOAT and THROW motions or that the mismatch 
could be due to animacy differences. These suggestions are discussed more fully in section 
8.6. 
8.4.4 Problematic examples found in the responses made by the sixteen year olds 
The sixteen year olds' pattern of response was similar to that of the mean scatterplot and 
fit the theoretical pattern better than the mean scores. The identities are more closely 
grouped together with the exception of the CARRY CARRY comparison, which stands 
apart from the others. The examples which were given a ranked theoretical difference of 
two again form a closely knit group with the one exception of the ROLL THROW 
comparison, which was seen as far more similar than expected. (Empirical value of 1.12). 
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The order of the examples which had ranked theoretical scores of 3 and 4 are similar to those 
found on the mean plot. There is a much bigger spread of examples for a ranked score of 
3 while the pairs of motions with a ranked theroetical score of 4 are more closely grouped 
together. 
8.4.5 Problematic examples found in the responses made by the fourteen year olds 
The main difference between the fourteen year olds' data and the mean scatterplot is that 
for this age the subjects saw the WALK1, WALK2 comparison as more different than the 
CARRY, CARRY comparison. The examples with ranked theoretical score of 3 and 4 were 
more spread out than in the mean scatterplot, while the comparisons for a ranked theoretical 
score of 2 formed a more closely knit group. 
8.4.6 Problematic examples found in the responses made by the twelve year olds 
The scatterplot of the twelve year olds is very similar indeed to that of the graph produced 
by the mean values. The minor differences are seen in the examples with a ranked theoretical 
score of 2. Here the examples do not fall into three distinct regions. Only one group is 
identified and consists of the FALL, FLOAT and WALK2, FLY1 pairs of motions which 
were seen as more different than the others in this column. The other four examples with 
a ranked theoretical score of 2 are more spread out. The ROLL, THROW pair is seen as more 
similar than the ROLL, ROLL comparison. Among the examples with a ranked theoretical 
score of 4 the THROW, FALL pair is seen as less different than in the mean group and closer 
to the results obtained from the 10 year olds. 
8.4.7 Problematic examples found in the responses make by the ten year olds 
The ten year olds saw the CARRY CARRY comparison as more different than the other 
identities. In fact this value stood apart from others in this column. There is a larger spread 
of results in column 3 but a similar ordering of examples as shown in the general scatterplot. 
Among the examples with a ranked theoretical score of 4 there are three pairs which are seen 
as more similar than the others in this group. These are THROW FLOAT, FLOAT FLY2 
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and THROW FLY2 comparisons. It is only the ten year olds that saw the THROW FLOAT 
pair of comparisons as the least different in the theoretical range of 4. 
8.4.8 Problematic examples found in the responses made by the seven year olds 
The main differences between the seven year old responses are as follows:- 
The CARRY CARRY and WALK WALK difference is greater than the perceived 
difference for the other identities. 
The THROW JUMP difference is smaller than expected while the ROLL FALL difference 
is greater than the others which had a theoretical predicted difference of 3. For the 
comparisons which had a predicted difference of 4 the differences between FLOAT FLY2 
and PUSH JUMP comparisons is smaller than expected. 
8.4.9 Summary 
Within the identities, the older children saw the inanimate/animate comparisons of WALK 
as more different than those of CARRY. The CARRY-IN/HELD distinction was recog-
nised more clearly by the seven and ten year olds than by the sixteen year olds. Other 
CARRY comparions did not fit the theoretical predictions which suggests that the role of 
CARRY requires further clarification. 
The ROLL THROW comparison was seen by all groups of children to be more similar than 
the model's prediction and this could well be the fault of the pictures chosen to represent 
these pairs of motions as described in section 8.4.3. The seven, ten and twelve year old 
pupils identified some of the FLOAT comparisons more differently than expected, which 
suggests that the theoretical role of FLOAT may not be quite correct or that the examples 
chosen to represent FLOAT may have caused unanticipated difficulties. Other differences 
were perceived by the children for some JUMP comparisons and this could be expressed by 
the pictures used to represent some of the JUMP motions (i.e. a horse jumping in the 
downward direction). These ideas are discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. 
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8.5 WHAT IS THE CONSISTENCY OF RESPONSE? 
The model suggests that children form their ideas about the causes of motion very early in 
their development and so should be using these ideas to make sense of the world from an 
early age. Thus the prediction is that seven year olds should be using the same type of 
reasoning as the sixteen year olds. If the model's account of a common mental structure is 
correct then the children of all ages should respond to the questionnaire in a similar way. 
In order to test this prediction children's judgements about pairs of comparisons were 
analysed in two separate ways, using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. This analysis allows 
the following two questions to be investigated. 
1. Do children of different ages identify the pairs of motions similarly? and 
2. Is the variability in responses similar for each group tested? 
In order to answer the question whether children of two different ages put the comparisons 
in the same order, or not, each comparison given by children of different ages was compared 
by rank order. These results are shown in table 8.3. The T values for the 10/14 and 12/14 
comparisons are within the 95% confidence limits, indicating there is not enough evidence 
to reject the hypothesis that any differences arose by chance. (For n = 49, 95% limits for 
T are 512 -713). For all the seven and sixteen year old comparisons plus the 10/12 
comparison the value of T falls outside the 1% S vu:fcc.0.4ce leict, supporting the view that 
there are real differences between the groups in their judgements of examples. 
Tki bace 
	 heA, 
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Table 8.2: Wilcoxon Test to see if the different aged pupils compare the identical pairs 
similarly 
T = T Values 	 n = 49 
Sevens Tens Twelves Fourteens 
Tens 144* 
Twelves 199* 474* 
Fourteens 197* 574 579 
Sixteens 197* 353* 318* 323 
* Values outside 95% confidence limits 
The variability of judgements was analysed by dividing the standard deviation by the 
maximum value it could have for the observed mean. This value was ranked for each pair 
of comparisons by age as shown in table 8.5. The T values are high for seven/fourteen, 
seven/sixteen and fourteen/sixteen comparisons which indicated there is no real difference 
in variability between the ranks while the low values of T for the other comparisons sup-
port the view that there are real differences between the ranks. 
Table 8.3: Wilcoxon Test to determine the differences in variability of responses by 
each age group 
T = T Values 	 n = 49 
Sevens Tens Twelves Fourteens 
Tens 238* 
Twelves 101* 370* 
Fourteens 543 203* 69* 
Sixteens 517 290* 153* 602 
* Values outside 95% confidence limits 
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In order to assess whether there were any systematic differences in the variability of 
responses the mean values for each comparison were plotted against the maximum standard 
deviation for each age tested, as shown in figures 8.9 - 8.13. This type of analysis should 
identify the pairs of motions which subjects were unsure about, i.e. when there was no 
consensus among each age group about the reply. Further examination of these examples 
could suggest problems with with the choice of particular pictures for comparison i.e. 
illustrate methodological problems in the construction of the task or point to instances 
where the model is unclear. 
8.5.1 Discussion of examples about which the children agreed and disagreed 
The first interesting feature from this analysis is that the ten year olds showed the least 
variation of opinion, with no examples with a standard deviation/standard deviation greater 
than 0.8. The twelve year olds were similar with only one example above 0.8. One possible 
explanation for this result could be that at these ages the children have received little if any 
physics tuition and are subsequently more confident about their commonsense ideas. 
There were no examples which the different age groups all differed strongly about and so 
there does not seem to be any methodological anomaly with any particular comparison. 
However, the seven and sixteen year olds disagreed amongst themselves most about the 
WALK FLY pair which had a standard deviation/standard deviation maximum of above 
0.8 and both the twelve and fourteen year olds differed amonst themselves most strongly 
about the FALL identity comparison, again with a standard deviation/standard deviation 
maximum above 0.8. 
There were more examples which different age groups agreed most strongly about i.e. those 
comparisons which all had a standard deviation/standard deviation maximum of 0.6 and 
below. All ages agreed most strongly about the WALK, ROLL comparison while the ten, 
twelve and fourteen year old agreed about ROLL, ROLL, FLY, FLYand FALL, FLOAT 
comparisons. 
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There appears not to be any systematic pattern from this set of data. This piece of anlysis 
instead, highlights the difficulties in constructing a test through representative examples. 
8.6 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MISMATCH BETWEEN EMPIRICAL DATA AND 
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
8.6.1 Introduction 
The scatterplots have shown the cases where the theoretical and empirical data do not fit and 
also the examples which contribute most to the positive correlations. The following section 
examines certain comparisons in more detail and speculates about their contribution to the 
correlation. Two questions are asked to try and identify areas of mismatch between model 
and data. These are: 
1. What distinctions may the children be making with the actual examples given which are 
not indicated by the model. (These ideas are drawn from informal discussions with the 
pupils after the task was administered). 
2. Are there any particular problems with the examples chosen to represent the classes of 
FLOAT and CARRY? (since these comparisons contributed substantially to the mismatch 
between theory and data). 
The correlations were recalculated after removing the problematic examples in each area 
to see more clearly how much these particular examples were contributing to the mismatch. 
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8.6.2 What distinctions could the pupils be making when comparing classes of motion 
which are not indicated by the theoretical model? 
The possible distinctions to be considered are:- 
a. Animate/inanimate - 
	
The motion of an animate object was compared with that of 
an inanimate object. 
b. Identical sources - 	 Two different stereotypical of motion motions were 
compared yet their sources of action were identical e.g. a 
horse was pushing a cart for the PUSH motion and a horse 
was jumping a fence for the JUMP motion. There is another 
possible interpretation for the similarity in children's 
responses for this example. One of the pictures chosen to 
represent JUMP was that of a horse jumping over a fence. 
The picture shows the horse landing and so this example 
could be interpreted more like a FALL motion. 
c. Speed of motion - 	 An example illustrated a difference in speed between the 
compared motions which was not intended. 
d. Direction of motion - 	 Some examples illustrated a difference in direction of motion 
that was not intended. 
The specific examples for each of these distinctions is described in table 8.4 below. Table 
8.5 illustrates the changes in correlations when these examples have been systematically 
removed. 
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Table 8.4: Paired examples of motions taken from Matching Task 1 which could have 
produced unpredicted results 
EXAMPLE EXAMPLE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE COMPARISON 
NUMBER 	 NAME 	 OF THESE TWO PARTICULAR PICTURES 
2 	 PUSH JUMP 	 Both sources of motion are HORSES. 
ROLL THROW 	 Both sources of people playing a game. 
32 	 WALK WALK 	 SPEED difference. 
15 	 JUMP JUMP 	 Movement in different directions. 
24 	 WALK WALK 	 Movement in the downward direction for both 
examples. 
Table 8.5: Correlations with theoretical position; comparison of 'identities' have been 
included after the removal of various examples 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 
Rank 
Sixteens 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
No examples 
removed 
0.680 0.620 0.655 0.750 0.720 0.698 
Animacy 0.78 0.814 0.801 0.85 0.842 0.816 
Horse ex. 0.716 0.627 0.639 0.773 0.739 0.721 
Roll Throw 0.67 0.609 0.446 0.746 0.716 0.692 
Speed ex. 0.665 0.602 0.637 0.739 0.707 0.683 
Direction 0.677 0.611 0.641 0.752 0.710 0.689 
The factor of animacy makes the most difference to the correlations. These results are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 9. The removal of the examples with identical sources 
of motion also improve the correlations, which suggests that the particular choice of 
examples interfered with the model's predictions. Identical causes of motion may decrease 
the predicted differences between many objects. However factors of speed and direction 
appear to make little difference to the correlations. 
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8.6.3 Are there particular problems with the examples chosen to represent CARRY 
and FLOAT? 
The previous analysis indicated that both CARRY and FLOAT comparisons contributed to 
the mis-match between the models predictions and the empirical data. Table 8.5 illustrates 
the examples which could have contributed to this mis-match. 
CARRY as a class of motion was not extensively tested in Matching Task 1. Only the two 
examples of CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD were used and this selection could have 
produced an unfair test because the children were asked to compare two different types of 
CARRY and yet were expected to treat the examples as though they were equal. 
The float examples all contained pictures of clouds. It was suspected that the motion of 
clouds in itself might be a difficult examples for the children to understand. Table 8.5 also 
reports these particular FLOAT examples found in Matching Task 1. 
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Table 8.6: Paired examples from Matching Task 1 which could have produced 
unpredicted results 
EXAMPLE 
NUMBER 
EXAMPLE 
NAME 
3 CARRY ROLL 
4 FALL CARRY 
8 WALK 2 CARRY 
10 CARRY PUSH 
12 CARRY WALK 
25 CARRY FLY 
31 CARRY CARRY 
35 CARRY THROW 
39 JUMP CARRY 
42 FLOAT CARRY 
11 FLOAT FLOAT 
23 PULL FLOAT 
33 FLOAT WALK 
42 FLOAT CARRY 
47 FLOAT THROW 
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 below report the Spearman correlations after the CARRY and the 
FLOAT comparisons were removed. 
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Table 8.7: Spearman correlations with theoretical position, plus identities; minus 
cloud examples. (Minus example numbers: 11, 23, 33, 42 and 47) 
n = 44 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 
Rank 
Sixteens 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Theoretical 
Rank 
0.679 0.602 0.635 0.718 0.703 0.679 
Table 8.8: Spearman correlations with theoretical position, plus identities; minus 
CARRY examples 
n = 39 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 	 Sixteens 
Rank 	 Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
Theoretical 
Rank 
0.687 0.681 0.689 0.759 	 0.748 0.715 
There is an improvement in the correlations for all ages when the CARRY correlations were 
removed, which suggests that treating CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD examples as equal 
did adversly affect the model's predictions. The correlations decrease when the FLOAT 
comparisons are removed, particularly so for the groups of fourteen year olds. This result 
suggests a problem with the theoretical status of FLOAT which is discussed in Chapter 11. 
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Table 8.9: Summary of Correlations with theoretical position; comparisons of 
`identities' have been included after the removal of various examples 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 
Rank 
Sixteens 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
No examples 
removed 
0.680 0.620 0.655 0.750 0.720 0.698 
Animacy 0.740 0.737 0.795 0.836 0.829 0.813 
Horse ex. 0.716 0.627 0.639 0.773 0.739 0.721 
Speed ex. 0.665 0.602 0.637 0.739 0.707 0.683 
Direction 0.677 0.611 0.641 0.752 0.710 0.689 
Float 0.679 0.602 0.635 0.718 0.703 0.679 
Carry 0.694 0.695 0.691 0.763 0.757 0.720 
Roll Throw 0.67 0.609 0.446 0.746 0.716 0.692 
Table 8.9 summarises all the results and indicates which pieces of the model may be missing, 
namely a factor of animacy (see Chapter 9). The role of CARRY deserves further 
clarification and it appears to have been an unwise decision to treat CARRY-IN and 
CARRY-HELD motions as similar throughout Matching Task 1. The analysis also 
identified certain problems with a selection of representative examples of the stereotypes 
and that identical sources of motion take priority over the type of motion when a degree of 
difference is assessed. The notions of speed and direction require further investigation. 
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8.7 CONCLUSION 
There are three main questions which need to be answered when the results from Matching 
Task 1 are considered. These are: 
1. Do the children's responses match the theoretical predictions? 
2. Are the responses similar for all the ages tested? 
3. What features of the model still require further clarification? 
(These questions are only briefly addressed in this chapter but are considered more fully 
in the light of the information gained from the other Matching Tasks, in Chapter 11.) 
1. The correlations range from 0.62 -0.720 which suggest that children's responses can be 
predicted by the model. However the older children's replies fit the model better. The 
reasons why the seven year old responses may stand outside the majority of the data is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. 
2. There are differences betwen the responses with age with less difference between the 
10/14 and 12/14 age groups. There were no systematic differences in the variability of 
responses with age (8.4.2) which could highlight any particular problem within the 
proposed theoretical model. Instead this result highlights the difficulties in construct-
ing a test with representative examples. 
3. The role of animacy, CARRY and FLOAT motions. require further clarification. 
Animacy and Carry are subjected to fuurther testing and the results are reported in 
chapters 9 and 10 respectively. 
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9. ANALYSIS OF MATCHING TASK 2 - A QUESTIONNAIRE TO 
INVESTIGATE THE ROLE OF ANIMACY IN A 
COMMONSENSE MODEL OF MOTION 
This Chapter reports the results from Matching Task 2 and divides itself into five sections. 
9.1 The Introduction, summarises the argument for devising a separate animacy task. 9.2 
Results, reports the findings from the task and describes how a theoretical factor for 
animacy was devised. 9.3 Further Analysis reports an improvement in the Spearman 
correlations from Matching Task 1 with the addition of an animacy factor. 9.4 What is the 
consistency of response between the two age groups?, discusses the differences in 
responses between the seven and sixteen year olds' data. 9.5 Conclusion, summarises the 
importance of the role of animacy in a commonsense account of motion. 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
A more systematic analysis of the role of animacy required a separate matching task, which 
was devised as described in Section 7.3.5. The question which this task was designed to 
answer is whether subjects' judgements about the degree of difference between an 
inanimate and animate comparison varies systematically. If so not only would this result 
indicate that animacy is an important factor in a commonsense understanding of motion but 
if the degree of difference between an animate and inanimate motion could also be assessed, 
then this factor could be used to rework the empirical data from Matching Task 1 where 
animate/inanimate comparisons appeared. An improvement in the correlations, with the 
addition of an animacy factor, would be a further indication that the present version of the 
model is incomplete. 
It was impractical to administer Matching Task 2 to all ages and so the animacy task was 
given to two groups of students only, the seven and the sixteen year olds. It was thought that 
if animacy is an important piece of the commonsense model of motion it should affect 
subjects' judgements at either end of the age spectrum and so the testing of only these two 
age groups should detect any animacy difference. 
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9.2 RESULTS 
Table 9.1 illustrates the results obtained from Matching Task 2. The values shown are the 
mean scores of the seven and sixteen year old subjects tested. There were thirty children 
in each group. The test was scored in the same way as Matching Task 1. A value of 1 
indicates that the pairs of motion were seen as very alike, 2 a bit alike, 3 a bit different and 
4 very different. 
There is a difference between the animate/inanimate comparison and both the animate/ 
animate and inanimate/inanimate comparisons for each class of motion tested except for 
FALLING. A possible explanation for the lack of any animacy effect for FALLING may 
be proposed using children's comments. The children during the piloting of the main 
Matching Task explained that living objects differed from non-living objects with respect 
to motion because the former are able to control their place and path of motion. These ideas 
make sense except when it comes to FALLING. But animate and inanimate objects have 
no control over FALLING motions once they have started. This proposal however requires 
further investigation. 
9.2.1 Assessing an animacy allowance 
In order to assess the importance of a difference between animate and inanimate motion the 
mean of inanimate/inanimate and animate/animate scores was taken from the animate/ 
inanimate score as shown in Table 9.2 below. The mean difference in animacy (for all the 
motions except FALL and PUSH) see Table 9.2 is 1.28. It therefore seems reasonable to 
suggest that a factor of 1.0 can be used to assess the difference between two distinct sources 
of motion with respect to animacy. 
The FALL and PUSH comparisons were ignored when calculating the animacy allowance. 
The reasons for ignoring FALL motions are as given in 9.2 while the PUSH comparisons 
were omitted because the moving object in all the PUSH motions was inanimate. This 
means that it was only the source of motion that changed in respect to animacy with the 
PUSH PUSH comparison. Therefore this example provides a very rough test of whether 
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the animacy difference is provoked by the moving object itself or the source of motion being 
alive. It appears that for our purposes we should only apply the animacy allowance to 
examples where the moving object is animate. 
Table 9.1: Mean value of similarity for each comparison from each age group per class 
of motion 
CLASS OF MOTION 
Examples 
Compared 
CARRY PUSH FLY 	 JUMP 
Mean 
Score 
7 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
16 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
7 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
16 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
7 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 	 Mean 
Score 	 Score 
16 	 7 
Year 	 Year 
Olds 	 Olds 
Mean 
Score 
16 
Year 
Olds 
II 
AA 
AI 
2.9 
3.24 
3.81 
1.6 
1.4 
3.3 
2.5 
2.7 
2.8 
2.3 
2.1 
1.7 
1.8 
1.95 
3.24 
	
2.0 	 2.48 
	
1.1 	 2.29 
	
3.2 	 3.05 
2.1 
1.4 
2.7 
CLASS OF MOTION 
FALL THROW WALK ROLL FLOAT 
Mean 
Score 
7 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
16 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
7 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
16 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
7 
Year 
Olds 
Mean 
Score 
16 
Year 
Olds 
	
Mean 	 Mean 
	
Score 	 Score 
7 	 16 
	
Year 	 Year 
	
Olds 	 Olds 
Mean 	 Mean 
Score 	 Score 
7 	 16 
Year 	 Year 
Olds 	 Olds 
II 
AA 
AI 
2.7 
3.1 
2.62 
1.2 
1.9 
1.44 
2.29 
1.95 
3.24 
1.1 
1.5 
2.5 
1.52 
3.38 
3.57 
1.1 
1.8 
3.24 
	
2.43 	 1.8 
	
1.76 	 1.2 
	
3.3 	 3.3 
	
3.00 	 1.6 
	
3.00 	 1.3 
	
3.67 	 3.2 
* I = Inanimate A = Animate 
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Table 9.2: Differences between the animate/inanimate score and the mean of the 
animate/animate and inanimate/inanimate values 
CLASS OF MOTION 
CARRY FLY 	 JUMP 
7 YEAR 	 16 YEAR 
OLD 	 OLD 
A/I 	 A/I 
DIFF- 	 DIFF- 
ERENCE ERENCE 
7 YEAR 
OLD 
A/I 
DIFF- 
ERENCE 
16 YEAR 	 7 YEAR 
OLD 	 OLD 
A/I 	 A/I 
DIFF- 	 DIFF- 
ERENCE 	 ERENCE 
16 YEAR 
OLD 
A/I 
DIFF-
ERENCE 
0.74 	 1.8 1.37 1.65 	 0.67 0.95 
CLASS OF MOTION 
THROW WALK ROLL FLOAT 
7YEAR 16 YEAR 
OLD 	 OLD 
A/I 	 A/I 
DIFF- 	 DIFF- 
ERENCE ERENCE 
7 YEAR 16 YEAR 	 7 YEAR 16 YEAR 	 7YEAR 16YEAR 
OLD 	 OLD 	 OLD 	 OLD 	 OLD 	 OLD 
A/I 	 A/I 	 A/I 	 A/I 	 A/I 	 A/I 
DIFF- 	 DIFF- 	 DIFF- 	 DIFF- 	 DIFF- 	 DIFF- 
ERENCE ERENCE 	 ERENCE ERENCE ERENCE ERENCE 
1.12 	 1.2 1.12 	 1.79 1.21 	 1.8 	 0.67 	 1.75 
I = Inanimate A = Animate 
9.2.2 Adjusting the theoretical predictions with respect to the animacy factor 
Each example from matching task 1 was carefully examined to see if there was an animacy 
difference between the pairs of moving objects. Eighteen examples were identified in all 
and a factor of 1 was added to the theoretical differences for these examples. The eighteen 
changed pairs are identified in Table 9.3 below. 
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FLY1 FLY2 
WALK1 WALK2 
CARRY CARRY 
FALL FALL 
WALK2 FLY1 
THROW JUMP 
PUSH WALK1 
FALL FLOAT 
PUSH FLY1 
JUMP FLY2 
JUMP FALL 
JUMP WALK2 
JUMP CARRY 
JUMP FLOAT 
ROLL JUMP 
CARRY FLY1 
FALL PUSH 
FLY1 ROLL 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
20 
27 
31 
38 
19 
28 
43 
49 
7 
9 
15 
21 
39 
44 
48 
25 
34 
50 
Table 9.3: The pairs of motion which were given an animacy allowance of one to 
their theoretical score 
Example Number 	 Example Name 	 New Theoretical Score 
This change gave rise to a new theoretical ranking with which the empirical data could be 
compared. This new ranking is shown in appendix VII. 
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9.3 FURTHER ANALYSIS 
The empirical data was then compared to the revised theoretical scores. The results of the 
recalculation of Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation are given in tables 9.4 and 9.5 
below and are discussed in conjunction with the new scatter plots. 
9.3.1 How are the Spearman Correlations affected by an animacy allowance? 
At each age, the inclusion of an animacy allowance improves the correlations between 
theoretical and empirical rankings of comparisons. The lowest correlation (is age ten) is 
now comparable with the highest previously obtained. The correlations are generally rather 
large. It remains the case that correlations for older children are higher than those for the 
younger ones. 
Table 9.4: Correlations with and without animacy allowance; (`identities' included) 
n = 49 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 	 Sixteens 
Rank 	 Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
No 
Animacy 
Allowance. 
With 
Animacy 
Allowance 
0.680 
0.740 
0.620 
0.737 
0.655 
0.795 
0.750 
0.836 
0.720 
0.829 
0.698 
0.813 
Table 9.5 reports the correlations with an animacy allowance when the identities are 
removed. There is an improvement at each age with the inclusion of an animacy allowance. 
The seven yearolds' correlation is much lower than the others and stands alone. It could be 
a methodological and/or a theoretical problem that the seven year olds' correlation is 
different from the others. The seven year olds may focus upon details in the pictures which 
do not necessarily provide relevant information to the problem in question. When some 
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seven year old children were asked why certain motions were different to others their replies 
suggested that they tended to focus upon mechanisms of motion and not the source of 
movement e.g. a go cart moves with its wheels and a horse moves with its legs. It could be 
suggested that internal and external sources of effort have not yet become generalised see 
11.2. These results draw attention to the fact that it is difficult to devise a paper and pencil 
task which is suitable for both young primary and senior secondary pupils. 
Table 9.5: Correlations with and without animacy allowance, comparison of 
different examples of the same class have been omitted 
n = 36 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 
Rank 
Sixteens 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
No 
Animacy 
Allowance. 
With 
Animacy 
Allowance. 
0.292 
0.399 
0.318 
0.517 
0.278 
0.561 
0.513 
0.665 
0.406 
0.623 
0.344 
0.579 
9.3.2 Scatterplot of mean score for total population sampled against the theoretical 
prediction 
The general shape of the scatter plot of mean results for all ages as shown by Figure 9.1 is 
that of a curve which peaks at a ranked theoretical score of 4 and then falls away to a ranked 
theoretical score of 5. The animacy allowance when added to the three pairs which already 
were scored as very different i.e. with a score of 4 gives them a score of 5 and puts them 
outside the range which the children could actually indicate during the test. The pupils in 
practice were not permitted to distinguish between very different and very very different as 
these new theoretical scores suggest. These three examples of FLY, ROLL; FALL, PUSH; 
and CARRY, FLY I were predicted by the model as the most different yet were not seen 
to be the most different by the children. 
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The identitites are now grouped together more closely than they were without the addition 
of an animacy allowance (see Figure 7.3). It is interesting to note that the inanimate 
comparisons of WALK are seen as more similar than the animate comparisons of WALK. 
The FLY comparisons are surprisingly the other way around. A possible explanation for the 
WALK result is that some of the seven year old pupils did differentitate more strongly 
between the motion of humans from that of other animals. 
The examples which had a ranked theoretical value of 2.0 fall into three distinct groups as 
before but now consist of different examples than found in Matching Task 1. The ROLL, 
THROW comparison as before, is seen by the pupils as more similar than expected. It at 
first seems rather puzzling that ROLL and THROW motions should be seen as more similar 
than the comparison of similar examples of FLOAT, WALK (animate), PUSH and ROLL. 
The reason could lie with problems associated with the theoretical status of FLOAT, and 
notions of control associated with human movement and the design of the matching task 
itself. The questionnaire required the pupils to focus upon the reasons why the two things 
move and it could be that with ROLL and THROW the pupils focussed only on the start of 
these motions, (see section 8.4.3). They both require an external source of motion and the 
ongoing motion is the same. It could be suggested that in this instance differences of support 
are ignored by the children when the reason or cause of these two types of motion are 
considered. 
	 . 
The CARRY, CARRY and WALK1, WALK2 comparisons even with the addition of an 
animacy allowance are much higher than predicted by the theory. The latter have already 
been discussed but CARRY is a complex motion and the results from its separate 
questionnaire are discussed in chapter 10. 
Most of the examples with a ranked theoretical score of 3 fit the theoretical predictions rather 
better with the addition of an animacy allowance. Except for the FALL FLOAT comparison 
and a group of CARRY comparisons. The FALL, FLOAT comparison is much higher than 
predicted by the model. The theoretical position suggested that FALLING and FLOATING 
actions were similar in one way and that was they both required no effort to make them 
move. The pictures used for these comparisons were those of a burglar falling from a 
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SCATTERPLOT OF TWELVES' MEAN SCORE AGAINST 
THEORETICAL SCORE OF FIRST FORMALISED VERSION 
OF THE MODEL, PLUS ANIMACY ALLOWANCE. 
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drainpipe and a balloon floating in the air. The latter example however requires closer 
inspection and it could be that the subjects believe that the balloon moves because of the air 
and so does require a source of effort. This unusual result could therefore be a methodo-
logical problem with the definition of float. 
There were five examples which were seen as more similar than expected. These were:- 
CARRY, PUSH 
PUSH, WALK 
CARRY, ROLL 
THROW, JUMP 
THROW, CARRY. 
Three of these are CARRY examples and the theoretical problems associated with CARRY 
are discussed in Chapter 10. It could be with the THROW JUMP comparison that these two 
motions are seen as more similar because they are both objects being thrown into the air. 
With throwing the object is given effort from by an external agent while with jumping the 
effort is internal. The suggestion is here that JUMPING is perceived by the children more 
like a THROW type motion than expected. This point requires further investigation. 
There is a greater separation between the examples with a ranked theoretical score of 4 when 
an animacy allowance is added. The pairs of comparisons which were seen as more similar 
than expected are identical to those shown in Figure 7.3 without the additon of an animacy 
allowance. 
9.3.3 Comparison of twelve, fourteen and sixteen year olds scatterplots with mean 
scatterplot 
These all exhibit a similar shape to the plot of the mean values. The fourteen year old curve 
differed the most from the mean plot with the PUSH JUMP, JUMP WALK2 and FLOAT 
FLY2 comparison seen as more similar than predicted. (These comparisons had a ranked 
theoretical score of 4). However other pairs of motions were seen as greater or less different 
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than predicted by the theoretical model and included CARRY, FLOAT, THROW and 
JUMP motions. This results perhaps raises questions about the theoretical status of these 
motions, it is discussed in cahpter 11. 
See Figures 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6. 
9.3.4 Comparison of ten year old scatterplot with mean scatterplot 
The general shape of the seven year old scatterplot is the same as depicted by the mean 
scatterplot if the CARRY, CARRY comparison is ignored. This value is unusually high for 
the ten year olds. 
See Figure 9.4. 
9.3.5 Comparison of seven year old scatterplot with mean scatterplot 
The general shape is similar to that of mean scatterplot but the high point is found at 
theoretical score 3 rather than score 4. It is the ROLL, FLOAT value which is very high here 
and throws out the general pattern. The THROW JUMP comparison in this column is also 
exceptionally low. 
See Figure 9.3. 
9.3.6 Summary 
There is a better match between the mean scatterplot and that of the theoretical plot when 
an animacy allowance is added because:- 
1. The identities now form a closely knit group, and 
2. There is a greater separation between the examples predicted as not identical. 
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The scatterplots of the seven and ten year olds showed more difference from the mean plot 
than the graphs of the secondary school pupils. The recurring difference of the seven year 
old data from the older children is discussed in section 11.2. 
The ROLL and THROW comparison was seen as more similar then predicted and points 
to a methodological problem in the choice of pictures used to represent these motions which 
perhaps caused pupils to focus only on the start of these motions, (see 9.3.2). Even with the 
addition of an animacy allowance there appear to be theoretical problems with CARRY, 
FLOAT, JUMP, THROW and ROLL comparisons. These issues are discussed in Chapter 
11. 
9.4 WHAT IS THE CONSISTENCY OF RESPONSE BETWEEN THE TWO 
AGE GROUPS FOR MATCHING TASK 2? 
As before, the Wilcoxon signed ranks test was used to see:- 
1. Whether the seven and sixteen year olds identified the pairs of motions similarly, and 
2. Whether the variability in the responses was the same for each group tested. 
A T value of 9 was obtained when each comparisons given by the children of different ages 
were compared by rank order. This value of T falls well outside the 1% Snifici4Nce Lewd, 
supporting the view that there are real differences between the two age groups in how they 
judged the differences between examples. (For n = 28, 95% limits for T are 105.8 - 272). 
A T value of 43 was calculated when the variability of judgements between the ages was 
compared. This was computed as described in section 8.3. Again the value of T lies outside 
the 1% 51-54c441ci, ionic supporting the view that there are real differences between the two 
ages in the variability of the judgements. (For n = 28, 95% limits for T are 105.8 - 272). 
Although there is a big difference in the variability of responses it would be interesting to 
see if the two ages agreed and disagree about any of the same comparisons. These examples, 
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if present, may identify methodological problems in the construction of the task. This 
information was obtained by plotting the mean values against the maximum standard 
deviation for the two age groups tested. 
Both age groups agreed most strongly about the PUSH (animate/ animate) comparison. 
There were two examples which the different age groups all differed most strongly about 
those being the inanimate/animate CARRY pair and the WALK inanimate/animate com-
parisons. The CARRY comparisons were perceived to be more different than expected in 
Matching Task 1. Those results highlighted the problem of in trying to pick identical 
examples of CARRY motions when the model itself predicts there are differences within 
the CARRY paradigm. The two graphs (Figures 9.7 and 9.8) however do show that there 
was a greater variability in responses with the seven year olds. This result emphasises the 
point raised in section 9.3 about devising a test suitable for such a wide age range of pupils 
especially where the younger ones were observed to focus on particular details of the picture 
examples. However, the difference between the seven year old data and the rest is an 
important issue which is discussed in chapter 11. 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
The systematic testing of inanimate and animate comparisons indicated that children do 
consider animacy to be an important distinguishing feature as regards to motion. An 
assessment of this degree of difference was calculated and applied to the model. 
A better match has been found between the empirical data collected in Matching Task 1 and 
the theoretical predictions. The correlations improved from about 0.6 to nearer to 0.8. 
However, the predictions were still rather better for the older children while the younger 
ones pay more attention to specific details and vary more in their judgements. The 
discrepant pairs suggest that animacy is linked to control or accident. In conclusion, the 
results suggest that animacy is a factor which should no longer be neglected by the model 
and should be considered as one of the essential elements of a commonsense understanding 
of causes of motion. 
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10. ANALYSIS OF MATCHING TASK 3 - A QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGNED 
TO INVESTIGATE THE ROLE OF CARRY IN A MODEL OF 
COMMONSENSE CAUSES OF MOTION 
This chapter reports the results of Matching Task 3. 10.1 Introduction, describes how the 
task was designed to systematically test the model's predictions about CARRY motions. 
10.2 Summary of results reviews the main results. 10.3 Analysis of CARRY identities 
specifies the results from these types of comparisons, while 10.4 Comparison of different 
CARRY motions reports the results from further comparisons. 10.5 How similar are the 
CARRY comparisons to the equivalent stereotypical single motion comparisons? de-
scribes the results when data collected from this test is compared with the equivalent results 
from Matching Task 1. 10.6 What is the consistency of response? discusses the 
difference between the seven, twelve and sixteen year old data. 10.7 Conclusion, 
summarises what has been learnt about the theoretical status of CARRY. 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
CARRY was tested in the same way as the other sterotypical motions in Matching Task 1 
(see chapter 8) in order to systematically examine all nine motions in a similar way. The 
results of Matching Task 1 showed that the CARRY motions differed more from one 
another than the other matched pairs, which indicates that its role requires further clarifica-
tion. 
CARRY ' s definition as a compound motion raises interesting questions about how people 
in practice actually do view the movement of a carried object. Will the carried object be seen 
as quite separate from the carrier or is it perceived as part of the carrier's motion? The model 
suggests that the carried object will be seen as part of the carrier's motion but that this will 
also be dependent upon the type of attachment between carried and carrier. In fact will 
objects that are carried in different ways e.g. HELD BY or CARRIED IN be seen as 
different? These are not such trivial questions as might appear: the nature of objects 
themselves may depend on such features as parts of an object being recognised as one whole 
unit and not seen as separate pieces. It would be interesting to explore this idea, albeit in a 
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very preliminary way, with a Matching Task which investigates the motion of carried 
objects. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to see if the model's predictions about "CARRY-type" 
motions are correct by answering the questions below. This is possible because the test was 
constructed in a systematic way to include the comparisons described below (see 7.3.6). 
1. Are the carry motion identities seen as similar? 
(Compare Carry X with Carry X). 
2. Are CARRY-IN motions seen differently from CARRY-HELD motions? 
(Compare Carry-In X with Carry-Held X). 
3. Is the movement of a carried object which is being flown, pushed or floated etc. seen 
as similar to the corresponding simple motions of flying, pushing or floating etc. 
(Compare Carry X with X). 
4. Are the responses between the age groups similar? 
It is possible to check these findings in another way by comparing the results from this test 
with the results from Matching Task 1. In this way one can ask another important question. 
Are CARRY motions compared in a similar way to their equivalent single stereotypical 
motions, e.g. is a CARRY PUSH, CARRY FLY comparison judged in a similar way as a 
single PUSH FLY pair of motions? 
CARRY as a compound motion deserves special attention and the results of its systematic 
testing are reported in order to clarify the role of CARRY in a model of commonsense ideas 
about causes of motion. 
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10.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The overall picture emerging from this test is illustrated by figure 10.1. The results on the 
whole tend to match the model's predictions about CARRY motions. 
These can be summarised as follows:- 
1. The motion of carried object is seen as similar to the motion of its carrier. CARRY 
X CARRY X comparisons were seen as similar to CARRY X X pairs and there was 
no significant variation between the ages tested. 
2. CARRY-IN pairs are seen as similar to one another but pairs of CARRY-IN, 
CARRY-HELD examples are viewed as rather different - supporting a view pro-
posed by the model that the two types of CARRY are different. It might be sup-
posed that the CARRY-IN attachment is seen as more permanent and stable than a 
CARRY-HELD link. This would mean that all the pieces of a CARRY-IN motion 
are interpreted more as the movement of only one object. Again there is no signifi-
cant difference between the responses of all the ages tested. 
3. The prediction that a carried object's motion should be seen as similar to the equiva-
lent motion of its carrier was also confirmed by comparing the data from Matching 
Task 1 with Matching Task 3. Some differences in responses are found between the 
ages. 
10.3 ANALYSIS OF CARRY IDENTITIES 
10.3.1 Comparison of CARRY-IN motions 
The examples are recognised as similar to each other by pupils of all ages. These pairs of 
motions are seen as more similar to each other than the rest of the CARRY identity 
comparisons. (Compare table 10.1 with tables 10.2 and 10.3). 
193 
For this set of comparisons the FLOAT difference between identities was larger than 
predicted by the model and bigger than the other set of comparisons in this group. The 
pictures used to represent FLOAT were passengers being transported in a hot air balloon and 
passengers travelling in a glider. It could well be that the pupils perceived the glider as an 
ordinary aeroplane flying under engine power. The comparison would then be between a 
CARRY FLOAT and a CARRY FLY rather than just CARRY FLOAT comparisons. The 
stereotypical motion Float and the examples chosen to represent this motion questions the 
previous theoretical conception of Float, especially as difficulties arose with this motion in 
Matching Task 1 also. It is proposed in chapter 12 that there are two possible interpretations 
for Float. 
Table 10.1: Comparison of Identities of CARRY-IN 
Example 
Number 
Example 
Name 
Sevens' 
Mean 
Twelves' 
Mean 
Sixteens' 
Mean 
4 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLY 1.63 1.21 1.22 
10 CARRY FLOAT AND CARRY FLOAT 1.67 1.83 1.81 
27 CARRY WALK AND CARRY WALK 1.23 1.28 1.06 
31 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY PUSH 1.57 1.45 1.25 
38 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FALL 1.40 1.72 1.41 
10.3.2 Comparison of CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD motions 
The model suggests that CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD pairs should be seen as different 
from one another. Therefore CARRY-IN/HELD comparisons were made for the five 
classes of motion investigated in this task. The results illustrated by Figure 10.1 and Table 
10.2 suggest that the pupils do distinguish between CARRY-IN/HELD motions and they 
are seen as different. 
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Table 10.2: Comparison of CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD Motions 
Example 
Name 
Sevens' 
Mean 
Twelves' 
Mean 
Sixteens' 
Mean 
CARRY WALK IN AND CARRY WALK HELD 2.83 2.90 2.75 
CARRY FLY IN AND CARRY FLY HELD 1.70 1.83 1.81 
CARRY FALL IN AND CARRY FALL HELD 2.47 1.86 2.13 
CARRY PUSH IN AND CARRY PUSH HELD 2.50 1.76 1.75 
CARRY FLOAT IN AND CARRY FLOAT HELD 1.50 1.52 1.09 
It is important to try to ascertain the factors which contribute to the differences between 
CARRY-IN/HELD motions. These could be attributed to differences in attachment. In the 
examples actually used it is the CARRY-HELD motions that are animate in nature, and this 
may be another contributory factor to the observed differences, since Matching Task 2 
suggests that a difference in the source of motion being animate is an important distinction 
used when assessing carry motions. 
10.33 Comparison of CARRY X X motions 
The suggestion that a carried object inherits the support and motion of the carrier predicts 
that a carried motion of a given kind should be seen as similar to the identical stereotypical 
motion. Therefore the subects were asked to compare the CARRY motion with its equiva-
lent single stereotypical counter part. Table 10.4 summarises these results and shows that 
the values agree favourably with this prediction, it is not claimed however that a carry 
motion of a given kind is identical to the motion of that kind. Figure 10.1 illustrates that 
these scores tend to be a little higher than those of the comparison of CARRY-IN identities 
except for Float. 
FLOAT again appears to fit outside the general pattern of results. The examples chosen for 
this comparison were a hot air balloon transporting passengers and an ordinary balloon 
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suspended the air. These examples are perhaps too similar to each other and may have 
produced this unusually low result. 
Table 10.3: Comparison of stereotypical motions with corresponding CARRY 
motions 
Example Example 
	
Sevens' Twelves' Sixteens' 
Number Name 	 Mean Mean Mean 
8 	 CARRY PUSH AND PUSH 	 1.77 	 1.90 	 1.97 
30 CARRY FALL AND FALL 2.30 1.86 1.66 
32 CARRY WALK AND WALK 1.40 1.52 1.97 
35 CARRY FLY AND FLY 2.00 1.83 2.19 
40 CARRY FLOAT AND FLOAT 1.33 1.34 1.31 
10.4 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT CARRY MOTIONS 
10.4.1 How similar are CARRY X CARRY Y pairs? 
The CARRY X CARRY Y pairs are seen as having differences within pairs greater than 
those for CARRY-IN identities and the CARRY-IN/HELD comparisons. This is what is ex-
pected: the comparisons are between different motions. The results are shown in Figure 
10.1 and in Table 10.4, e.g. the seven year old viewed the CARRY WALK and CARRY 
FLY motion as more different than the other ages. 
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Table 10.4: CARRY X CARRY Y pairs 
Example Example Sevens' Twelves' Sixteens' 
Number Name Mean Mean Mean 
5 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FLOAT 3.50 2.86 3.44 
26 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLOAT 1.83 1.83 2.09 
9 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLOAT 2.63 2.21 2.22 
18 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FALL 3.17 3.38 3.47 
22 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FALL 3.27 3.00 3.47 
34 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLY 2.87 1.93 1.84 
36 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLY 3.40 2.72 2.94 
6 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLOAT 2.77 2.72 3.44 
12 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FALL 3.33 3.17 3.84 
14 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY WALK 2.50 2.48 2.25 
10.4.2 How similar are CARRY X Y pairs? 
The model suggests that these pairs should differ more than the CARRY X X motions. (See 
table 10.5). 
Four comparisons (CARRY FLOAT FLY, CARRY FLOAT PUSH, CARRY FLOAT 
FALL AND CARRY FLOAT WALK) which should have been included were omitted by 
an oversight which was not detected until it was too late to remedy it. 
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Table 10.5: Carry X Y pairs 
Example 
Number 
Example 
Name 
Sevens' 
Mean 
Twelves' 
Mean 
Sixteens' 
Mean 
2 CARRY FLY AND WALK • 2.90 2.79 2.75 
3 CARRY FALL AND PUSH 3.47 3.52 3.72 
7 CARRY FALL AND FLOAT 3.23 2.69 3.38 
11 CARRY FALL AND WALK 3.30 3.38 3.63 
16 CARRY PUSH AND WALK 2.17 2.24 2.94 
17 CARRY WALK AND FLOAT 3.07 3.03 3.47 
20 CARRY FLY AND FLOAT 2.33 2.21 2.72 
21 CARRY PUSH AND FALL 3.57 3.38 3.63 
23 CARRY PUSH AND FLY 3.23 2.76 3.50 
24 CARRY WALK AND FLY 3.23 3.14 3.56 
29 CARRY PUSH AND FLOAT 3.33 3.24 3.63 
33 CARRY FALL AND FLY 3.17 2.86 3.66 
37 CARRY WALK AND FALL 3.60 3.31 3.69 
39 CARRY FLY AND PUSH 3.43 2.76 3.03 
41 CARRY WALK AND PUSH 2.77 2.28 2.38 
42 CARRY FLY AND FALL 3.23 3.14 3.59 
Table 10.5 indicates there is agreement between the age groups with the following 
exceptions, CARRY FLY and PUSH, CARRY FALL and FLOAT, CARRY PUSH and 
WALK, CARRY PUSH and FLY, CARRY FALL and FLY and CARRY WALK and 
PUSH. 
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10.5 HOW SIMILAR ARE THE CARRY COMPARISONS TO THE 
EQUIVALENT STEREOTYPICAL SINGLE MOTION COMPARISONS? 
10.5.1 Introduction 
The model suggests that a CARRY motion can be seen as very similar to that of the motion 
of the CARRIER itself. If this is the case then the data collected from this test can be 
compared with equivalent results obtained from Matching Task 1 and there should be some 
correspondence between the two independently collected responses. This section assesses 
whether there are any differences between the judgements made by the separate age groups 
for different sets of pairs, discussing comparisons between data from Task 1 and Task 2 as 
follows:- 
i. Comparison of CARRY X CARRY X with X X. 
ii. Comparison of CARRY-In X CARRY-Held X X with X X. 
iii. CARRY X X with X X. 
iv. Comparison of CARRY X CARRY Y with X Y. 
v. Comparison of CARRY X Y with X Y. 
It should be noted that these comparisons are less reliable than those above, because they 
come from two tasks done with different children. 
In order to examine the five sets of comparisons described above in more detail, the 
judgements for Matching Task 3 were plotted against the judgements from Matching 
Task 1. 
1. Therefore, five graphs were plotted (Figures 10.2 - 10.6). 
1. CARRY X CARRY X with XX 
2. CARRY-IN X with CARRY-HELD X with XX 
3. CARRY X X with XX 
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4. CARRY X CARRY Y with XY 
5. CARRY XY with XY. 
If the judgements are the same, the points will fall near a straight line slope of 1. 
These graphs are discussed in sections 10.5.3 - 10.5.7. 
10.5.2 Are CARRY X CARRY X pairs similar to X X pairs? 
Figure 10.2 shows that the CARRY X CARRY X pairs are seen as similar to X X motions. 
However FLOAT and FALL comparisons are not seen as more different than the others by 
the seven year olds. 
10.5.3 Are CARRY X X pairs similar to X X pairs? 
Figure 10.3 shows that there is similarity between the CARRY X X pairs and the X X 
motions but not such good agreement as the CARRY X CARRY X and X X (See figure 
10.3). All ages agreed FLOAT did not fit into the general pattern while the sixteen year olds 
did not find WALK and PUSH to be so similar. 
10.5.4 Are CARRY-IN X CARRY-HELD X pairs similar to X X pairs? 
Figure 10.4 shows that the motions of FLY, PUSH and FALL are seen as more similar than 
the WALK and FLOAT comparisons. Float continues to appear as problematic while 
differences in Walk comparisons could be explained by an animacy difference in the 
examples taken from Matching Task 1. 
10.5.5 Are CARRY X CARRY Y pairs similar to X Y pairs? 
The following comparison of data between matching task 1 and 3 provides another check 
upon the model's prediction that carry pairs are similar to the equivalent motion of the 
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carrier. Carry X and Carry Y pairs are compared with X Y pairs. 
Figure10.5 illustrates the mean comparisons for all age groups tested and shows that the Fall 
comparisons exhibit the best fit i.e. are seen as most similar. 
These are the FALL WALK 
FALL FLOAT 
FALL FLY 
The PUSH comparisons show the next best fit. 
These are 	 PUSH FLY 
PUSH FLOAT 
PUSH WALK 
and PUSH FALL. 
However, 
	
FLOAT WALK 
FLOAT FLY 
WALK FLY 
do not follow the general pattern. Only the CARRY FLY, CARRY FLOAT examples as 
identified in Section 10.6.2 as one which the subjects did not agree about and displayed a 
higher standard deviation/maximum standard deviation. 
10.5.6 Are CARRY X Y pairs similar to X Y pairs? 
The model predicts that a CARRY FLY is similar to a FLY motion and the above results 
suggested that this was a reasonable supposition. This notion can be tested further, if a 
CARRY X motion is compared with another stereotypical motion (which is not a CARRY 
- denoted by Y) to see if these pairs are are similar to the equivalent stereotypical motions. 
That is, CARRY X Y XY. Figure 10.6 illustrates the mean comparisons for all age groups 
tested. 
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It is interesting to note that most of the points fall on the lower side of the line in figure 10.6. 
XY pairs are seen as further apart than CARRIED CARRY X CARRY Y pairs. This is not 
unexpected in that the CARRY X CARRY Y pairs have at least CARRY in common. 
10.5.7 Summary 
In conclusion there is more agreement about ther similarity of identities than the discrep-
ancies. The Float comparisons stand out as fitting outside the general pattern, another 
indication that the theoretical status of FLOAT requires review. These results however, 
indicate that the model's suggestion that a CARRY motion can be seen as very similar to 
the motion of the CARRIER itself is correct. 
10.6 WHAT IS THE CONSISTENCY OF RESPONSE? 
In order to determine whether the children from the three different ages responded to the 
questionnaire in a similar fashion the Wilcoxon signed ranks test was used, as previously 
described in sections 8.4 and 9.4. 
When the mean value of each pair of comparisons was ranked by age as shown in table 10.7 
then the T values for the 7/16 and 12/16 comparisons are within the 95% confidence limits, 
indicating there is not enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that any differences arose 
by chance. (For n = 41, 95% limits for T are 277 - 583). 
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10.6.1 Wilcoxon Test of difference between differently aged pupils 
Table 10.6: Table of T values to show results of Wilcoxon Test to see if the different 
aged pupils identified the pairs similarly 
n = 41 
Sevens Twelves 
Twelves 
Sixteens 
176* 
384 293 
* Value outside 95% confidence limits 
Next, as before not the judgements, but their variability is compared. For each comparison 
the standard deviation was divided by the maximum value it could have for the observed 
mean, and this value was ranked for each pair of comparisons by age as shown in Table 10.9. 
In each case the value of T falls at or outside the 1% 6 L3ntfuloce level,., supporting the view 
that there are real differences between the groups in the variability of their judgement. 
Table 10.7: Table of T values to show the results of Wilcoxon Test to determine the 
differences in variability of responses of each age group 
n = 41 
Sevens Twelves 
Twelves 
Sixteens 
125* 
93* 254 
* Value outside 95% confidence limits 
In order to identify problematic examples among the comparisons the mean values were 
plotted against the maximum standard deviation for each age group tested, as shown by 
Figures 10.7 - 10.10. This technique illustrates the pairs of motions which the pupils were 
unsure about i.e. when there was no consensus among each age group about the reply. 
209 
a 
0 0 
a 
2 
0•2 
	
7 	 7 II  II II •7 pang 
	
x 5 	 7o c 
 .T 
0 
a. 
a. 
5 
00 
11 
p 
0 
o
• • 
> 
< 
tv, 
rn 
Z 
vi 
> 
0 
Mean Value 
•-• 	 !") 
t,) 	 be∎ oo N t,..) 4 ON 00 u, 
W 
	
tN.) 	 Cr∎ 00 
	
1 	 I 	 1 	 1 
210 
Mean Value 
.., 	 ,-, ,-.., 
a
• , 
 bo N .4.  ..,  
N N N N 
N) i.) 4 ON co w 
W W W 
N :4, 1:::h 
W 
00 4 
o 
p nc) 
o 
4) I 	 1111111111111 
ol 
ba li 
_, o 
	 -I 
LI = (4 C4 
-.9 
(41  
m 7 * 173 T 7 	 17 ? 
0"qn4;lig ,,_. 
 
nIM 
MI 
211 
0 
0$ 
r3-2 
7 71f7 4T C11)  
151qtn-' 11ig 
Mean Value 
- tQPPP wwww 
- i,):4, i,NbotQt.)4oNoo w i.):4.c/N00 4  
—n 
212 
° 
	
ob 
20 Q 
O 
oo 
Mean Value 
I-,  
n-+ IQ :P. ON 00 NNPN 	
wt.atata 
N N.) 4 ON 00 ul N.) 4 ON 00 41, 
1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 I 	 I 	 I 
nr) 
2 0.? 
aq 
r") 
01; 10 6, 
1290°3' 
1:1 41:  *0 
9 o 
0 92 	 • 
9 	 Z4 
9 
11 
• 
0 
t 0 
O 
< 
ti g z 
w 
> 
W 
X 
g 
z 
m 
0 
TTT771? 
4.T a l;E i 
213 
Further examination of these examples could suggest problems with the choice of particular 
pictures for comparison i.e. methodological anomalies in the construction of the task or 
point to areas where the model is unclear. 
10.6.2 Discussion of examples about which the subjects agreed and disagreed 
It is interesting to note that the examples which the different age groups all agreed most 
strongly about were:- 
(Standard deviation/standard deviation maximum of 0.58 and below). 
CARRY FLY, WALK and 
CARRY FLY, CARRY FLOAT. 
The examples which the different age groups all differed most strongly about were:- 
(Standard deviation/standard deviation maximum of 0.8 and above). 
CARRY PUSH-IN and CARRY PUSH-HELD 
CARRY FALL and CARRY FALL. 
Float proved to be a problematic comparison throughout the Matching Task 3 which 
suggests the role of FLOAT needs further theoretical clarification as discussed in chapter 
11. Again there is no systematic pattern from this set of data which can point towards places 
where the theroetical account is incorrect. 
10.7 CONCLUSION 
The results of this questionnaire are discussed in three sections. The first part answers 
questions about the accuracy of the model's predictions about the role of CARRY in a 
commonsense understanding of causes of motion. The second part discusses the findings 
in relation to the different age groups tested, while the third part makes some suggestions 
about which areas of the model require further clarification. 
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10.7.1 Do people group CARRY motions as predicted by the model? 
The results suggest,as the model predicts, that the movement of a CARRIED object is 
perceived as part of the motion of the CARRIER. The most striking evidence for this 
statement is the similarity of the CARRY X X comparisons for all ages tested. The results 
also suggest that subjects found the movement of a carried object which is flown, pushed 
or floated etc. as similar to the corresponding simple motion of flying, pushing and float-
ing etc. (the CARRY X X comparisons). It is therefore reasonable to suggest that when the 
motion of a carried object is scrutinized its source of effort and support is also considered 
i.e. the motion of the CARRIER. A second form of analysis revealed that the model's 
prediction could be supported by further comparisons. The CARRY X CARRY Y and 
CARRY XY judgements were compared with those of the XY pairs from Matching Task 
1 and although these results need to be treated with more caution as they are taken from two 
separate tasks examining different children, similar responses were found. 
However, objects which inherit their support and effort from other objects are not 
necessarily considered alike as regards to motion. The model predicted that there are three 
further distinctions within the CARRY paradigm. These are objects which are fixed to a 
carrier which should be seen as different from objects which form part of a carrier or 
CARRIED IN or ON the carrier. 
It was not possible to test for the PART-OF distinction in this Matching Task as previously 
discussed in section 7.3.6 but the results show that subjects perceived a difference between 
the movement of objects which are CARRIED-IN or CARRIED-HELD by the carrier. This 
result suggests that the type of attachment or support between pieces of a scene could well 
prove to be an important consideration in the perception of objects. 
10.7.2 Are the results similar for the three age groups tested? 
When the Wilcoxon signed ranks test was used to obtain more information about the way 
the different age groups judged the paris of motion for the whole test there was no significant 
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difference. There were significant differences in variability of response between the ages 
but no systematic pattern in differences in response per age could be identified which could 
given any new information on the state of the model itself. 
10.7.3 Points for further clarification 
Only one set of CARRY HELD comparisons were used throughout the task and so a more 
systematic testing of CARRY HELD differences would be desirable. An interesting point 
is that the examples which were used in this task to distinguish between CARRY IN/HELD 
motions also exhibited an animacy difference. Therefore more inanimate examples such as 
cranes and robots holding other objects need to be tested to see the true value of the CARRY 
distinction since the results of Matching Task 2 (see chapter 9) demonstrate that animacy 
is an important feature when cause of motion are considered. 
The CARRY-PART-OF distinction was not tested and merits further research. A different 
sort of task may well need to be designed to investigate this notion further and it would be 
interesting to probe in greater detail how people do recognise different objects in a scene. 
It remains in the next chapter to draw together the results of the three tasks. 
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11. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
This chapter discusses the overall results of the major test of the theoretical model i.e. 
Matching Task 1 with respect to the other subsidary tests. Section 11.1 A First test of the 
commonsense model of motion uses the data from the subsidary tasks to help to explain 
some of the results which did not fit the theoretical predictions. 11.2 Possible causes of 
mismatch between theoretical predictions and empirical data obtained from the 
younger children, proposes three reasons for this discrepancy. The final section 11.3 What 
remains a puzzle? identifies some remaining problems and suggests further ways to test 
the model. 
11.1 A FIRST TEST OF THE COMMONSENSE MODEL OF MOTION 
11.1.1 The role of animacy in a commonsense understanding of motion 
The rank correlations between theoretical predictions and empirical scores improved for all 
ages with the addition of an animacy allowance. The empirical evidence suggests that the 
movements of live objects are thought about differently than are the movements of things 
which are not alive. We can draw some ideas from Piaget's study of animism about how 
children think about the movement of living things. 
Piaget (1928) defines animism as the child's tendency to endow physical objects and events 
with the attributes of biological and psychological entities, that is with attributes of life and 
consciousness. Piaget suggests four stages in its development. He was however cautious 
about overstating his findings, saying that the results only indicate a general direction of 
thought not a comprehensive and coherent system of beliefs. These stages are as follows: 
1. Almost any object is potentially conscious,given the right conditions. E.g. A stone is 
not conscious but will 'feel' when it is moved. 
2. Potentiality for consciousness is generally attributed to objects which regularly 
possess some kind of movement, that is those whose special function is movement. 
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Thus, a bicycle and the wind may know or feel, but a stone cannot. 
3. Only objects capable of spontaneous motion are conscious: the sun and wind can be 
but no longer objects such as a bicycle. 
4. Consciousness is only attributed to people and animals. 
Piaget placed his work on animism within a causal framework and suggested that both 
animism and artificialism are the fruits of precausality. He defined precausality as the 
child's lack of differentiation between physical causality and psychological or logical 
motivation. He says: 
"Childish causality is therefore not visual, in other words is not interested in spatial contacts 
nor in mechanical causation. It is intellectual, that is to say, full of considerations that are 
foreign to pure observation: justification of all phenomena, syncretistic tendency to connect 
everything with everything else, in short, confusion of physical causality with psychologi-
cal or logical motivation. Hence once again, precausality". 
Piaget's evidence has been taken to show that activity and movement do become the basis 
for children's decisions about what is alive. Carey (1985) however, maintains that child-
hood animism is not, as Piaget suggests it is, a lack of a schema for mechanical causation. 
She argues that mechanical causation is present in preschool children (see Bullock, Gelman 
and Baillargeon 1982) and Schultz (1982) whose studies show that phenomena involving 
propagation of physical forces through space, whether involving contact or not are 
interpreted mechanistically.) Carey suggests that the child's animistic attribution of "alive" 
to inanimate objects reflects the child's struggle in distinguishing animals from non animals 
more than distinguishing living things (plants) from non living things. Although her data 
suggests that for no child does movement or activity (autonomous or otherwise) constitute 
the single criterion for life, it does remain a feature of the child's reasoning. 
Therefore when considering how the model can be improved animism will be an important 
consideration and the development of these ideas deserves further attention (see 12.7). 
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11.1.2 A clarification of the role of CARRY in a commonsense understanding of 
motion 
It appears that the model's suggestion that a carried object will be seen as part of the carrier's 
motion is basically correct and also depends upon the carried objects type of attachment to 
the carrier. It was therefore in retrospect unwise to have chosen two different types of 
CARRY motion (i.e. CARRY-IN and CARRY-HELD) for Matching Task 1. It was also 
perhaps unwise to have tested CARRY in the same way as the other stereotypical motions. 
This appears to be a possible explanation of why CARRY comparisons, though often 
generally fitting the theoretical predictions , provided several anomalies. One of the 
model's assumptions is that an object is recognised as a whole unit if all its pieces move 
together, this assumption being also recognised by Piaget (1980) as an important relation 
at the root of the first operational ideas of movement and speed. He says that the motions 
of movement and speed "are logical operation forming systems which are reversible and 
capable of synthesis. These operations are established before the occurrence of mathemati-
cal groups and are a precondition for subsequent mathematization". 
A clinical interview technique developed around Ogborn's prolog version of the model of 
commonsense causes of motion which explicitly shows carried objects inheriting proper-
ties from the carrier might provide a useful tool to explore in more detail how people's ideas 
about objects are recognised and differentiated. 
11.1.3 What other anomalies remain unexplained? 
Even after an animacy allowance was added to the results of Matching Task 1 some 
anomalies remained between the theoretical predictions and the empirical data. These are:- 
i. The theoretical description of FLOAT. 
ii. Problems with certain THROW and JUMP comparisons. 
It appears that there is a real problem with the theoretical description of floating objects. 
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After talking to pupils of different ages it appears that floating is a difficult notion for them 
to explain. I suspect that two analogies are used to explain floating objects. Objects which 
float in air can be divided into two different groups. One group contains objects which float 
and remain in the air e.g. clouds, and birds gliding while the other group consists of objects 
which are light and float in the air for only a limited period. This latter group of objects 
inevitably have to fall down to the ground, albeit more slowly than other objects. It does 
not appear unreasonable to suggest that our early experiences of floating and learning about 
the behaviour of light and heavy objects arises from experimenting with falling objects. 
This suggests that children should see floating objects such as balloons and feathers as 
similar to falling objects. 
However, a different mode of explanation is needed for objects in the first group because 
these objects do not have to come down to the ground in the same way as the others. I believe 
that another model may be recruited to explain the floating of such objects. The closest anal-
ogy from experience may be that of a CARRY type motion. The clouds could be seen to 
be carried along by the air, that is the clouds have to be supported and moved by something, 
and that agent of motion and support can be seen as the air. 
The problems associated with the THROW JUMP and PUSH JUMP comparisons seem to 
be methodological rather than theoretical. The choice of examples for JUMP illustrated 
motions in two different directions. The one of the horse in the downward direction could 
be interpreted as being more like a FALL than a JUMP and in fact upon closer inspection 
of the empirical data, the empirical value for the PUSH JUMP difference was close to the 
theoretical prediction for a PUSH FALL comparison. 
The unexpectedly small difference found between ROLL and THROW has been discussed 
in Chapters 8 and 9, and suggests that the cause or type of EFFORT being similar might take 
precedence over the rest of the object's motion when assessing differences. The request in 
this questionnaire to focus on the reasons why two objects move, may have reinforced such 
a tendency or induced it. 
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11.2 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MISMATCH BETWEEN THEORETICAL 
PREDICTIONS AND EMPIRICAL DATA OBTAINED FROM THE 
YOUNGER CHILDREN 
The goal of developmental cognitive psychology is to document the nature of emerging 
thought and knowledge and to explain why children seem to know some things and to think 
like adults in some ways but not in others. Using some ideas from Piaget, and from the work 
of other neo-Piagetians, three reasons can be proposed to explain why the seven year old data 
shows more variability than that of the other ages. These are:- 
i. Limitation of processing capacity. 
ii. Egocentricity. 
iii. Concentrating on particular features in the Matching Task and not generalising. 
i. Limitation of processing capacity 
Several developmental theorists have proposed limits on children's information - process-
ing systems (e.g. Case, Kurland and Goldberg (1982), Pascual Leone (1970). They argue 
that developmental growth reflects changes in "capacity" or processing space. According 
to one account Case (1972), processing capacity is not necessarily dependent on maturation 
per se but increases with the acquisition of specific experience at various mental tasks. 
Piaget however explains the child's inconsistency of response with his/her inability to give 
complete logical justifications or reasons for what he/she is doing. Piaget proposes that the 
child needs to become simultaneously conscious of two or more elements when reasoning. 
Case agrees with Piaget but insists that the reason why the child cannot reason with two 
elements simultaneously is due to an overload in the memory system. Regardless of whether 
memory capacity increases owing to general developmental growth or to practice in specific 
cognitive tasks or both, limits on capacity seem a likely source of the child's partial, limited 
competence. 
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ii. Egocentricity 
It can be proposed that the seven year olds are more vulnerable to errors and fallacies when 
reasoning than the older ones. These sources of error can be due to the egocentricity of the 
young child. For Piaget egocentrism can be roughly defined as a failure to differentiate and 
distinguish clearly between one's own point of view and another's. Piagetian egocentrism 
is assumed to be very prevalent in early childhood and to decline thereafter. 
Piaget states:- 
"The whole perspective of childhood is falsified by the fact that the child being ignorant of 
his own ego, takes his own point of view as absolute, and fails to establish between himself 
and the external world of things that reciprocity which alone would ensure objectivity". 
A relevant example of egocentrism from Piaget is his identification of different uses of the 
term 'because' in children's spontaneous talk and reactions to a number of set tasks. These 
are: 
1. Causal explanations which establish a cause and effect relationship between two 
facts, (e.g. He tripped because the pavement was uneven). 
2. Psychological explanations which establish a cause and effect relation between an 
intention and an act, (e.g. I hit him because he took my toy). 
3. Logical implication which establishes a reason - and - consequence relation between 
two ideas or two judgements, (e.g. I know that animal is not dead because it is still 
moving). 
Piaget found that the preoperational child (2 - 7 years) does not discriminate between these 
three kinds of relations. In fact his response is more like an "and" or "in such a manner that" 
rather than "because". However even a consecutive relation is not employed consistently. 
The child uses a mixture of explanations indisciminately, since it is suggested that the child 
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at this stage is not concerned about the kind of relationship in question but his thinking 
consists of a mere juxtaposition of facts or ideas. 
This analysis suggests how it may have arisen that when asked to consider "reasons why 
things move", younger children may have varied much more than older ones in what they 
paid attention to. 
iii. Concentrating on particular features in the Matching Task and not generalising 
All the Matching Tasks were designed to probe the nature of children's generalisations 
about motion and if young children find it difficult to generalise then this fact could account 
for why they perform more variably on the Matching Tasks. 
Piaget (1928) says that the child always forms his judgments from an immediate and 
egocentric point of view which makes him incapable of grasping the relativity of ideas to 
the extent of being able to generalise them. He also emphasises that thoughts and processes 
which are implicit and not available to consciousness cannot be subjected to testing and 
logic. He argues that as long as meaning is only implicit it remains subject to all the 
fluctuations of subconscious thought. Piaget proposes that children in their spontaneous 
reasoning infer only from the particular to the particular. All the data collected are 'mental 
experiments' carried out on an individual case without any attempt at generalisation or 
appeal to laws previously generalised. Childish reasoning does not move from universal to 
particular or particular to universal but from part to part. 
An example from some interviews with the seven year olds illustrates this type of reasoning. 
When they were asked to compare the motion of a cart and a horse, they said the motion of 
these two objects were different because the wheels make a cart move and the legs make a 
horse move. 
Piaget suggests that immediate perception is the measure of all things: that the child sees 
things in terms of the momentary perception which is taken as absolute and therefore makes 
no attempt to find the intrinsic relations existing between things. Therefore the internal 
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relations of objects are not considered and so things are either conglomerated into a 
confused whole (syncretism) or else considered one by one in a fragmentary manner devoid 
of synthesis. 
My own view is that iii. is the most important reason for the seven year olds variability of 
response, while recognising that for Piaget ii. and iii. are all aspects of the same thing. This 
difference also illustrates the difficulty in trying to devise a task suitable for a large age range 
of children and although attempts were made to minimise the verbal content it would not 
be advisable to use this type of methodology with children below seven years of age. 
11.3 WHAT REMAINS A PUZZLE? 
The discrepancies which remain such as the theoretical classification of FLOAT raise such 
questions as:- 
1. Are the present terms of the theory correct? 
2. Is CONTROL too broad a term not providing sufficient distinction between the 
stereotypical motions? 
3. How do ideas about the stereotypical motions develop? 
4. Does the understanding of certain types of motion precede others? 
5. How do notions of animacy develop? 
These ideas are given further consideration in Chapter 12 which discusses how the model 
might be improved. 
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12. CAN THE COMMONSENSE MODEL OF MOTION BE IMPROVED? 
This chapter suggests ways in which the commonsense model of motion might be improved. 
The Introduction questions some of the previous model's basic assumptions while the 
second section What are the components needed to construct a set of stereotypical 
motions?, proposes that the three primitive actions of SEE/HOLD, LET-GO and SELF 
MOVEMENT could provide a basic understanding of movement. The third section, 
Predicting the differences between the stereotypical motions proposes a new set of 
theoretical differences which are tested against the empirical data the results of which 
reported in section four, Synopsis of Results obtained from comparison of new theoreti-
cal predictions with empirical data. Section five The comparison of correlations from 
the previous and reformulated theoretical models shows there is an improvement in the 
new correlations which is most marked with the addition of an animacy factor. Section 6, 
Multi-dimensional scaling introduces a further statistical analysis of the new model while 
section seven A possible development of animacy suggests that a more fundamental 
account of animacy should include some developmental hypothesis. The final section 
Future Research proposes the use of Frames as a possible representation for a develop-
mental model of motion. 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
A first attempt at trying to improve the model (not in such a fundamental way as proposed 
in chapter 13) is to question some of its basic assumptions. 
1. Is it reasonable to think that all the stereotypical motions are at the same basic level? 
Are there some which are more basic than others? For example ideas about flying 
probably emerge from something like a WALK type motion. In that case FLYING 
could be thought of as rather like WALKING in the air. In turn, it is probably the 
child's realisation of its own movement that helps him/her to arrive at a category of 
autonomous motion such as WALK. 
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2. How do these causal ideas about motion arise? If thinking is causal, following Piaget, 
then the basic ways of thinking are constructed through ACTION very early in life. 
Action and movement lead to the construction of the notions of object, time, space and 
cause. 
3. Is it reasonable to assume that motions are partly identified by their closeness to the 
earliest actions performed in childhood? 
Therefore one way to reformulate the model would be to provide a broad picture of the 
construction of classes of MOTIONS from ACTIONS. This chapter therefore explores the 
possibility of constructing the stereotypical motions from a set of primitive actions and 
incorporating them into a reformulation of a commonsense model of motion, to be tested 
against the available data. 
12.2 WHAT ARE THE COMPONENTS NEEDED TO CONSTRUCT A SET OF 
STEREOTYPICAL MOTIONS? 
12.2.1 What are the primitive components of a commonsense theory of motion 
required to do? 
The commonsense model of motion to date has assumed that the world is composed of a 
variety of objects which occupy a topological space. Under normal circumstances many of 
these objects never move and may create obstacles to the movement of other objects. 
However if their means of support fail then they do move in quite a spectacular way - they 
FALL down. 
The causal model also proposed that people do not consider motion to be a permanent state 
of affairs for different objects; things start and then they stop moving. Objects do not start 
moving in the same way and the starting process is connected to how people perceive the 
particular cause of motion. Some objects need an external agent to start their movement; 
while others are able to take "charge-of' and cause their own motion. The latter type of 
objects tend to be animate in nature and the empirical evidence suggests that they exhibit 
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the special property of control during the course of their movement. This property provides 
a sharp differentiation from other types of motion. 
The commonsense model of motion can be improved by identifying the primitive actions 
in which the child is engaged in order to understand a world of objects occuping a 
topological space. These actions should permit a causal mechanism for reasoning about 
motion and should give rise to levels of stereotypes, starting with primitive stereotypes from 
which the others can be constructed. If the model can propose a limited number of 
prototypical actions from which the nine classes of motion are generated, then differences 
such as animacy and control may also follow naturally and there will not be any need to patch 
these factors into the previous version of the model. 
The construction of the stereotypical motions from the primitives might substantiate the 
model's assumption that objects are differentiated by their potential movement and that 
parts of an object can be distinguished from whole objects when their support and motion 
become differentiated ie a CARRY motion is translated into another type of motion. 
12.2.2 What sorts of actions appear to be the most likely candidates to form primitives 
from which other motions might develop? 
A Piagetian account of the beginning of conceptualisation of motion might run as follows. 
The child has an innate grasping reflex, and an innate ability to attend to movements in the 
visual field. From grasping, arise actions of taking hold of objects, displacing them, and 
letting them go. From noticing movements arises in the end the notion of an object. The 
coordination of these two starting points (in what Piaget calls near and far space respec-
tively) can lead to a first conceptualisation of causes of motion. The term SEE/HOLD used 
below reflects this need for coodination of hand and eye. The child's own ability to move 
itself adds the element of autonomous motion. So a triplet of basic types of motion might 
be SEE/HOLD, LET GO and SELF MOVEMENT. 
Figure 12.1 proposes how different types of motion can arise from these three basic actions. 
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Figure 12.1: Motions derived from three basic actions 
    
	
 motions where object is grasped and moved (SEE/HOLD) 
	  motions after an object is LET-GO 
	
 motions where an object moves itself (MOVE YOURSELF) 
    
Types of 
   
   
motion 
   
   
The network of figure 12.2 suggests how further motion stereotypes might develop by 
differentiation within these three. 
Figure 12.2: Development of stereotypes from three basic actions 
see/ 	 push/pull 
hold 
carry 
Primitive 	 throw 
Action 	 let go 	 roll 
fall 
move 
yourself 	 walk 
12.3 PREDICTING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STEREOTYPICAL 
MOTIONS 
12.3.1 Defining the differences between the classes of motion 
A reformulation of the model could then take account of the three primitive actions proposed 
above of See/Hold, Let-go and Self Movement. If the subsequent motions are compared 
with each other in terms of these primitive actions see Figure 12.3 then some basic 
constructions about objects and causes can be postualted. 
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Figure 12.3: The role of primitive action in understanding the movement of objects, 
action as a cause, and self as a cause 
Objects which 
move themselves 
i.e. PEOPLE. 	 WALK 
SELF seen as CAUSE 	 Produce 	 FLY motions 
and OBJECT 	 JUMP 
through action of 
SELF MOVEMENT. 
WORLD 
OF 	  
OBJECTS 
Things which 
are manipulated 
through the action 
of LET-GO lead to 
the recognition of 
object movement. 
Produce ROLL 
THROW motions 
FALL 
OBJECTS and AGENTS Produce 	 CARRY 
causally paired 	 PUSH motions 
and physically 
joined. 
Action of SEE/HOLD 
produces a 
cause. 
Fixed objects. 	 Produce 	 State of non 
motion i.e. 
STILL or at 
REST. 
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12.3.2 Development of FLY and JUMP 
If a stereotypical motion of JUMP exists, it could develop in two ways. One would be to 
see it as 'moving oneself' (WALK) but up in the air. This means it would be close to FLY. 
Another way would be to see it as analogous to THROW, but involving the idea of 
`throwing' yourself in the air. Both suggestions rely on analogical relations. 
FLYING is a motion which cannot be directly experienced by the child and is a "projected" 
understanding. The commonsense model of motion is now proposing that ideas about 
FLYING and FLOATING are rationalised rather than constructed through direct action. 
Flying can be alternatively described as an action where the moving object e.g. the bird or 
aeroplane holds itself up and is also able to move itself. Therefore the source of motion and 
support are identical. The only other type of motion where this is the case is CARRY and 
so FLYING may also be thought of as CARRYING yourself in the air. 
Figure 12.4 below describes WALK, JUMP and FLY as classes of autonomous motion. 
Figure 12.4: Network to describe how WALK, FLY and JUMP belong to a group of 
autonomous motions 
Moved by 
mover 
No support given 	  JUMP 
Support given 	  FLY 
by itself. 
Own motion 
Support given 	  WALK 
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12.3.3 Two derivations of FLOAT 
Section 11.1.3 suggested that ideas about the motion of FLOATING objects, can be seen 
as similar to FALLING or CARRIED objects. This means FLOAT can be derived from two 
primitive actions, LET GO and SEE/HOLD. The primitive action of LET-GO or alterna-
tively from SEE/HOLD. If FLOATING is thought of in terms of a motion similar to a LET-
GO action then it would include such objects as a feather and a balloon. While if 
FLOATING is thought to be derived from a SEE/HOLD action then objects such as clouds 
would be thought to move in this way. Therefore the revised model proposes two possible 
derivations for a FLOAT-type motion. 
12.3.4 What other features of difference distinguish between each stereotypical 
motion, apart from primitive actions? 
The notions of support and effort need to be included as important features of discrimina-
tion between stereotypical motions, while the notion of control requires further clarifica-
tion. The notion of control is probably connected to or derived from an understanding of 
causality, which is in turn probably constructed during the sensori-motor period. An 
appreciation of the notion of control is also connected to the source of effort since an object 
which can provide its own effort can also change the course of its own motion. 
The younger children also discriminated sharply between moving objects which were alive. 
However this feature is not easily translated into a table of differences and has been omitted 
from Table 12.1 below, since it is possible to have both types of objects i.e. animate and 
inanimate participating in all the stereotypical motions except for FLOAT (B) and JUMP. 
The previous version of the model also predicted that Falling is very different from other 
motions because it does not require any effort. The notion of Effort needs to be 
distinguished not only more clearly in terms of its presence or absence but also in terms of 
the nature of its source. All these extra features of difference are incorporated in Table 12.1 
below. The features to do with Control and Effort have been further refined by adding a 
feature of agency. 
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Table 12.1: Assessment of differences between the classes of motion using five 
features of difference 
FEATURES OF DIFFERENCE 
CLASS AGENCY CONTROL EFFORT SUPPORT ORIGINAL 
STEREO- 
TYPE 
WALK/ Itself Controlled +Effort Ground Self 
RUN Movement 
FALL No- Free -Effort None Let go 
prev-
ention 
FLY Itself Controlled +Effort Itself Self 
Movement 
ROLL/ Other Free +Effort Ground Let go 
SLIDE 
THROW Other Free +Effort None Let go 
PUSHED Other Controlled +Effort Ground See/Hold 
CARRIED Other Controlled +Effort Mover See/Hold 
JUMP Itself Free +Effort None Self 
Movement 
A 
FLOAT 
No 
Prevention 
Free -Effort None 
but not 
needed 
Let go 
B Air Free -Effort Mover See/Hold 
FLOAT 
The features of difference are translated into a numerical score as shown in Table 12.2 from 
which predictions can be made as before, about the differences between pairs of motion e.g. 
FALL and WALK will be seen as very different because they differ in respect of all five 
features between them as do PUSH and FALL. However, THROW and ROLL will be seen 
as rather alike as they only differ in respect of one. 
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Table 12.2: The number of features which are different between the nine classes of 
motion (derived from table 12.1) 
WALK FALL FLY ROLL THROW PUSHED CARRIED JUMP FLOAT 
WALK 
FALL 
FLY 
ROLL 
THROW 
PUSHED 
CARRIED 
JUMP 
FLOAT 
(A)  
FLOAT 
(B)  
5 
1 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
5 
5 
5 
3 
2 
5 
5 
3 
1 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 or 
3 
4 
1 
4 
5 
4 
4 
5 
3 
4 
4 3 
The derivation of differences between stereotypical motions from primitive actions, has led 
to a new set of predictions about the degree of differences which should be seen by children 
between the classes of motions and how the pairs of motions should be ranked. It would be 
of interest to see how well these new predictions match the empirical data. 
12.4 SYNOPSIS OF RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE COMPARISON OF NEW 
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS WITH EMPIRICAL DATA 
The empirical data used was from Matching Task 1. The mean score from the total sample 
was ranked with the revised theoretical scores and then each individual age group was 
compared with the theoretical score. The results are summarised in the tables 12.3 and 12.4 
below. 
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Table 12.3: Spearman Correlations obtained with new theoretical position; 
plus 'identities' 
n = 49 
A =36 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 
Rank 
Sixteens 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
+ Identities 
- Identities 
0.647 
0.237 
0.673 
0.452 
0.701 
0.401 
0.745 
0.502 
0.775 
0.566 
0.754 
0.504 
The correlations including identities are all relatively high as shown in table 12.3. It appears 
upon first inspection that there is a tendency for the correlations to improve with the age of 
the children tested but it must be remembered that an animacy factor has not been included 
at this stage. The scatterplots indicate that the identities form a close group with the 
exception of the WALK and CARRY comparisons. The scatterplot of the mean versus 
theoretical score shows that the comparisons which were predicted as the most dissimilar 
were indeed seen in this way by the children. (See Appendix IX for scatterplots). 
The correlations are appreciably less good when the identities are removed. The result of 
the seven year olds drops more than for any of the other ages,which points to either a 
weakness in the general structure of the model or to the fact that a particular piece of it is 
missing. The latter explanation seems to be the most likely because when a factor for 
animacy is added the correlation , minus identities , improves from a value of 0.237 to 0.793. 
This result also suggests that animacy plays a more important role in the youngest children's 
decisions about motion but is still a necessary consideration for all ages since there is an 
improvement in all the correlations with the addition of an animacy factor. 
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Table 12.4: Spearman Correlations obtained with new theoretical position; plus and 
minus identities with an animacy allowance 
n = 49 
IN = 36 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 
Rank 
Sixteens 
Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
+ Identities 
- Identities 
0.676 
0.793 
0.775 
0.558 
0.806 
0.549 
0.877 
0.615 
0.853 
0.687 
0.840 
0.635 
12.5 THE COMPARISON OF CORRELATIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS AND 
REFORMULATED THEORETICAL MODELS 
The correlations between the old and new theoretical predictions (including the comparison 
of identites) are illustrated in Table 12.5 below. There is an improvement in all the 
correlations for each age group except the seven year olds. These results indicate that the 
performance of the sixteen year olds matched the predictions better on this type of task. The 
sixteen year olds certainly have a better memory than the youngest children, they are less 
impressed with particular accidental features in the pictures and might also be actively 
seeking to produce consistent results. 
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Table 12.5: Comparison of correlations from the old and new theoretical models 
Sevens 
Rank 
Tens 
Rank 
Twelves 
Rank 
Fourteens 
	 Sixteens 
Rank 	 Rank 
Mean 
Rank 
New Model 
+ id 
+ anim 0.676 0.775 0.806 0.877 0.853 0.840 
-id 
+ anim 0.793 0.558 0.549 0.615 0.687 0.635 
-anim 
-id 0.237 0.542 0.401 0.502 0.560 0.504 
-anim 
+ id 0.647 0.673 0.701 0.745 0.775 0.754 
Old Model 
+ id 
+ anim 0.740 0.737 0.795 0.836 0.829 0.813 
-id 
+ anim 0.399 0.517 0.561 0.665 0.623 0.579 
-anim 
-id 0.292 0.318 0.278 0.513 0.406 0.344 
-anim 
+ id 0.680 0.620 0.655 0.750 0.720 0.698 
id = identities 	 + = plus 
anim = animacy allowance 	 - = minus 
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12.6 MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SCALING 
12.6.1 Introduction 
A further statistical analysis was applied to the revised version of the model in order to 
inspect structural relationships between the stereotypical motions, when defined both 
theoretically and empirically with the different aged subjects. This technique attempts to 
predict a statistical structure and so provides a stronger check than has been previously 
applied to the model. A multi-dimensional scaling method was chosen to construct a 
geometrical representation of the data in a Euclidean space of two dimensions. The essential 
ingredient defining all multi-dimensional scaling methods is the spatial representation of 
data structure. The amount of data would only support two dimensions (there was not 
enough data to try three or more dimensions) yet in two dimensions there was quite a good 
fit and the results lend themselves to a reasonable interpretation. 
12.6.2 Procedure 
Six matrices were constructed of the dissimilarity judgements for all pairs of comparisons 
of the nine different stereotypical motions. A four point scale was used to represent their 
judgements. Five of these matrices presented the different ages of the subjects tested i.e. 7, 
10, 12, 14 and 16 year olds and the sixth matrix described consisted of the reformulated 
theoretical description with an animacy allowance. 
Analyses of these data were carried out to:- 
a. See if the theoretical predictions fitted an interpretable two dimensional representation. 
b. See if the subjects dissimilarity judgement of the different age groups tested fitted an 
interpretable two dimensional representation. 
c. Obtain information about how different the subjects dissimilarity judgements were 
from those predicted by the model, and 
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d. Identify attributes of the classes of motion to which subjects pay attention when 
making dissimilarity judgements. 
The scaling analyses were carried out using the ALSCAL and INDSCAL program in the 
SPSS statistical package. 
The initial analysis of each subject age group was directed towards determining whether the 
configuration shown in Figure 12.5 (the theoretical description) adequately represents the 
different aged subjects' judgements. The second analyses using the INDSCAL program 
analysed all the empirical data from the five age groups tested. A value of 'weirdness' is 
calculated which gives a measure of the importance of each dimension to each subject group 
and provides a picture of the combined data. The adequacy of the various MDS models was 
determined by comparing the fit indices of constant dimensionality across models. The 
measures of fit reported by ALSCAL amd INSCAL are presented in tables 12.6 and 12.7 
below. The root Mean Square (RSQ) values are the proportion of variance of the scaled data 
which is accounted for by their corresponding distances. The STRESS measure is Kruskal's 
normalised measure of residual variance defined on the Euclidean distance and the 
disparities. Since STRESS is a measure of unexplained variance, smaller values indicate a 
better fit. On the other hand, as RSQ increases, the fit improves. MDS can recover spatial 
relations, but only up to rotation, reflection and inversion. In the figure, MDS maps have 
been rotated, reflected or inverted as necessary to obtain the closest match with one another. 
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12.6.3 Results 
Table 12.6: Fit Indices for Scaling Analyses with ALSCAL model in two dimensions 
MATRICES 
INDEX 
RSQ STRESS 
1. Theoretical prediction 0.936 0.09 
2. Seven years 0.75 0.21 
3. Ten years 0.904 0.117 
4. Twelve years 0.736 0.19 
5. Fourteen years 0.815 0.16 
6. Sixteen years 0.797 0.161 
Table 12.7: Fit Indice for Scaling Analyses with INDSCAL model in two dimensions 
MATRICES 
INDEX 
RSQ STRESS 
1. Combined all ages 0.695 0.207 
12.6.3.1 General Overview 
By far the most striking result of this analysis is how well the dissimilarity judgements can 
be represented in terms of a two dimensional model. In general judgements of dissimilarity 
among these stereotypical motion stimuli can be interpreted as more strongly influenced by 
the nature of the support and the cause of motion i.e. whether self activated or with the effort 
supplied by another agent. Closer inspection of the individual age group representations 
demonstrate deviations from the theoretical predictions, with the sixteen year old data 
providing the best fit. 
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12.6.3.2 Overview of MDS space for Theoretical Predictions 
The points described by the theoretical matrix can be interpreted (see Figure 12.1) as a two 
dimensional map. The model predicts that pupils will use properties such as support and 
cause to separate the nine stereotypical motions and in fact Dimension 1, the horizontal axis, 
can be interpreted as SUPPORT and NON SUPPORT and dimension 2 the vertical axis can 
be described as representing the notion of SELF CAUSE or CAUSED BY OTHER. 
Upon inspection of the theoretical map the only motions which are SELF CAUSED are 
found in the lower half of the graph and these are JUMP, FLY and WALK. They are sepa-
rated in space by a difference in their support. WALK and JUMP are found at the extremes 
of dimension 1 while FLY is found in the middle which indicates FLY's support is an 
intermediate of the other two. The model predicts that FLYs support is provided by itself 
through its own effort. 
All motions which are not supported and are caused by another source are found in the upper 
left hand quadrant of the graph. These are FALL, FLOAT, THROW and ROLL. While the 
supported motions caused by an agent are found in the upper right hand quadrant. The fit 
indices of RSQ 0.936 and stress 0.09 indicate how well the theoretical predictions are 
represented in terms of a two dimensional model. 
However, there is an anomaly presented by this theoretical description and that is the 
position of FALL. In the theory the role of an agent letting go of something is very different 
from that of an agent directly causing a motion through effort. 
12.6.3.3 Description of MDS space for sixteen year old data 
The stress of 0.16 and RSQ of 0.8 indicates that the empirical data is well represented by 
a two dimensional map, and like the theoretical representation these dimensions can be 
interpreted as SUPPORT/NONSUPPORT versus SELF CAUSE/CAUSED BY OTHER. 
The sixteen year olds data provides the best match with the theoretical predictions. 
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However, FLY, JUMP, CARRY and FLOAT least fit the theoretical predictions (i.e. they 
appear in different quadrants of the map to the theoretical points). 
i. FLY - The subjects response indicates that the motion is unsupported yet provided by 
self. However, the theoretical prediction recognised support supplied by the motion 
itself, i.e. with a bird the theory says the motion itself provides the support. It looks as 
though the subjects don't interpret a FLY motion in quite this way. 
ii. CARRY - In the sixteen year olds representation CARRY is found in the top left hand 
quadrant rather than in the top right hand quadrant of the map. The empirical data differs 
from the theoretical prediction with respect to dimension 1 i.e. SUPPORT. It appears 
that the subjects recognise CARRY more as an unsupported motion. 
iii. JUMP - The subjects disagree with the theoretical prediction in respect to dimension 
1. The results suggest that they see JUMP more like a supported self motion rather than 
an unsupported self motion. JUMP is found much closer to WALK on the multi-
dimensional scaling map which suggests the subjects recognise JUMPING more like 
WALKING in the air rather than THROWING yourself into the air (see section 11.1.3). 
iv. FLOAT - is found just in the lower left hand quadrant of the map suggesting it is viewed 
more as an unsupported self caused motion rather than an unsupported movement 
caused by an agent. 
12.6.3.4 Description of MDS space for fourteen year old data 
The stress of 0.16 and RSQ of 0.815 indicates the data is well represented in two dimensions. 
Again a good fit is found between the fourteen year olds data and that of the theoretical 
predictions. FLY, JUMP and FLOAT least fit the theoretical predictions and are found in 
similar positions to those of the sixteen year olds which means a similar interpretation can 
be placed on these results as already described for the sixteen year olds in section 12.6.3.3 
above. 
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12.6.3.5 Description of MDS space for twelve year old data 
The stress factor is still quite low 0.19 but the RSQ indicates that only 73% of the variance 
is accounted for by this representation. In order to make sense of this map dimension 1 can 
still be interpreted as SUPPORT versus NON SUPPORT but dimension 2 is now more like 
controlled versus uncontrolled action. This new interpretation of the dimension 2 still gives 
rise to some anomalies which are the positions of FLOAT, and WALK. FLOAT is viewed 
as a controlled but unsupported action, while WALK is seen as an uncontrolled yet 
supported motion. 
12.6.3.6 Description of MDS space for ten year old data 
The ten year old model has a high RSQ of 0.904 and a stress factor of 0.117 which indicates 
a good representation of the data in two dimensions. If the two dimensions are interpreted 
in a similar way to the theoretical map namely as support/non support and caused by self/ 
caused by other then JUMP, FLOAT, CARRY and FLY motions do not fit the theoretical 
predictions. The dimension of own cause/other cause is better described as controlled/ 
uncontrolled motion and then the predictions made by the subjects is more reasonable. This 
result is an indication that the twelve year olds and ten year olds view the differences 
between the stereotypical motions in a similar fashion to each other which differs from that 
of the theoretical model. 
12.6.3.7 Description of MDS space for seven year old data 
It is more difficult to see clearly what descriminations the subjects are making in this two 
dimensional representation. It appears that only one dimension has a reasonable interpre-
tation namely Support. This map only accounts for 75% of the variance. 
12.6.3.8 Overview of the MDS space for Combined Ages 
This map was produced by combining the matrices from all the ages tested. The map of 
combined ages indicates that seven of the nine stereotypical motions are placed in the same 
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quadrant of the graph as predicted by the theory. Interpreted in terms of the dimensions of 
SUPPORT/NONSUPPORT, OWN CAUSE/CAUSE BY OTHER then the subjects appear 
to agree that - 
i. FLY and FLOAT are motions with their own cause and no support. 
ii. FALL and THROW are motions with another cause and no support. 
iii. ROLL and PUSH are motions with another cause and support. 
iv. WALK is a motion with own cause and support. 
However on this interpretation CARRY is described as a motion with its' own cause and 
support. The examples chosen to represent CARRY were a man carrying a pole and a train 
carrying passengers. Both sources of motion of the carried objects were autonomous in 
nature and hence were representatives of "own causes of motion". 
JUMP is seen as a motion that is not supported yet caused by an agent. This is not such a 
strange result as first appears since as discussed in section 11.1.3 some of the pictures 
which represented JUMP were closer to a FALL type motion. 
It must be recognised that the fit is poorer for the combined data than for any other 
representation. The graph only fits 69.5% of the variance. From the weirdness values the 
seven and ten year olds give more importance to dimension 1 the SUPPORT of motion 
rather than to 2 the cause of the motion. 
12.6.4 Discussion 
All the MDS representations have one dimension which can be interpreted as motion taking 
place in the air or on the ground. The other dimension can be interpreted as to do with cause. 
Cause can be produced by an agent or by the object itself and is the other important distinc-
tion predicted by the theoretical model. The MDS representations fit the theoretical 
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predictions reasonably well however, dimension 2 needs to be interpreted as control versus 
non control for the ten and twelve year olds map. The pattern produced for the seven year 
olds fit the least well, where only one dimension can be interpreted which is SUPPORT 
versus NON SUPPORT. With the sevens model a similar result would have been produced 
if this year group were using more than two dimensions. This would mean they were paying 
attention to particular features in the pictures as argued before in section 11.1.3. Some 
problems occurred with interpretation of JUMP and this could be the fault of the pictures 
which were selected to represent this motion. However it is reasonable to suggest that the 
models prediction of JUMPING being considered as more like WALKING in the air rather 
than being THROWN into the air is correct. It appears that FLYING is viewed more like 
WALKING in the AIR rather than being CARRIED in the air while FLOATING cannot be 
interpreted as being closer to a FALL or a CARRY motion from this set of data. 
12.7 A POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF ANIMACY 
The correlations indicate that it is not so wise to add the same factor for animacy to all the 
age groups tested and in fact a proper account of animacy should include some develop-
mental hypothesis. This would mean that different ages received differing adjustments with 
respect to animacy. Although I do not wish to present a full developmental analysis of this 
feature an outline of its possible genesis is described below. 
The child's actions during the sensori-motor period only start to lay the foundations of 
distinctions made between objects which can move themselves and others which require 
external agents to cause their displacement. Children recognise living things by their ability 
to move on their own. This could be a first stage in an understanding of animacy. 
Figure 12.11 below speculates about the development of the notion of animacy and suggests 
that a second stage in the notion of animacy iswhere objects which are moved by external 
agents are recognised as being able to be alive too. 
By the time the third stage is reached the mover can also be alive or not alive. During the 
early stages of this understanding errors of judgment would probably take the form of a 
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projection of animate properties onto inanimate objects. (N.B. These ideas can only occur 
when the child is able to symbolise an ability which does not appear until about eighteen 
months. Therefore only the beginnings of notions about animacy could be suggested as 
developing during the sensori-motor period). There are still questions about animism and 
its derivation to be answered in terms of the model and this third version draws further 
attention to these problems. 
Figure 12.12: Possible development of ideas of animism related to motion 
1ST STAGE 
ALIVE 	  move 
NOT ALIVE — moved 
2ND STAGE 
ALIVE - move 
  
   
ALIVE 
NOT ALIVE 
MOVED 
  
  
   
3RD STAGE 
MOVER 
MOVED 
  
ALIVE 
— NOT ALIVE 
— ALIVE 
— NOT ALIVE 
    
    
    
12.8 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has shown that a simple task, administered to a wide age range of subjects, which 
just counts features of difference between motions can in some sense account for subjects 
conceptions of causes of motion. Although the theoretical model has now been adapted 
there is a limit to the amount of progress that can be made to this type of reformulation and 
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so in order for the work to advance what sorts of avenues merit exploration? A developmen-
tal model could be proposed with a different representation for various ages. However, this 
is not the only way forward. Another model could be produced which takes account of the 
varying agreement of features per motion. A possible candidate for this representation is 
that of FRAMES, (Minsky, 1975). I do not propose to discusss in this thesis, the details 
involved in this line of research but possible sketches for probable frames are found in 
Appendix IX. A frame representation could provide a possible starting point for future work 
and allow questions about how a series of expectations about certain motions are built up 
into a scene. Figure 12.6 proposes a possible set of expectations which are derived from the 
following four questions:- 
1. What changes the object's position from rest? 
2. How does this change come about? 
3. Where is the motion taking place? 
4. When did the action occur? 
If these questions are answered then decisions about the reasonableness or likely occurrence 
of certain types of motion can be made. Pupils in the interview study (see chapter 5) were 
able to explain very quickly why certain actions completed by cartoon characters could or 
could not happen in real life. The frame representation couldnot only be used to describe 
a series of expectations about each stereotypical motion but also to construct a series of 
expectations about a number of different motions in a scene. 
These are also the sorts of ideas which might be considered in the next phase of a prolog 
version of a commonsense model of motion. The concluding remarks together with 
suggestions for a more fundamental reformulation of the model are discussed in chapter 13. 
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Figure 12.13: Network to show how we possibly construct a series of expectations 
about motions in a scene 
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13. CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter is in four sections. 13.1 Overview of the research describes what has 
been achieved in this thesis. 13.2 Summary, answers the research questions posed in 
chapter 4. 13.3 Suggestions for improving the model, indicates a need for some type of 
developmental account of motion while 13.4 General issues raises matters which deserve 
further investigation. 
13.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
Previous research into children's ideas about physical phenomena has shown that these 
ideas are very different from those of the scientist. The area of dynamics has produced a 
large body of research data, mainly particular descriptive accounts of children's reasoning, 
which are not always easy to interpret. There is also a difference of opinion about how these 
conceptions should be viewed. That is, whether children's ideas in dynamics should be 
described as systematic mental structures or as adhoc temporary constructions. It is not 
easy, however, to see how to empirically test the merits of these different positions. This 
thesis set out to test a particular theoretical hypothesis about the content and nature of com-
monsense reasoning about motion. 
A first version of a model of commonsense thinking about motion was proposed by Ogborn 
(1985) with ideas derived from Hayes' (1979) "Naive Physics Manifesto". It provided a 
moderately clear theoretical account of how children could think about the causes of motion 
using two primitive motions, support and effort. The first phase of the research was to 
explore the use of two different methodologies:- 
i. An interview technique and 
ii. A repertory grid technique 
In separate pilot studies to test this theoretical account both techniques suggested that 
children understood motion in terms of the major components of the model i.e. they 
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discussed different types of motion in a way that could be interpreted as using the primitives 
of Support and Effort. However, the repertory grid method provided not only a more 
systematic testing of the theoretical account than the interview study but also proved to be 
a more successful way of exploring a model constructed of generalisations, since this 
methodology required subjects to make such generalisatons in order to classify different 
examples of types of motion. An important distinction found with this technique used by 
the subjects and not mentioned by the model was that of animate/inanimate motion. 
The results of these two studies helped in the modification and improvement of the 
theoretical account which led to the construction of a formalised second version of the 
model which aimed to describe the sorts of motions which people naturally use in order to 
make comparisons. This second version, still based upon ideas from Piaget, suggested that 
early ideas about motion are formed through action. The formalised model used an analysis 
of causation to provide its basic structure which was expressed through a series of systemic 
networks.This causal framework clearly explained the link between Effort and Support and 
gave rise to a description of nine stereotypical motions. More importantly this version of 
the model defined the differences between these motions. It provided a number of testable 
hypotheses about tacit conceptions of motion, by specifying stereotypical motions and 
predicting differences between them. Hence a matching task which assessed the features 
of difference between these stereotypical motions suggested itself as a methodology for the 
main study. 
A Matching Pairs Paper and Pencil Task was developed for the main study, in which 
subjects, aged between 7 and 16 years, were asked to distinguish between examples of the 
nine stereotypical motions, comparing the differences between the causes of these motions. 
Two supplementary tests were carried out to 
i. Clarify the role of motions in which one object carries another 
ii. Assess the importance of the role of animacy in deciding differences between 
motions. 
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The results from the main Matching Task showed that responses could be predicted to some 
extent by the model. There was however an improvement when an animacy feature was 
taken into account. It also appeared, as the model predicted, that the movement of a 
CARRIED object is perceived as part of the motion of the CARRIER. However in the 
theory objects which inherit their support and effort from other objects are not necessarily 
considered alike as regards to motion. There are three further distinctions within the 
CARRY paradigm which predict that objects which are fixed to a CARRIER should be seen 
as different from objects which form part of or are CARRIED-IN or CARRIED-HELD by 
the CARRIER. Although the PART-OF distinction was not tested in this study the results 
show that subjects perceived a difference between the movement of objects which were 
CARRIED IN or CARRIED HELD by the CARRIER. The results indicates that the type 
of attachment or support between pieces of a scene could prove to be an important 
consideration in the perception of objects and their motion. 
The systematic testing of animate/inanimate comparisons indicated that children do 
consider animacy to be an important distinguishing feature as regards motion. A better 
match was found between the empirical data and the theoretical predictions when a factor 
of animacy was added. In fact the correlations improved from about 0.6 to 0.8. This result 
suggests that animacy is a distinction which cannot be neglected by any theoretical account 
of commonsense ideas about motion. 
In the light of the empirical data the commonsense model of motion was again modified and 
improved by trying to paint a broad picture of the construction of classes of motions from 
actions. This new version explored the possibility of constructing the stereotypical motions 
from a set of more primitive actions, incorporating them into a reformulation of a 
commonsense model of motion, to be tested against the available data. It was possible using 
the primitive actions of SEE/HOLD, LET GO and MOVE YOURSELF to construct the 
basic stereotypical motions and when these primitive distinctions were incorporated as an 
additional feature of difference together with agency, cause, effort and support, the 
correlations between theoretical predictions and the empirical data further improved. 
Further statistical analysis was applied to this revised version of the model to see what the 
spatial relationships were between the stereotypical motions. One striking result is that both 
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the theoretical and empirical data fitted an interpretable two dimensional representation. 
This is an important finding since it tends to suggest that the revised version can predict in 
some way the structure of thinking about motion. 
13.2 SUMMARY 
The commonsense model after testing and modification provides a good account of 
commonsense causes of motion. It is now possible to provide some answers to the research 
questions raised in Chapter 4 about the nature and content of a commonsense knowledge 
of motion. 
1. Is this knowledge structured and internally consistent? 
The striking agreement between the empirical data and the theoretical predictions across a 
wide age range is an indication that commonsense knowledge about motion is structured and 
internally consistent since the data was derived from the systematic testing of an internally 
consistent model. 
2. Has the model clearly defined the primitives of this structure? 
It appears that the units or primitives of EFFORT and SUPPORT are central to an 
understanding of motion and in that sense the model gains support. However notions about 
animacy are also important considerations in the understanding of movement and are a 
feature which cannot be omitted from any future model. The identification of three 
primitive actions from which the stereotypical motions could develop points a way towards 
a further developmental account of motion, (see 13.3). 
3. What holds the pieces of the structure together? 
Causality has provided a useful and perhaps necessary framework for the understanding of 
motion. This is suggested because, following Piaget, if the basic ways of thinking are 
constructed through action, then action and movement lead to the construction of the notions 
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not only of object, time and space but also of cause. 
4. Do the ideas predicted by the model appear across a wide age range of subjects? 
Correlations were substantial at all ages. However, in general the models predictions were 
better for the older pupils than for the younger ones and three possible causes of mismatch 
between the theoretical predictions and empirical data obtained from the younger children 
are proposed. These are:- 
i. Limitation of processing capacity. 
ii. Egocentricity. 
iii. Concentrating on particular features in the Matching Task and not 
generalising. 
In my opinion the most important reason for the seven year old variability in response is the 
failure to generalise. In this sense, a model constructed of generalisations is not entirely 
appropriate. 
5. How do such commonsense ideas develop? 
The model postulated that ideas about motion are formed through action, and the final 
revision proposed that these early actions could be SEE/HOLD, LET-GO AND SELF 
MOVEMENT. This version of the model also suggested that if stereotypical motions were 
derived from such action schemes then some motions could be considered as more basic 
than others . This means that ideas about FLYING and FLOATING should be considered 
as rationalisations from actions such as WALK, CARRY and FALL. It would be important 
to test if motions are partly identified by their closeness to the earliest actions performed in 
childhood,since this theoretical proposal suggests that subjects should not only be able to 
differentiate between stereotypes but should also be able to rank their differences. 
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13.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE MODEL 
Certain anomalies still remain with the model, even in its revised form. These include (a) 
the theoretical status of FLOAT, and (b) that all the features of difference between the 
stereotypical motions carry the same weighting. The above problems together with the 
proposals which have already been suggested in sections 12.7 and 12.8 to improve the model 
illustrate a need to build some developmental theory. The primitives of any new model need 
to explain how the following features are understood: 
1. Objects and their properties. 
2. The space occupied by these objects. 
3. The notions of effort and cause, and 
4. Ideas about time and its change - since motion is an alteration in time and space. 
Therefore, integral to the child's knowledge of motion are his ideas about time, space and 
causality. 
It is Piaget's early work on the sensori- motor period, which includes descriptions of how 
the child constructs not only the object concept but also the notions of space and causality, 
which deserves further attention here. Tables 13.1 and 13.2 summarises some of this work. 
Figure 13.1 suggests how Piaget's findings can be used to construct six of the stereotypical 
motions. It is through the manipulation of objects by for example holding them and moving 
with them, the child becomes aware of a world made up not only of moving and moveable 
but also fixed objects. These activities also create the idea of space in the young child, as 
she/he becomes aware that there are objects and that there are also gaps between these 
objects. These include obstacles which are too large or heavy for us to move ourselves. 
Thus the world is made up of things which are able to move themselves, and other things; 
there are also fixed objects which cannot be moved. 
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Table 13.1: Table to illustrate the types of actions exhibited by the infant during the 
sensori-motor period 
SENSORI-MOTOR 
PERIOD 
DESCRIPTION 
i.  
(0-1 month) 
At birth actions of sucking and grasping exercised 
within a limited repertoire of actions which include hearing 
and seeing. Sucks anything that touches lips and grasps 
any object which touches palms of the hand. 
ii.  
(1-4 months) 
Beginning of arm mouth co-ordination - infant able to 
suck thumb at will. Able to move another object and repeat 
this movement (primary circular reaction) e.g. move blanket 
on cot is now becoming aware of objects through their 
"graspability", "visibility" and "suckability". 
iii.  
(4-8 months) 
Elaboration of grasp relflex. More notice taken of "let-go". 
Starts to attend to the start of a falling motion. At 5 months 
when an object is dropped outside the pram she/he only looks 
at the hand that dropped it but if the child drops the objects 
she/he views its trajectory. 
7 months - searches for objects dropped onto the cot. 
iv.  
(8-12 months) 
Actions mainly grabbing, shaking, balancing, hiding and 
finding things. There is also a big increase in autonomous 
motion. 
v.  
(12-18 months) 
More regularly carries objects from place to place. Puts 
solid objects into hollow ones places objects on/on top of 
other objects. Slides objects up and down inclines. 
No longer just lets things fall to the ground but purposefully 
throws them down. 
vi.  
(18-24 months) 
Connection of actions into events since there is a 
development of the notion of time. Child is able to notice 
before and after. Further exploration of properties of objects. 
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Table 13.2: Table describing the development of the notions of Object, Space Cause 
and Support during the sensori-motor period (after Piaget) 
SENSORI-MOTOR 
PERIOD 
DEVELOPMENT 
i. 
 
(0-1 month) 
World appears as a visual tableaux. 
ii.  
(1-4 months) 
Becoming more aware of objects through their 
"graspability", "visibility" and "suckability". 
iii.  
(4-8 months) 
Effort becoming externalised. 
Increase in reaching and touching other objects, helps to 
differentiate self and non-self in space. 
iv.  
(8-12 months) 
Further development of object concept. 
Starting to understand effort or cause which pertains to motor 
action. Noticing effect of causes. Aware of boundaries of 
objects but still does not realise need for contact between his 
arm and the moved object. Notion of object tied to previously 
successful action ie. grabbing, shaking, balancing, hiding 
and finding. Spatial sense increasing can put objects on other 
ones. 
v.  
(12-18 months) 
More systematic investigation into behaviour. 
Notion of SUPPORT of objects increases. 
First conscious attempts to investigate relationship of placed 
on/on top of. Relationships appear between actions as 
causes and displacements as results. 
Notices himself and others as Agents or cause. 
vi.  
(18-24 months) 
Object permanence established. Seems to attribute causal 
power to independent centres e.g. child is able to point to an 
object it cannot reach and looks at the parent to fetch it. 
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Figure 13.1: Network to propose a description of how the child's actions of SEE/ 
HOLD, LET-GO and SELF MOVEMENT not only start to divide the 
world of objects into those which cannot be moved, move themselves or 
move other objects, but also give rise to six stereotypical motions 
described by the commonsense model of motion 
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There is no direct documentary evidence about the child experimenting with floating objects 
in the air. The literature instead records the child's experimentation with falling objects. The 
revised model (see chapter 12) proposed that FLOAT could arise from a LET-GO primitive, 
because the child is learning about lightness and heaviness through dropping and throwing 
things around. It is also suggested that FLOAT could develop from the notion of "moving 
in" or "moving as part of another object". These ideas may start to develop in sensori motor 
period iv. and progress as the child himself moves objects together i.e. CARRIES toys from 
one position to another. 
Another issue which requires further consideration is the formalism which should be 
adopted to represent any developmental theory. The network formalism is best adapted to 
showing the structure of ideas at a moment, so that development is represented as a series 
of systemic networks. A frame representation might prove to be a formalism which 
deserves investigation.(see 12.8). 
13.4 GENERAL ISSUES 
The testing of a model of thinking about motion raises questions of a more general nature 
such as : 
i. Are there more generalised thinking schemes at the root of such models? 
In thinking about the developmental aspects of motion, analogical reasoning suggests itself 
as a general scheme of thinking, e.g. FLYING can be considered as WALKING in the air. 
These sorts of ideas need to be explored along with how children understand floating 
objects. 
ii. Is causality a useful framework for commonsense thinking? 
The present research indicates that causality provides a framework of understanding for 
motion and it might prove useful to see if it is possible to build causal models of children's 
thinking in other areas. 
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iii. Is it possible to construct an ontology of commonsense? 
All the versions of the model to date have sought to look for the primitives of reasoning about 
motion. The present findings suggest that the way towards improving the model is to look 
at a deeper analysis following Piaget. He proposed that during the sensori-motor stage the 
child constructs the notions of object, time, space and causality. These notions suggests 
themselves as likely candidates for primitives of an ontology of commonsense reasoning. 
The present research with a number of modest and simple tests has helped to make a first 
trial of a formal way of describing and talking about commonsense ideas about motion. The 
results suggest that the model can give some insight into the origins and structure of 
commonsense conceptions of motion. In so far as this is true, it provides a language for 
teachers to use in thinking with pupils about the differences between commonsense and 
Newtonian (or other) theories of motion. There is thus a case for using these ideas in initial 
and in-service training. More important, however, in the long run may be this initial success, 
however partial, to describe commonsense ideas clearly enough for the accuracy of the 
description to be amenable to independent testing. 
265 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Achinstein P. (1968). Concepts of Science: a philosopical analysis. The John Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore and London. 
Adey P. with Bliss J., Head J. and Shayer M. (1989). Adolescent Development and 
School Science. The Falmer Press. 
Aikenhead G. (1985). Collective decision-making: implications for teaching science. 
Bull Science Tech. & Soc 5 (2). 
Andersson B. (1986). The experimental gestalt of causation: a common core to pupils' 
preconceptions in science. European Journal Science Education, 8, No.2, 155-171. 
Andersson B. and Karrqvist C. (1982). Light and its properties. Ekna Report No., Ekna 
Project, Department of Educational Research, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 
Arons, A.B. (1976). Cultivating the capacity for formal reasoning: Objectives and 
procedures in an introductory physical science course. American Journal of Physics, 44, 
834-838. 
Aslin R. N. (1981). Experiential influences and sensitive periods in perceptual develop-
ment: A unified model. In R. N. Aslin, J. R. Alberts and M. R. Peterson (Eds), Development 
of Perception: Psychobiological perspectives. Vol 2: The visual system. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Aslin R. N., Alberts J. R. and Peterson M. R. (Eds.)., (1981). Development of 
perception: Psychobiological perspectives. New York: Academic Press. 
266 
Aslin R. N.. Pisoni D. P., and Jusczyk P. W. (1983). Auditory development and speech 
perception in infancy. In M. M. Haith and J. J. Campos (Eds). Handbook of child 
psychology: Infancy and developmental psychobiology (Vol. 2). New York: Wiley. (P.H. 
Mussen, General Editor). 
Ausubel D. P. (1968). Educational pyschology: a cognitive view. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
Ausubel D. M. and Schiff H. M. (1954). The effect of incidental and expermentally 
induced experience on the learning of relevant and irrelevant causal relationships by 
children. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 84, 109-123. 
Banks M. S. and Salapatek P. (1983). Infant visual perception. In M. M. Haith and J. 
J. Campos (Eds.), Handbook of child psycholgy: Infancy and developmental biology (Vol. 
2). New York: Wiley. (P. H. Mussen, General Editor). 
Bannister D. (1977). New Perspectives in Personal Construct. London. Academic Press. 
Bannister D. and Mair J. M. (1968). The Evaluation of Personal Constructs. London. 
Academic Press. 
Bannister D. and Fransella F. (1980). Inquiring Man. Second Edition. London. Penguin. 
Bassili J. (1976). Temporal and spatial contiguity in the perception of social events. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33(6), 680-685. 
Beard R. M. (1969). An Outline of Piaget's Developmental Psychology. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London. 
Berger P. and Luckmann T. (1967). The social construction of reality. Penguin Press. 
267 
BerzonskyM. D. (1970). Effects of probing children's phenomenistic explanations of 
cause and effect. Developmental Psychology 3(3) 407. 
Berzonsky M. D. (1971). The role of familiarity in children's explanations of physical 
causality. Child Development, 42, 705-712. 
Berzonsky M. D. (1973) A factor-analytic investigation of Child Animism. 
The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 122, 287-295. 
Berzonsky M. D. (1973). Some relationships between children's conceptions of 
psychological and physical causality. Journal of Social Psychology, 90, 299-309. 
Berzonsky M. D. (1974). Refectivity, Internality, and Animistic Thinking. Child 
Development, 45, 785-789. 
Blalock. H. M. Jr. 1979. Social Statistics - revised second edition. McGraw-Hill 
Kogakusha, Ltd. 
Bliss J., Monk M., Ogborn J. (1983). Qualitative data analysis for educational research, 
Croom Helm. 
Bliss J. and Ogborn J. (1984). "A commonsense theory of motion:" Methodological issues 
and results of a pilot study. Report presented to the British Psychological Society Easter 
Conference 1984. 
Bliss J., Ogborn J. (1989) "A commonsense theory of motion:" issues of theory and 
methodology examined through a pilot study, Black P.J., Lucas A. (Eds) Children's 
informal ideas, Croom Helm. 
Bliss J., Ogborn J. and Whitelock D. (1989). 'Secondary pupils' commonsense theories 
of motion, International Journal of science Education Vol. 11, No. 3. 
268 
Bower T. G. R. (1974). Development in Infancy. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. 
Bradley N. C. (1948). The Growth of the Knowledge of Time in Children of School Age. 
Brit J. Psychol, 38, 67-78. 
Brainerd C. J. (1973) Judgements and explanations as criteria for the presence of cognitive 
structures. Psychological Bulletin, Vol 79. No. 3, 172-179. 
Bronowski J. (1969). The Commonsense of Science. Heinemann, London. 
Bronson G. (1974). The postnatal growth of visual capacity. Child Development, 45, 873- 
894. 
Bullock M. and Gelman R. (1977). Numerical Reasoning in young children: The ordering 
Principle. Child Development, 48, 427-434. 
Bullock M. and Gelman R. (1979). Preschool Children's assumptions about cause and 
effect: Temporal ordering. Child Development, 50, 89-96. 
Bullock M., Gelman R. and Baillargeon R. (1982) The Development of Causal 
Reasoning. In W.J. Friedman, ed., The Developmental Psychology of Time. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Butterworth G. (1981). Infancy and Epistemology. The Harvester Press Limited. John 
Spiers, Brighton, Sussex. 
Campos J. J., and Stenberg C. R. (1981). Perception, appraisal and emotion: The onset 
of social referencing. In M. E. Lamb and L. R. Sherrod (Eds.), Infant social cognition: 
Empirical and theoretical considerations. Hillsdale N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Caramazza A., McCloskey M. and Green B. (1981). Naive beliefs in 'Sophisticated' 
Subjects: misconceptions about trajectories of objects. Cognition 9, 117-123. 
269 
Carey S. (1985). Conceptual Change in Childhood. The MIT Press, Cambridge, London. 
Case R. (1972). Validation of a neo-Piagetian mental capacity construct. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 14, 187-302. 
Case R., Kurland D. M. and Goldberg J. (1982). Operational Efficiency and the growth 
of short-term memory span. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 33(3), 386-404. 
Case R. (1985). Intellectual Development. Birth to Adulthood. Academic Press. (London) 
Ltd., London. 
Champagne A., Klopfer L. and Gunstone R. (1981). Cognitive research and the design 
of science instruction. Paper presented at the International Workshop on problems concern-.  
ing students' representation of physics and chemistry knowledge, Padogogische Hochschule 
Ludwigsburg, September. 
Champagne A., Gunstone R. and Klopfer L. (1983). Naive Knowledge and Science 
Learning. Research in Science and Technological Education. 1(2), 173 - 183. 
Chi M. T. H., Glaser R. and Rees E. (1982). Expertise in Problem solving. In: Sternberg, 
R. J. (ed). Advances in the psychology of human intelligence. Vm.1, L.E.A.:Hillsdale, N.J. 
Thesis, p. 7-75. 
Clement J. (1982). Student preconceptions in introductory mechanics. Am. J. of Physics 
50 (1), 66-71. 
Clough E. E. and Driver R. (1986). A Study of Consistency in the Use of Students' 
Conceptual Frameworks Across Different Task Contexts. Science Education 70(4), 473-
496. 
Cohen C. and Manion L. (1985). Research Methods in Education (Second Edition). 
Croom Helm Ltd. 
270 
Cohen H. G. (1985). A longitudinal study of the development of spatial conceptual ability. 
Journal of Genetic Psychology, 148(1). 71-78. 
Cohen M. R. (1978). Reason and Nature. Dover Publications, Inc. 
Copi I. M. (1978). Introduction to logic (5th edition), Macmillan Press, New York. 
Copple C. and Coon R. (1977). The role of causality in encoding and remembering events 
as a function of age. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 130, 129-136. 
Corrigan R. (1975). A scalogram analysis of the development of the use and comprehen-
sion of "Because" in children. Child Development 46(1) 195-201. 
diSessa A. (1978). On 'Learnable' Representations of Knowledge, in J. Lochhead and J. 
Clement (Eds.). Cognitive Process Instruction, Philadelphia: Franklin Institute Press, 239-
266. 
diSessa A. (1980). Computation as a physical and intellectual environment for learning 
physics, Computers and Education. 4, 67-75. 
diSessa A. (1981). Phenomenology and the evolution of intuition, M.I.T. working paper 
from Division for Study and Research in Education, Cambridge, Mass: Mass. Institute of 
Technology. 
diSessa A. (1981b). Phenomenology and the Evalution of Intuition. Working Paper 12. 
Division for Study and Research in Education. M.I.T., Cambridge, MA. 
diSessa A. (1982). Unlearning Aristotelian Physics: A Study of Knowledge-Based 
Learning. Cognitive Science 6, 37-75. 
diSessa A. (1986). Artificial worlds and real experience. Instructional Science, 14, 207- 
227. 
271 
diSessa A. (1988). Knowledge in pieces, in Forman G. and Hall P. B. (eds.) Constructivism 
in the computerage, Lawrence Erlbaum, New Jersey. 
Do!gin K. and Behrend D. (1984) Children's Knowledge about Animates and Inanimates. 
Child Development. 55, 1646-1650. 
Donalson M. (1978). Children's minds. Fontana, London. 
Driver R. (1983). The pupil as scientist. Open Univ. Press. 
Driver R. (1984). The many faces of teaching and learning. Mechanics Conference on 
Physics Education, Utrecht, 171-197. 
Driver R. (1989). In Adey P. with Bliss J, Head J. and Shayer M. (eds.). Changing 
Conceptions. The Falmer Press. 
Driver R. and Easley J. (1978). Pupils and pradigms: a review of literature related to 
concept development in adolescent science students. Studies in Science Education 5, 61-
84. 
Driver R. and Erickson G. (1983). Theories-in-Action: Some Theoretical and Empirical 
Issues in the Study of Students' Conceptual Frameworks in Science. Studies in Science 
Education 10, 37-60. 
Driver R., Guesne E. and Tiberghien A. (1985). Children's ideas in science. Open 
University Press. 
Duit R. (1981). Students' notions about the energy concept - before and after physics 
instruction. Paper presented at the International Workshop on problems concerning 
students' representation of physcis and chemistry knowledge. Padagogische Hochschule 
Ludwigsburg. 
272 
Easterby-Smith M. (1980). The design, analysis and interpretation of repertory grids. Int. 
J. Man-Machine Studies, 13, 3-24. 
Eimas P. D. (1975). Developmental studies of speech perception. In L. B. Cohen and P. 
Salapatek (Eds.), Infant perception: From sensation to perception (Vol.7). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Erricker B. C. (1971). Advanced General Statistics. Hodder and Stoughton. 
Evans W. F., and G ratch G. (1972). The stage IV error in Piaget's theory of object concept 
development: Difficulties in object conceptualization or spatial localization? Child 
Development 43, 682-688. 
Evans W. G. (1958/59). Causality and Explanations. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Reserach, 19, 466-485. 
Feyerabend (1962). Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism. Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science eds. H. Feigh and G. Maxwell. Minneapolis III, 28-97. 
Flavell J. H. (1963). The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc., Toronto, New York, London. 
Flavell J. H. (1977). Cognitive Development. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey. 
Flavell J. H., Flavell E. and Green F. (1983). Development of the Appearance-Reality 
Distinction. Cognitive Psychology, 15(1), 95-120. 
Fox R. and McDaniel C. (1982). The perception of biological motion by human infants. 
Science, 218, 486-487. 
Fraisse P. (1982). The adaptation of the child to time. In W. H. Friedman, ed., The 
developmental psychology of time. New York: Academic Press. 
273 
Fransella F. and Bannister D. (1977). A manual for Repertory Grid Technique. 
Academic Press. 
Friedman W. J. (1982). Conventional time concepts and children's structuring of time. 
In W. H. Friedman, ed., The developmental psychology of time. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Gelman R. (1982). Basic Numerical abilities. In: Sternberg R. J. (ed). Advances in the 
psychology of human intelligence, vol. 1. L.E.A.: Hillsdale N. J. p. 181-205. 
Gelman, R., Spelke E. and Meck E. (1983). What preschoolers know about animate and 
inanimate objects. In D. Rogers and J. Sloboda. eds., The Acquisition of Symbolic Skills. 
New York: Plenum. 
Gentner D. and Gentner D.R. (1983). Flowing Waters or Teeming Crowds: Mental 
Models of Electricity, in Mental Models, (eds) Gentner D. and Stevens A.L. London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Gibson E. J. and Spelke E. (1983). The development of perception. In J. H. Flavell and 
E. M. Markman (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Cognitive development (Vol. 3). 
New York: Wiley. (P. H. Mussen, General Editor). 
Gilbert J., Osborne R. and Fensham P. (1982). Children's science and its consequences 
for teaching. Science Educ. 66(4), 623-633. 
Gilbert J. K. and Watts M. D. (1983). "Concepts, Misconceptions and Alternative 
Conceptions: Changing Perspectives in Science Education". Studies in Science 
Education 10, 61-98. 
Gilbert J. K. and Zylbersztajn A. (1985). A conceptual framework for science eduation: 
The case study of force and movement. Eur. J. Sci. Educ., 7, 107-120. 
274 
Gil-Perez D. and Carrascosa-Alis J. (1984). The many faces of teaching and learning. 
Mechanics Conference on Physics Education, Utrecht, 303-309. 
Ginsburg H. and Opper S. (1969). Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Development, An 
Introduction. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey. 
Golinkoff R., Harding C. G., Carlson V. and Sexton M. E. (1984). The infant's 
perception of causal events: The distinction between animate and inanimate objects. In L. 
P. Lipsitt and C. Royce-Collier, eds., Advances in Infancy Research. Vol. 3. Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex. 
Gratch G. (1975). Recent studies based on Piaget's view of object concept development. 
In L. B. Cohen and P. Salapatek (Eds.), Infant perception: From sensation to cognition. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Greeno J. G. (1983). Conceptual Entities in Mental Models, Gentner D. and Stevens A.L. 
(eds). Lawrence Eribaum Associates, London. 
Gruber H.,Fink C. and Damm V. (1957). Effects of experience on perception of 
causality. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53, 89-93. 
Guardo C. J. and Bohan J. B. (1971). Development of self-identity in children. Child 
Development, 42 1909-1921. 
Guesne E. (1978). Lumiere et vision des objets: un example de representation des 
phenomenes physiques preexistant a l'enseignement. In Physics Teaching in Schools (Ed. 
G. Delacote), pp. 265-273. Taylor and Francis: London. 
Guidoni P. (1985) On natural thinking. European Journal of Science Education, 7.2. 
Gunstone R. F. and White R. T. (1981). Understanding of gravity. Science Education 65, 
291. 
275 
Harner L. (1982). Talking about the past and future. In W. H. Friedman, ed., The 
developmental Psychology of time. New York: Academic Press. 
Harris P. L. (1975). Development of search and object permanence during infance. 
Psychological Bulletin, 82, 332-344. 
Harris P. L. (1983). Infant cognition. In M. M. Haith and J. J. Campos (Eds.), Handbook 
of child psychology: Infancy and developmental psychobiology (Vol. 2). New York: 
Wiley. (P. H. Mussen, General Editor). 
Hayes P. (1979). "The naive physics manifesto" in Michie D. (ed.). Expert system in 
the microelectric age. Edinburgh University Press. 
Helm H. (1980). Misconceptions in physics amongst South African students, Physics 
Education 15, 92-105. 
Hesse Mary B. (1961). Forces and Fields. Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. London, 
Edinburgh, Paris, Melbourne, Johannesburg, Toronto and New York. 
Hewson P. W. (1981). A conceptual approach to learning science. Eur. J. Sci. Educ. 3(4) 
383-396. 
Hewson P.W. (1982). 	 Students' existing knowledge as a factor influencing the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
Hewson P.W. (1985). Epistemological commitments in the learning of science. European 
Journal of Science Education. 
Huang I. (1943). Children's conception of physical causlity: A critical summary. Journal 
of Genetic Psychology, 64 71-121. 
276 
Huang L and Lee W. (1945). Experimental analysis of child animism. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, 66, 71-121. 
Hudson H. T. (1977). Correlation between mathematical skill of physics. American 
Journal of Physics 470-1. 
Hudson H. T. and McIntire W. R. (1976). Correlation between mathematical skills 
and success in physics. Amercian Journal of Physics, 45, 470-471. 
Inbody D. (1963). Children's understandings of natural phenomena. Science Education, 
Vol 47. No. 3, 270-278. 
Jahrda G. (1958). Child animism: A critical survey of cross cultral research. Journal of 
social psychology 47, 197-213. 
Kagan J., Kearsley R. B., and Zelazo P. R. (1978). Infancy: Its place in human 
development. Cambridge, Massl: Harvard University Press. 
Karmel B. Z. (1969). The effect of age, complexity, and amount of control density on 
pattern preferences in human infants. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 7, 339-
354. 
Kelly G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs, vols. 1 and 2, Norton. 
Kelly, G. A. (1969) Clinical Psychology and Personality: the Selected Papers of George 
Kelly, edited by B. A. Maher Wiley, New York. 
Kelley H. (1973). The process of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 28, 107-128. 
Kendler H. and Kendler T. (1975). From discrimination learning to cognitive 
development: A neoberhavioristic odyssey. In W. K. Este (Ed.). Handbook of learning and 
cognitive processes, Hillsdale N. J.: Erlbaum. 
277 
Klingberg G. (1957). The distinction between living and not living among 7 -10 year old 
children with some remarks concerning the so-called animism controversy. Journal of 
Genetic Psychology 90, 227-238. 
Klingensmith S. (1953). Child animism: What the child means by "alive". Child 
Development, 42, 51-61. 
Kuhn D. and Phelps H. (1976). The development of children's comprehension of causal 
direction. Child Development, 47. 248-251 
Kuhn D., Amsel E. and O'Loughlin M. (1988). The development of scientific skills. 
Academic Press, 1988. 
Kuhn T.S. (1977a). Concepts of cause. In T. S. Kuhn, ed., The Essential Tension. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kun A. (1978). Evidence for preschooler's understanding of causal direction in extended 
causal sequences. Child Development, 49, 218-222. 
Lakoff G. and Johnson M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Larkin J. H. (1983). The role of Problem Representation in Physics, in Mental Models, 
(eds) Gentner D. and Stevens A.L. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Larkin J. H. McDermott J. Simon D. P. and Simon H. A. (1980). Models of competence 
in solving physics problems. Cognitive Science 4, (4) 417-345. 
Laurendeau M. and Pinard A. (1962). Causal Thinking in the Child: A Genetic and 
Experimental Approach. New York: International Universities Press. 
278 
Law N. Ogborn J. and Whitelock D. (1986). Knowing what the student knows: A use 
of Apes in Science Education. Paper presented at Prolog in Education Conference, Exeter. 
Lawson A. E. (1989). In Adey P. with Bliss J., Head J. and Shayer M. (eds.). Research 
on Advanced Reasoning, Concept Acquisition and a Theory of Science Instruction. The 
Falmer Press. 
Leslie A. M. (1982). The perception of causality in infants. Perception, 11, 173-186. 
Lesser H. (1977). The growth of perceived causality in Children. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, 130, 145-152. 
Leven I. (1982). The nature and development of time concepts in children: The effect of 
interfering cues. In W. H. Friedman, ed., The developmental psychology of time. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Lloyd P. and Donaldson M. (1976). On a method of eliciting true-false judgements from 
young children. Journal of Child Language, 3, 411-416. 
Loneday R. (1974). Practical Statistics and Probability. Cambridge University Press. 
Looft W. (1973). Animistic thought in children: Effects of two response modes. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 36, 59-62. 
Looft W. (1974). Animistic thought in children: understanding of "Living" across its 
associated attributes. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 124: 235-240. 
Looft W. R. and Bartz W. H. (1969). Animism Revived. Psychological Bulletin, 71, 1- 
19. 
Lovell K. (1961). The Growth of Basic Mathematical and Scientific Concepts in Children. 
University of London Press Ltd., Warwick Lane, London. 
279 
Lovell K. and Slater A. (1960). The Growth of the Concept of Time: a Comparative Study. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1, 179-190. 
MaloneyD. P. (1985). Rule-governed physics: Some novice predictions. Creighton 
University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA. Eur. J. Sci. Educ. 7(3), 295-306. 
McCloskey M. (1983). Intuitive physics, Scientific American 284(4). 
McCloskey M., Caramazza A. and Green B. (1980). Curvilinear motion in the absence 
of external forces: naive beliefs about the motion of objects. Science 210, 1139. 
McDermott L. C.(1984). An Overview of Research on Conceptual Understanding in 
Mechanics. Physics Today. 
Mendelson R. and Shultz T. (1976). Covariation and temporal contiguity as principles 
of causal inference in young children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 22, 408-
412. 
Michotte I. (1963). The perception of causality. New York: Basic Books. 
Minsky M. (1975). "A framework for Representing Knowledge." In the Psychology of 
Computer Vision, P. Winston (Ed.), McGraw-Hill, New York, 1975. 
Minsky M. (1987). The Society of Mind. William Heinemann Ltd., London. 
Mogar M. (1960). Children's causal reasoning about natural phenomena. Child 
Development, 31, 59-65. 
Moore M. K., Borton R., and Darby B. L. (1978). Visual tracking in young infants: 
Evidence for object identity or object permanence? Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 25, 183-198. 
280 
Moroney M. J. (1951). Facts and Figures. Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, England. 
Mounoud P. and Hauert C.-A. (1982). Development of Sensorimotor Organization in 
Young Children: Grasping and Lifting Objects. Foeman S. (Ed.) Action and thought. From 
sensorimotor schemes to symbolic operations. Academic Press: New York, 1982. 
Nash R. (1973). Classrooms observed. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Nisbett R. and Ross L. (1979). Human inference: strategies and shortcomings of social 
judgment. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Novak J. (1980). Learning how to learn. A teacher handbook available from the author. 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
Nussbaum J. and NovickS. (1981). Brainstorming in the classroom to invent a model: 
a case study. School Science Review 62(221) 771-778. 
Ogborn J. (1985). "Understanding students' understandings: an example from dynamics." 
European Journal of Science Education, 7, 141-150. 
Olum V. (1956). Developmental differences in the perception of causality. Americal 
Journal of Psychology, 69, 417-423. 
Olson G. M., and Sherman T. (1983). Attention, learning, and memory. In M. M. Haith 
and J. J. Campos (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Infancy and developmental 
psychobiology (Vol 2). New York: Wiley. (P. H. Mussen, General Editor). 
Osborne R. (1980). Some aspects of the students' view of the world. Research in Science 
Education. 10. 11 - 18. 
Osborne R. (1981). Children's ideas about electric current. New Zeland Science Teacher. 
29, 12 - 19. 
281 
Osborne R. (1985). Building on Children's Intuitive Ideas in Learning in Science, Osborne 
R. and Freyberg P. (eds). Acukland: Heinemann. 
Osborne R. and Freyberg P. (1985). Learning in Science: The implications of children's 
science. Heinemann Publishers. 
Osborne R. J. and Gilbert J. K. (1980b). A method for investigating concept 
understanding in science. European Journal of Science Education 2(3) 311-321. 
Osborne R. J., Bell B. F. and Gilbert J. K. (1983). Science teaching and children's views 
of the world. Eur. J. Sci. Educ. 5(1), 1-14. 
Pascual-Leone J. (1970). A mathematical model for the transition rule in Piaget's 
development stages. Acta Psychologica 63, 301-45. 
Phillips J. L., Jr. (1969). The Origins of Intellect, Piaget's Theory, Second edition. W.H. 
Freeman and Company, San Francisco. 
Piaget J. (1926). La representation du monde chez l'enfant, Paris: Alcan. 
Piaget J. (1927). La causalite physique chez l'enfant, Paris: Alcan. 
Piaget J. (1928). Judgment and Reasoning in the Child. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 
London. 
Piaget J. (1954). The Construction of Reality in the Child. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 
London. 
Piaget J. (1970). Genetic Epistemology. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Piaget J. (1970). The Child's Conception of Movement and Speed. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., London. 
282 
Piaget J. (1974). Understanding Causality. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
Piaget J. and Inhelder B. (1969). The Psychology of the Child. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., London and Henley. 
Pines A. L. and West L. H. T. (1986). Conceptual Understanding and Science Learning: 
An Interpretation of Research within a Sources-of-knowledge Framework. Science 
Education 70(5): 583-604. 
Polanyi M. (1969). Knowing and Being. Edited by Marjorie Green. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul (London). 
Pope M. (1980). Personal Construct Theory and Current Issues in Education. University 
of Osnabruck, Germany. 
Pope M. (1982). Personal construction of formal knowledge. Interchange 13(4) p.3-15. 
Pope M. and Gilbert J. (1983). Personal Experience and the Construction of Knowledge 
in Science. Science Education, 67(2), 193-203. 
Posner G. J. and Hoagland G. (1981). Development of an instrument for assessing 
students' beliefs about science. Paper presented at the Annual Convocation of the North 
Eastern Educational Research Association, Fallsview Inn, Ellenville, New York, October. 
Preece P. F. W. (1976). The concepts of electromagentism: a study of the internal 
representation of external structure. Journal of Research in Science Teaching 13(6), 517-
124. 
Priest A. G. (1986). Solving Problems in Newtonian Mechanics. Instructional Science 14, 
339-355. 
283 
Ravenett A. T. (1975). Grid techniques for children, Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 16, 79-83. 
Reif F. (1981). Teaching problem-solving: a scientific approach. The Physics Teacher 19, 
310. 
Reif F. (1983). Understanding and teaching problem-solving in physics. Proceedings of 
the first International Workshop in Physics Education. La Londe les Maures, France. 
Richards D. D. (1982). Children's time concepts: going the distance. In W. H. Friedman, 
ed., The developmental psyhology of time. New York: Academic Press. 
Rudnitsky A. N. and Hunt C. R. (1986). Children's strategies for discovering cause-
effect relationships. Journal of research in science teaching., Vol. 23 No 5, PP 451-464. 
Rumelhart D. E. and Norman D. A. (1985). Representation of Knowledge, in Issues in 
Cognitive Modelling. (Eds) Aitkenhead A.M. and Slack J.M. London: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Saltiel E. and Viennot L. (1985). What do we learn from similarities between Historical 
Ideas and the Spontaneous Reasoning of Students? Conference on Physics Education, (ed) 
Lijnse P.L., Utrecht. 
Schustack M. W. (1988). Thinking about Causality. In the Psychology of Human 
Thought. Eds. Sternberg R. J. and Smith E. E. Cambridge University Press. 
Shaw M. L. G. (1979). Conversational heuristics for eliciting shared understanding. Int. 
J. Man-Machine Studies, 11, 621-634. 
Shaw M. L. G. (1980). On Becoming a Personal Scientist. London: Academic Press. 
284 
Shaw M. L. G. and Thomas L. F. (1978). FOCUS on education - an interactive computer 
system for the development and analysis of repertory grids. Int. J. of Man-Machine Studies, 
10, 139-173. 
Shayer M. and Adey P. (1981). Towards a Science of Science Teaching: Cognitive 
Development and Curriculum Demand. Heinemann Educational Books. 
Shipstone D. (1982). A study of secondary pupils' understanding of current, voltage and 
resistance in simple DC circuits. Paper available from author. Unversity of Nottignham. 
Shultz T. R. (1982). Rules of Causal Attribution. Monographs of the Society for Research 
in Child Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Shultz T. and Mendelson R. (1975). The use of covariation as a principle of causal 
analysis. Child Development, 46, 394-399. 
Siegler R. (1975). Defining the locus of developmental differences in children's causal 
reasoning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 20, 512-525. 
Siegler R. and Liebert R. (1974). Effects of contiguity, regularity and age on children's 
causal inferences. Developmental Psychology, 10, 574-579. 
Sjoberg S. and Lie S. (1981). Ideas about force and movement among Norwegian pupils 
and students. Technical Report 81-11, University of Oslo. 
Solomon J. (1984b). Prompts, cues and discrimination: the utililization of two separate 
knowledge systems. Eur J Sci Educ. 6(3) 277-284. 
Solomon J. (1985b). Classroom discussion: amethod of research fro teachers? British 
Educational Research Journal. 11(2) 153-162. 
285 
Solomon J. (1989). Reply to Driver (1989) Changing Conceptions in Adey P with Bliss 
J. Head J. and Shayer M. The Falmer Press. 
Solomon J., Black P., Oldham V. and Stuart H. (1985). The Pupils' View of Electricity. 
European Journal of Science Education, 7(3), 281-294. 
Spelke E. S. (1982). Perceptual knowledge of objects in infancy. In J. Mehler , E. C. T. 
Walker, and M. Garrett (Eds.), Perspectives on mental representation. Hillsdale, N. J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Springer D. (1952). Development in Young Children of an Understanding of Time and 
the Clock. F. Genet Psychol, 80, 83-96. 
Stead K. and Osborne R. (1981a). What is friction? Some children's ideas. The 
Australian Science Teachers Journal. 27(3), 51-57. 
Stead K. and Osborne R. (1981b). What is gravity? Some children's ideas. New Zealand 
Science Teacher. 30, 5-12. 
Stein N. L. and Glenn C. G. (1982). Children's concept of time: The development of a 
story schema. In W. H. Friedman, ed., The developmental psychology of time. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Sternberg R. J. (1986). Intelligence. Ablex Publishing Corporation 10, 281-314. 
Strauss S. (1981a). Cognitive development in school and out. Cognition 10, 205-300. 
Strauss S. (Ed.) (1981b). U shaped behavioural growth. New York: Academic Press. 
Sutton C. (1980). The learner's prior knowledge: a critical review of techniques for 
probing its organisation. Eur J Sci Educ. 2 107-120. 
286 
Terry C. and Jones G. (1986). Alternative frameworks: Newton's third law and 
conceptual change. Eur. J. Sci. Educ. 8, 291-298. 
Trowbridge D.E. and McDermott L. (1980). "Investigation of student understanding of 
the concept of velocity in one dimension." American Journal of Physcis, 48, 1020. 
Tversky A. (1977). Features of similarity. Psychological Review, 84, 327-352. 
Uzgiris I. C., and Hunt J. M. V. (1975). Assessment in infancy: Ordinal scales of 
psychological development. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Vasconcelos N. (1987). . Motion and forces: A View of Students' ideas in relation to 
Physics teaching. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of London. 
Viennot L. (1977). Le raisonnement spontane en dynamique elementaire. These de 
Doctorat d'Etat. Universite Paris V11. 
Viennot L. (1979a). Spontaneous reasoning in elementary dynamics, European Journal 
of Science Education, 1(2), 205-221. 
Viennot L. (1979b). Le raisonnement spontane en dyanamique elementaire. Paris: 
Hermann. 
Viennot L. (1985). Analysing students' Reasoning in Science: a Pragmatic View of 
Theoretical Problems, European Journal of Science Education, (2), 151-162. 
Wartofsky M. W.(1968). Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought. MacMillan 
Company, New York. 
Watts M. (1981). Exploring pupils' alternative frameworks using the interview-about-
instances method, Paper presented at the workshop on 'Students Representations'. 
Pedagogische Hochshule, Ludwigsburg. September, 1981, Germany. 
287 
Watts M. (1982). Gravity - don't take it for granted! Physics Educ. 17, 116-121. 
Watts M. (1983). A study of school children's alternative frameworks of the concept of 
force. European Journal of Science Education, 5(2), 217-230. 
Watts M. and Zylbersztayn A. (1981). A survey of some children's ideas about force, 
Physics Education, 16, 360-365. 
Watts M. and Pope M. (1989). Thinking about thinking, learning about learning: 
constructivism in physics education. Phys. Educ. 24. 
Whitaker R. J. (1983). Aristotle is not dead: student understanding of trajectory motion. 
American Journal of Physics 51, 352. 
White B. Y. (1983). Sources of Difficulty in Understanding Newtonian Dynamics. 
Cognitive Science 7, 41-65. 
White B. Y.(1984). Designing Computer Games to Help Physics Students Understand 
Newton's Laws of Motion. Cognition and Instruction, I(1), 69-108. 
Whitelock D. M.(1985). Investigating a Commonsense Theory of Motion. Unpublished 
M.Ed. report. Centre for Science and Mathematics Education, Chelsea College, University 
of London. 
Whitelock D. M. (1987). What does the student know? Investigating a commonsense 
theory of motion in R. Lewis and E. D. Tagg (eds). Trends in Computer Assisted Educa-
tion. Blackwell Scientific Publications. 
Whitelock D. M. (1988). Investigating a Commonsense Theory of Motion in R. Lewis 
(ed) Research in Progress - research studentships. ESRC Occassional Paper, ITE/25a/88. 
288 
Whitelock D. M. (1988). Repertory Grid Eliciation: A potential tool for studying 
Secondary School Pupils' ideas in Dynamics? Paper given at the International Seminar of 
Empirical Research in Science and Mathematics Education Dortmund, May, 1988. 
Whiteman M. (1970). The development of conceptions of psychological causality. In: 
Heilmuth J. (ed.). Cognitive Studies, Vol 1. Brunner-Mazel:N.Y. p339-359. 
Wilde J. and Coker P. (1978). Probability, spatial contact and temporal contiguity as 
principles of causal inference. Unpublished manuscript. Claremont Graduate School. 
Wilkening F. (1982). Children's knowledge about time, distance, and velocity interrela-
tions. In W. H. Friedman, ed., The developmental psychology of time. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Wolf P. H. (1960). The developmental psychologies of Jean Piaget and Psychoanalysis. 
International Universities Press, Inc, New York. 
Young F. W. and Hamer R. M. (1987). Multidimensional Scaling: History, theory, and 
applications. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Za'rour G. J. (1976). Interpretation of natural phenomena by Lebanese school children, 
Sci. Educ., 60 227-97. 
Ziman J. (1978). Reliable Knowledge. An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
289 
APPENDIX I 
COMICSTRIPS USED FOR INTERVIEW STUDY 
(SEE CHAPTER 5) 
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APPENDIX II 
PICTURES USED IN REPERTORY GRID STUDY 
(SEE CHAPTER 5) 
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APPENDIX III 
FOCUSED GRIDS FROM REPERTORY GRID STUDY 
(SEE CHAPTER 5) 
300 
FODEED GR1I) 1 
65 
57 
77 
80 
87 
14 
1.4•...1.$1144M4,41414441414444411.4 4444444444Iff44,41,1fP4 
3 
1 
4 13 '7 
POQ1Sed Rape. rtory Grid 
Name of Subject: 6th Year 	 Number of Grid: 1 
EL EtiENTS 
E14 DkAINP1PE SNAPS 
L13 AkkOW ACkub 
E12 IlktijiL41ApLL UN HEAL) 
ElIkD 
E9 FkEU-bATIERING RAM 
EU ALKOPLANE 
E6 SLIDING 
EskYL POGOSTICK 
E7 WE 
E4 FOO TBALLERS 
E3 POLICEC ► K 
E2 6EF rL i,uNNINu 
LI buwLS 
100 90 80 70 Y.) 5) 40 3.) 20 
	
5 	 5 
	
5 	 5 
	
5 	 1 
	
5 	 5 
5 
5 	 5 
5 	 J 
5 	 5 
5 	 5 
1 	 5 
5 
1 
1 	 4 
5 4 
5 3 
5 4 
5 * 
5 * 
5 
4 4 
* 9 
8 
1 
17 
1 -- 
14-r- 
2 
19 
10 
-- 
5 
3 
7 
4-- 
142 
13 
11—.1 1 
1 5 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 4 5 
8 4 	 5 	 5 	 4 	 4 	 4 	 4 	 1 	 1 	 4 	 5 5 
1* 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 
4 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 
12 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 
64 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 * 
	
1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 5 5 
	 5 	 5 5 
3 z 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 4 	 5 	 5 4 
7 $ 1 2 	 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 2 
4444114 2 4 3 5 5 5 
Constructs 
1. Need fuel to move 
2. Needs manpower to start it 
3. Not wind assisted 
4. Projectile moves through air 
5. Ground assisted 
6. Shape helps move faster 
7. Friction stops motion 
8. Gravity makes things fall 
U. Moves across 
10. Objects thrown or fired 
Constructs 3, 5, 7, and 9 reversed 
- doesn't need fuel to move 
- doesn't need a man to start it 
- wind assisted 
- doesn't move through air 
air assisted 
- shape doesn't help move faster 
- Friction not stopping motion 
- Kept up in spite of gravity 
- mows up and down 
- not thrown or fired 
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Name of Subject: 6th year 
Science Student Phys. Chem. Maths 
(.41,41.14..
. •011.2.0. 
5* 
60 
70 
72 24 
75 	 22 23 
81 
83 17 
F18 
POCUSed Repertory Grid 
Number of Grid: 2 
EL Enters 
E14 DRAINPIPE SNAPS 
E13 ARROW ACRUb 
E12 BERYL-BALL ON HEAD 
Ell ARROW UP 
Ele. BIRD 
ES" FRED-BATTERING RAM 
E8 AEROPLANE 
E7• Kl1E 
E6  SLIDING 
ES BRYL FOGOSTICK 
E4 FOOTBALLERS 
E3 POLUECAR 
E2 BERYL RUNNING 
El BOWLS 
$ 10 i 3 
	 11 13 7 14 12 4 6 2 9 5 
1** 4;4 ** 44iii0iiifilii4i44i4i444i440,*1111**444**4***4****** 
5* 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 1 115 
1 i 1 	 1 	 2 	 2 	 1 	 1 	 2 	 5 	 5 	 5 4 	 2 	 2 	 1 * 1 
41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 51 4 
10 $ 5 1 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 51 10 
	
11 * 5 1 
	 1 	 1 1 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 • 11 
2 * 1 
	 1 	 1 5 5 5 1 	 1- 5 1 5 5 5 5 2 
12 $ 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 
7$ 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 $ 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6$ 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 
3 $ 1 
	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 5 5 5 5 4 
9 * 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 1 $ 9 
103 40 80 70 60 5) 40 30 20 
LL 
22 
5 1 5 5 $ 12 
5 .5 1 1 $ 7— 
–1 13 
5 1 1 148 
	
 
1 	 1 	 1 	 5 $ 6 
	  
1 1 1 4 11 3 —_--- 
    
   
21 
18 
17 
   
   
	r23 
1. Powered flight 
2. Man working force 
3. Movement parallel to earth 
4. Movement to move a man 
5. Accidental movement 
6. Potential Lnergy change 
7. Controlled movement 
8. Movement for a purpose 
9. Movement on earth 
10. Fast 
11. Not much movement 
12. Movement causes damage 
Constructs 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 reversed 
- falling through air 
- not man made 
- movement not parallel to earth 
- movement not made to move a man 
- deliberate movement 
- chemical change causing mov(1,,ont 
- not controlled movement 
- movement not for a purpose 
- movement not on earth 
- slow 
- moves a lot, a big movement 
- movement does not cause damage 
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£(3 16 
24-23 
/3/ 
	
\ 	 1  
18 	 \ 
91 15 
'19 
.n...• ••••* 
POCUSed Reporty Grid 
Name of Subject: 6th Form 
"A" Level Arts Student 
MOWED GRID 3 
27 
Number of Grid: 3 
EL EMEWS 
E14DRAINPIPE SNAPS 
E13ARROW ACRUb 
E12 BERYL-BALLON MEAD 
Ell ARROW UP 
BIRD 
E9' FRED-BATTERING RAM 
E8 AEROPLANE 
£7. KITE 
E6 SLIDING 
ES bRYL POGOSTICK 
E4 FOOTBALLERS 
E3 POLICECAR 
E2 BERYL RUNNING 
El BOWLS 
I 3 6 2 9 5 1 8 
	 1a 11 13 4 14 12 
	 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 
iti444414400*41ii044.41444.444#444•44444444444 4* 
	
4$ I 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 5 	 5i4--____ $ 	 15 
1* 1 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1$1----- 
3 4 1 5 1 5 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5$ 3--------
4 
2$ S 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 * 2 -- 
8 * 1 1 1 1 5 1 5 5 1 1 5 5 3 5 $ 8 ..:,-------------::' 
* 
5 $ 1 
	 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 * 5 
* 	 __-_-_----'13 
9$ 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 * 9-- --- I 
 __---- 14 
11 $ 
	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 5 	 5 5 	 1 	 5 	 5 	 5 	 5 $ 11-
_____ 
 
* 	 _ 
12 $ 1 
	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 
	 5112  $ 
7$ I 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 * 7 
6 $ 1 
	 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 $ 6 $ 
10 *t 1 	 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 5 *10 
Constructs  
23 
1. Humans move on own 
2. Moving on own 
3. Moving needs another force apart 
from own attributes 
4. Need force gravity to move 
5. Friction stops movement 
6. Shape helpe movement 
7. Light move easily 
8. Upward direction of movement 
9. Things move along on ground 
10. Falling over losing balance 
Moving in air 
- humans powered by engine 
- not moviny on own 
- moving doesn't need another force 
- doesn't need gravity to move 
- no friction 
- shape doesn't help movement 
- heavy no move so easily 
- horizontal direction of movement 
- things not on ground 
- not falling maintaining balance 
- not rTk ►vino in aiz 
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16 
RDCUSed Repertory Grid 
Name of Subject: 1st year 
FODSED GRID 5 
54 
6 	 2 
64
2  
 
24 
-\20 
75 
77 
81 
85 
91 
I 
I 	 I $ 14 6 
	 7 13 11 
	 16 3 
	 1  1 1, 5 $0440”4#4fT#Mff44f4“444# 4ff4f444444f4M44,44;444444.444 
6i 1 1 1 1 11515111 1 1 
2! 4 1 1 1 5 5 5 4 5 1 2 1 1 
11: 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
12 $ 
	 5 1 5 5 5 2 3 2 5 2 1 1 
5 I 
	 5 4 2 4 1 
	 1 	 2 3 5 5 3 
	 1 	 1 
10 1 5 5 4 1 1 1 1 5 5 4 
1 $ 
	 2 5 
	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 2 	 5 5 
	 5 	 1 
7 $ 2 5 2 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 $ 
9 $ 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 
8 $ 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 2 5 1 
	 5 5 5 5 
3$ 1 1 4 4 5 5 5 1 4 5 5 $ 
4 i 2 3 4 4 3 3 4 
69 
70 
72 
Number of Grid: 5 
EL EMENTS 
E14 DRAINPIPE SNAPS 
E13 ARROW ACRU4 
E12 BERYL—BALL ON HEAD 
Ell ARROW UP 
E10, BIRD 
E9' FRED—BATTERING RAM 
ES AEROPLANE 
E7. KITE 
E6 SLIDIN6 
ES BRYL POGOST1CK 
E4 FOOTBALLERS 
E3 POLICECAR 
E2 BERYL RUNNING 
El BOWLS 
103 90 80 70 60 ` 40 30 20 
* -6-- 
15 
1 * 2 
1 a 11 
1 * 12--  
5 a 5--- 
2 2 2 * 10-- 
1a 1 
 
1 * 7 
5 5 4 4 * 9 
5 5 5 5 * 8 
	 
5 5 5 * 3 
4 2 4 4 1 5 5 i 4--  
Constructs 
1. Movement through air 
2. Fast 
3. Moved by person/person in control 
4. Bouncing 
5. Moving and holding object 
6. Moving in something 
7. Moving across 
8. Deliberate action 
9. Moving for a purpose 
10. Shape increases speed of movement 
11. Gravity helps motion 
1:). Somebody pulling to cause motion 
- movement on ground 
- slow 
- person not in control 
- rolling 
- person standing still and not holding object 
- not moving in something 
- moving up 
- accidental 
- not moving for a purpose 
- shape decreases speed of movement 
- gravity does not help motion 
- somebody pushing to cause motion 
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Name of Subject : 
ROAD GRID 6 
60 
62 
64 
63 
70 
77 
81 
83 
1st year 
9 
POCUSed Repertory Grid 
	
14 3 8 
	 9 2 10 11 13 
	 5 
 12 
wimm,4444;41144.34444,444******4****4***-**4;t**4**U04* 
12) 	 5 5 1 
	 1 	 1 	 5 	 1 	 5 5 	 5 5 5 5 5* 1 
1 * 5 5 5 5 
	 1 	 2 2 2 
	 5 5 5 5 
	 1 	 1 
2$ 2 2 5 5 3 1 1 3 
5 1 
	 3 	 1 	 5 	 5 	 5 	 1 	 1 	 1 
6 $ 	 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 	 1 5 5 5 5 1 
7 I 1 1 5 5 4 4 2 5 4 4 4 4 4 
4t 3 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 4 5 
11$111115555551 
8$ 1 1 1 1 3 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
10 $ 5 1 1 2 2 1 2 5 5 5 2 3 
3t 1 4 1 5 2 2 1 5 2 4 1 2 
98112111111145 
1 
1 7 
1* 4 
1 1111 
	
5 5 $ 8 
	  
4 31 10 
4 	 4 $ 3- 
	  
5 519 _  
Number of Grid:6 
ELEMENTS 
El4 DkAINPIPE 
E13 ARROW ACRUb 
E12 6= U
P 
UN HEAL) 1 
ElA filkD 
E9 FRED-bAlTEK1N6 hAM 
Ea AEROPLANE 
E6 SLIDING 
£5 BRYL POGubilCt. 
E4 FOOTbALLEF6 
E3 POLACECAR 
kUNN1Nu 
E1 bUwLS 
103 40 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 
22 
5 5 5 2 5 5 4 2 ----- 
5 5 5 5 5 
	 1$ 5 
Constructs  
1. Move fast 
2. People running 
3. Moving on ground 
4. Moving to get away 
5. Something propelling them 
6. People holding something and 
doing something 
7. Controlled movement can be 
changed 
8. Natural 
9. Bouncing 
10. Held up in air by light material 
11. Muscles to cause movement 
12. Need fuel 
Constructs 2, 3 and 12 reversed 
- move slow 
- people standing still 
- moving in the air 
- moving towards something 
- something not propelling them. Moving on own. 
- people not holding something 
- 
non controlled movement cannot be changed 
- unnatural 
- not bouncing 
- on ground, heavy material 
- 
not muscles but something else causing movement 
- don't need a fuel 
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POCUSed Repertory Grid 
Name of Subject: 1st year 
FUSED 'aIU 7 
55 
67 
70 
72 
75 
80 
85 
87 
90 
5• 2 6 14 	 10 tl 13 	 '8 
$4044.141144414f4M414.4444444444444444444.44444-44444444444  
	
1 I 	 1 	 5 5 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 4 	 5 	 5 5 	 5 5 	 1$ 	 
2$ 1 5 5 5 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 -2 
	
6 3 2 4 1 	 1 2 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
$ 
	
7 $ 1 	 2 1 1 2 3 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 * 7- 
34 1 2 1 1 1 3 4 5 4 4 2 1 1 5 3 '7-7-=' --  
$ 
	
9 * 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 5 	 5 $ 9- 
	
$ 	 .14 1 
81 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 548 
4* 5 5 5, 1 1 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 1 	 1 5 5 $ 
5 $ 5 5 3 3 1 1 5 5 1 5 5 1 3 5 * 5 - 	  
10 $ 5 5 2 2 2 2 5 2 1 1 5 5 1 1 * 10 
Constructs  
1. Something to help it move 	 - moving on its own 
2. Accidental 	 - deliberate movement 
3. Flying 
	 - movement on the ground 
4. Moving towards 
	 - moving away 
5. Moving up 
	
- moving down 
6. People running 
	
- people still 
7. People moving 	 - objects moving 
8. Moving in something 	 - not moving in something 
9. Movement with engine 	 - movement without engine 
10. Fast 	 - slow 
Constructs 2, 6, 7, and 10 reversed 
is 
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Number of Grid: 7 
EL EtiENTS 
E14 DRAINPIPE SNAPS 
E13 ARROW ACRU4 
E12 BERYL-BALL ON HEAD 
Ell ARROW UP 
E10, l -8IRD 
V?' FRED-bATTER1N6 RAM 
Ea AEROPLANE 
E7• KITE 
E6 SLIDIN6 
E5 BRYL POGOSTICK 
E4 'FOOTBALLERS 
E3 POLICECAR 
E2 BERYL RUNNING 
El bOWLS 
100 90 93 70 60 50 40 30 20 
FO LED GRID 8 
54 
64 
70 -r 
72 
81 
83 
27 
8? 6 
EL 5MENTS 
E14DRAINPIPE SNAPS 
E13 ARROW ACRUb 
E12 BEFIL-bALL ON HEAD 
Eli ARROW UP 
Eli!, 61RD 
E9 FRED-BATTERING RAM 
EB AEROPLANE 
E7 KITE 
E6 SLIDING 
E5 BRYL POGOST1CK 
E4 FOOTBALLERS 
E3 POL10ECAR 
E2 bERYL RUNNING 
El BOWLS 	
•, 
90 BO 70 60 50 4, 3: :o 1D 
PDCUSed Repertory Grid 
Name of Subject: 6th year 
Science Student Phys. Chem. Maths 
103 
	
$ 9 5 	 2 13 11 10 	 14 6 1 
44#L04ii**444*i44444444444444;441 414 44444141444i1443044 
11* 	 1 	 1 	 5 	 5 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 4 	 5 	 5 	 5 	 4 $ 11 
9$ 4 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 2 5 	 5 5 	 1 4 9 
2 $ 	 5 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 5 	 5* 
3t 	 1 	 2 	 1 	 1 	 2 	 2 	 1 	 1 
	
1 	 5 	 5* 3 
t 
7$ 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 4 	 4 	 4 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 5 	 5* 7--  
84 1 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 	 1 1 5 5 5$8 
12 	 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 	 1 5 5 5 5 $ 12 --- 
5$ 4 3 1 
	 1 	 1 5 4 5 	 3 5 5 5 4 $ 	 - 
10 $ 5 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 5 5 4 	 5 5 5 5 5i10 
6$ 	 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 * 6. 
1$ 	 1 	 5 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 4 	 3 3 	 3 3 	 4 5 	 5 $ 1 	  
4 4 	 2 	 2 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 5 	 5 	 5 	 5 	 1 
	
1 	 5 	 2i4 	  
Number of Grid: 8 
Constructs 
1. Means transport 
2. People doing something to object 
to make it move 
3. Machine provides movement 
4. Sport type movement 
5. Direction upward/downward 
6. Stay up off ground defy gravity 
7. High speed aerodynamic shape 
R. Needs lot of force 
Won't sto ► dead 
- not means transport 
- moving on its own 
- no machine for movement 
- non sport type movement 
- direction sideways 
- stay on ground don't defy gravity 
- not aerodynamic 
- not lot of force 
- slop dead 
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APPENDIX IV 
PICTURE EXAMPLES OF STEREOTYPICAL MOTIONS 
USED IN MATCHING TASK 1-3 
308 
i-k1-1)12:ND1 X IV 
l'IC.'TURi~5 "TO 	 T1-16; NI Ni. SL-1. -?1-1)TYI I CAL, 
OTIONS MSTilD IN I\ fQ i1NG "'Ask 1 
i∎Y 
The people in the train move 	 The pole moves 
cvi ► i< ANit. LAT E 
The man moves 
	 The bull moves 
309 
The lorry moves 
	 The car moves 
1 
 
The pram moves  The hay cart moves 
The hoop moves 	 The bowl moves 
310 
• 
The bird moves 	 The bee moves 
The plane moves 
,TI 
The horse moves  
The helicopter moves 
The girls moves 
311 
The ball moves  The football moves 
The bomb moves 
	 The man moves 
 
The balloon moves 
  
The clouds move 
           
  
          
          
          
          
312 
The pole moves The washing-basket moves ! 
The people move 
1'1 C.:11.111;i-S 	 i6i1 )1Z1F—SiliNT Ti lay N NI-F, ST 	 '1_ 
1`• OT It N _) 	 iN 	 \ ITCH I. 	 rrksi: 2 
. 	 Y 	 \i\I I 	 1 :11 I: 
k 	 NAN l'is-ATh PA k 
The sand moves 
313 
The car moves 
Al111111•111011.. 
RE tiovAL 
The lorry moves 
y\t_I% 
	 1—',\ I 
            
 
The bull moves 
     
The man moves 
 
   
   
   
          
          
          
            
            
            
tvv/ALls; 
L 
314 
The hay cart moves The pram moves 
The car moves 
Elj:)11 AND,ATE 
I 	 I IN V\ -11,.AT3 
The earth moves 
315 
The skier moves 
i1.1_ 	 ..11M, i I 
The skater moves 
1 :\;:N1 	 \L 	 1J 
      
 
I The bowl moves 
 
  
The hoop moves 
 
      
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
316 
The bird moves 
The plane moves The helicopter moves 
11:Y AN] 	 F'AII  
The bee moves 
FLY 	 Vrii, I 
The horse moves The girl moves 
The jackinbox moves 
, It 1: LI 	 li\ANU, .T.' 
     
      
      
The 
pogo 
stick 
moves 
 
   
   
318 
319 
1.11.).. V 	 \NI:\ 	 I  
T1 	 1 	 1':\1 ,? 
The rocket moves 
The ball moves The football moves 
The bullets move 
320 
The man moves 
\1 J 
S \IJ_ 	 I 
The bomb moves The nest moves 
The girl moves 
The bird moves The butterfly moves 
[The clouds move 
:ATE I-)AI 1Z 
Hi \ -r INANHAN PAL: 
The balloon moves 
321 
The passenger move 
' T C711_11?i-iS US ',I) TO REF iESENT TU.., NINti STiiiLi.)TY1. I CAL 
UTIGN T 
	 I 	 UCH 1 NG TS1 3 
C : 
The pae,- Jsengers move 
(7. 	 . VALE. 
    
1N 
  
The passengers move 
      
        
        
    
The pole moves 
     
     
    
    
    
     
     
322 
:1  re passengers move 
CARRY I USII 
         
Tr)e baby moves 
    
The earth moves 
 
  
         
RRY PUSH IN 
 
:.'t•RRYI ljD1 i I iL].!) 
 
    
The earth moves 
C\LMY FLY 
lhe passengers move 
323 
The passengers move 
The washing moves 
FALL 1 1 riL D 
The man moves 
t,;:∎11  
The book moves 
324 
The washing moves 
• C\ IWY ELY FIELD 	 0\16N FLY I; 
The twig moves 
C\inin/ FALL 
I The passengers move The passengers move 
G"\i6a! Li-11)1F 
Ck;,niY Fl.j):1T 	 CA I 	 FL()AT 
325 
APPENDIX V 
ORDER OF EXAMPLES IN MATCHING TASK BOOKLETS 
(SEE CHAPTER 8, 9 AND 10) 
326 
Table V.1: Randomly ordered examples for Matching Task 1 
Example 
Number 
Example Name Pictures representing 
classes of motion for comparison. 
PUSH THROW 
(Training example) 
Go-cart 	 Tin can 
2 PUSH JUMP Hay cart 	 Horse jumping down 
3 CARRY ROLL Carried pole 	 Bowl 
4 FALL CARRY Man and broken 	 People in train 
drainpipe 
5 FLY2 FLY2 Aeroplane 	 Helicopter 
6 ROLL FALL Hoop 	 Bomb 
7 PUSH FLY1 Pram 	 Bird 
8 WALK2 FALL Car 	 Man and broken drainpipe 
9 JUMP FLY2 Girl 	 Helicopter 
10 CARRY PUSH Carried pole 	 Hay cart 
11 FLOAT FLOAT Balloon 	 Clouds 
12 WALK1 CARRY Man 	 People in train 
13 ROLL THROW Bowl 	 Football 
14 WALK2 WALK2 Lorry 	 Car 
15 JUMP FALL Horse jumping down 	 Bomb 
16 FALL FLY2 Man and broken 	 Aeroplane 
drainpipe 
17 ROLL ROLL Hoop 	 Bowl 
18 THROW PUSH Ball 	 Pram 
19 WALK2 FLY1 Car 	 Bee 
20 FLYI FLY2 Bird 	 Helicopter 
21 JUMP WALK2 Girl 	 Lorry 
22 THROW FALL Football 	 Bomb 
23 PUSH FLOAT Hay cart 	 Clouds 
24 JUMP JUMP Horse jumping down Girl 
25 CARRY FLY1 Carried pole 	 Bee 
26 FLY2 THROW Aeroplane 	 Ball 
27 WALKI WALK2 Bull 	 Car 
28 THROW JUMP Ball 	 Girl 
29 ROLL PUSH Bowl 	 Pram 
30 FLOAT ROLL Balloon 	 Hoop 
31 CARRY CARRY People in train 	 Carried pole 
32 WALKI WALK] Man 	 Bull 
33 FLOAT WALK2 Clouds 	 Lorry 
34 FALL PUSH Man and broken 	 Hay cart 
drainpipe 
35 CARRY THROW Carried pole 	 Ball 
36 WALK2 THROW Car 	 Football 
37 FLOAT FLY2 Balloon 	 Helicopter 
38 FALL FALL Bomb 	 Man and broken drainpipe 
39 JUMP CARRY Horse jumping down 	 People in train 
40 PUSH PUSH Pram 	 Hay cart 
41 THROW THROW Ball 	 Football 
42 FLOAT CARRY Clouds 	 Carried pole 
43 PUSH WALKI Hay cart 	 Bull 
44 JUMP FLOAT Girl 	 Balloon 
45 FLY1 FLY1 Bird 	 Bee 
46 WALKI ROLL Man 	 Bowl 
47 FLOAT THROW Clouds 	 Football 
48 ROLL JUMP Hoop 	 Horse jumping down 
49 FALL FLOAT Man and broken 	 Balloon 
drainpipe 
50 FLY1 ROLL Bee 	 Bowl 
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Table V.2: Randomly ordered examples for matching task 2 to test role of 
animacy in the commonsense understanding of motion 
Example number Example Name Pictures representing the classes 
of motion for comparison 
1 TRAINING Cart 	 Tincan 
EXAMPLE 
2 CARRY I.I. People in train 	 Sand in lorry 
3 PUSH 	 I.I Car towed 	 Earth moved 
4 FLY 	 A.A. Pigeon 	 Bee 
5 JUMP I.A. Pogostick 	 Girl 
6 FLY 	 I.A. Plane 	 Pigeon 
7 FALL A.A. Drainpipe 	 Girl/tree 
8 THROW A.A. Football 	 Cricketball 
9 WALK A.A. Bull 	 Athlete 
10 CARRY I.A. People in train 	 Pole 
11 JUMP A.A. Horse 	 Girl 
12 WALK I.A. Car 	 Bull 
13 PUSH A.A. Haywain 	 Pram 
14 FLY 	 I.I. Plane 	 Helicopter 
15 PUSH 	 I.A. Car towed 	 Haywain 
16 FLOAT I.A. Clouds 	 Butterfly 
17 ROLL I.A. Hoop 	 Skater 
18 THROW I.A. Rocket 	 Football 
19 JUMP 	 I.I. Pogostick 	 Jackinthebox 
20 ROLL 	 I.I. Hoop 	 Bowl 
21 FLOAT I.I. Bird gliding 	 Butterfly 
22 CARRY A.A. Pole 	 Washing basket 
23 FLOAT I.I. Balloon 	 Clouds 
24 WALK I.I. Car 	 Lorry 
25 ROLL A.A. Skater 	 Skier 
26 FALL I.I. Bomb 	 Nest 
27 THROW I.I. Rocket 	 Bullets 
28 FALL 1.A. Drainpipe 	 Nest 
A = ANIMATE I = INANIMATE 
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Table V.3: Randomly ordered examples for matching task 3 to test role of animacy 
in the commonsense understanding of motion 
Example 
Number 
Example Name Pictures 
TRAINING EXAMPLE Go cart and tin can 
2 CARRY FLY AND WALK Passengers in Helicopter and lorry 
3 CARRY FALL AND PUSH Eggs in nest and pram 
4 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLY Passengers in aeroplane and 
passengers in Helicopter 
5 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FLOAT Washing in basket and passengers in glider 
6 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLOAT Baby in pram and passengers in balloon 
7 CARRY FALL AND FLOAT Eggs in Nest and Balloon 
8 CARRY PUSH AND PUSH Earth in wheelbarrow and haycart 
9 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLOAT Passengers in train and passengers in glider 
10 CARRY FLOAT AND CARRY FLOAT Passengers in balloon and passengers in glider 
11 CARRY FALL AND WALK Washing in basket and car 
12 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FALL Baby in pram and eggs in nest 
13 CARRY WALK In AND CARRY WALK Passengers in bus and man 
Held holding pole 
14 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY WALK Earth in wheelbarrow and passengers in train 
15 CARRY FLY In AND CARRY FLY Passengers in aerplane and 
Held bird holding twig 
16 CARRY PUSH AND WALK Baby in Pram and athlete 
17 CARRY WALK AND FLOAT Passengers in Bus and cloud 
18 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FALL Passengers in train and eggs in nest 
19 CARRY FALL In and CARRY FALL Washing in basket and girl 
Held holding book 
20 CARRY FLY AND FLOAT Passengers in helicopter and balloon 
21 CARRY PUSH AND FALL Earth in Wheelbarrow and Bomb 
22 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FALL Passengers in aeroplane and eggs in nest 
23 CARRY PUSH AND FLY Baby in Pram and bird 
24 CARRY WALK AND FLY Passengers in Train and Bee 
25 CARRY PUSH In AND CARRY PUSH Earth in Wheelbarrow and 
Held baby holding rattle in pram 
26 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLOAT Passengers in helicopter and passengers 
in balloon 
27 CARRY WALK AND CARRY WALK Passengers in train and passengers in bus 
28 CARRY FLOAT In AND CARRY Passengers in glider and 
FLOAT Held man on handglidcr 
29 CARRY PUSH AND FLOAT Baby in Pram and balloon 
30 CARRY FALL AND FALL Washing in basket and man falling off drainpipe 
31 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY PUSH Baby in Pram and earth in wheelbarrow 
32 CARRY WALK AND WALK Passengers in Bus and lorry 
33 CARRY FALL AND FLY Eggs in Nest and Helicopter 
34 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLY Passengers in train and passengers in aeroplane 
35 CARRY FLY AND FLY Passengers in helicopter and aeroplane 
36 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLY Earth in wheelbarrow an passengers in aeroplane 
37 CARRY WALK AND FALL Passengers in bus and man falling off drainpipe 
38 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FALL Eggs in nest and washing in basket 
39 CARRY FLY AND PUSH Passengers in aeroplane and haycart 
40 CARRY FLOAT AND FLOAT Passengers in balloon and balloon 
41 CARRY WALK AND PUSH Passengers in train and haycart 
42 CARRY FLY AND FALL Passengers in aeroplane 
and man falling off drainpipe. 
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APPENDIX VI 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR MATCHING TASK 1 
(SEE CHAPTER 8) 
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Table VI.I: Summary of Theoretical Scores matched with average score of 
population tested 
EXAMPLE SCORE 1- VERY ALIKE (0 DIFFERENCE) AVERAGE 
NUMBER 
	
PUPILS 
RESPONSES 
5 
	
FLY2 FLY2 
	
1.53 
11 
	
FLOAT FLOAT 
	
1.97 
14 
	
WALK2 WALK2 
	 1.17 
17 
	
ROLL ROLL 
	
1.74 
20 
	
FLY1 FLY2 
	
2.23 
24 
	
JUMP JUMP 
	
1.50 
27 
	
WALK1 WALK2 
	
2.87 
31 
	
CARRY CARRY 
	
2.88 
32 
	
WALK1 WALK1 
	
1.91 
38 
	
FALL FALL 
	
2.23 
40 
	
PUSH PUSH 
	
1.74 
41 
	
THROW THROW 
	
1.47 
45 
	
FLY 1 FLY1 
	 1.26 
SCORE 2 - A BIT ALIKE (1 DIFFERENCE) 
13 
	
ROLL THROW 
	
1.67 
19 
	
WALK 2 FLY 
	
3.31 
28 
	
THROW JUMP 
	 2.44 
29 
	
ROLL PUSH 
	
2.32 
43 
	
PUSH WALK 
	
2.63 
49 
	
FALL FLOAT 
	
3.62 
SCORE 3 - A BIT DIFFERENT (2 DIFFERENCES) 
3 
	
CARRY ROLL 
	
2.60 
6 
	
ROLL FALL 
	 3.17 
7 
	
PUSH FLY 
	
3.68 
9 
	
JUMP FLY2 
	
3.45 
10 
	
CARRY PUSH 
	
2.64 
12 
	
WALK CARRY 
	
3.15 
15 
	
JUMP FALL 
	
3.43 
18 
	
THROW PUSH 
	
2.92 
21 
	
JUMP WALK2 
	
3.45 
30 
	
FLOAT ROLL 
	
3.22 
35 
	
CARRY THROW 
	
2.38 
39 
	
JUMP CARRY 
	
3.30 
44 
	
JUMP FLOAT 
	
3.19 
46 
	
WALK ROLL 
	
3.05 
47 
	
FLOAT THROW 
	
3.25 
48 
	
ROLL JUMP 
	
3.32 
SCORE 4 - VERY DIFFERENT (3 DIFFERENCES) 
2 
	
PUSH JUMP 	 2.8 
4 
	
FALL CARRY 
	
3.5 
8 
	
WALK2 FALL 
	
3.6 
16 
	
FALL FLY2 
	
3.5 
22 
	
THROW FALL 
	
2.9 
23 
	
PUSH FLOAT 
	
3.57 
25 
	
CARRY FLY 
	
3.35 
26 
	
FLY2 THROW 
	
2.99 
33 
	
FLOAT WALK2 
	
3.59 
34 
	
FALL PUSH 
	
3.45 
36 
	
WALK2 THROW 
	
3.11 
37 
	
FLOAT FLY2 
	
2.63 
42 
	
FLOAT CARRY 
	
3.29 
50 
	
FLY ROLL 
	
3.48 
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Table VI.2: Comparison of theoretical score with average value of 7 year 
olds responses 
EXAMPLE SCORE 1- VERY ALIKE (0 DIFFERENCE) 7 YEAR OLD 
NUMBER 
	
PUPILS 
RESPONSES 
5 
	
FLY2 FLY2 
	
1.72 
11 
	
FLOAT FLOAT 
	
2.47 
14 
	
WALK2 WALK2 
	
1.25 
17 
	
ROLL ROLL 
	
2.25 
20 
	
FLY1 FLY2 
	
2.52 
24 
	
JUMP JUMP 
	
1.9 
27 
	
WALK1 WALK2 
	
2.8 
31 
	
CARRY CARRY 
	
2.87 
32 
	
WALK1 WALK1 
	
2.52 
38 
	
FALL FALL 
	
2.8 
40 
	
PUSH PUSH 
	
1.92 
41 
	
THROW THROW 
	
1.95 
45 	 FLY1 FLY1 
	
1.67 
SCORE 2 - A BIT ALIKE (1DIFFERENCE) 
13 
	
ROLL THROW 
	
2.22 
19 
	
WALK 2 FLY 
	
3.62 
28 
	
THROW JUMP 
	
2.15 
29 
	
ROLL PUSH 
	
2.8 
43 
	
PUSH WALK 
	
2.75 
49 
	
FALL FLOAT 
	
3.25 
SCORE 3 - A BIT DIFFERENT (2 DIFFERENCES) 
18 
	
PUSH THROW 
	
3.5 
3 
	
CARRY ROLL 
	
3.00 
6 
	
ROLL FALL 
	
3.87 
7 
	
PUSH FLY 
	
3.77 
9 
	
JUMP FLY2 
	
3.67 
10 
	
CARRY PUSH 
	
2.95 
12 
	
WALK CARRY 
	
3.32 
15 
	
JUMP FALL 
	
3.7 
18 
	
THROW PUSH 
	
3.5 
21 
	
JUMP WALK2 
	
3.67 
30 
	
FLOAT ROLL 
	
3.3 
35 
	
CARRY THROW 
	
2.75 
39 
	
JUMP CARRY 
	
3.3 
44 
	
JUMP FLOAT 
	
3.1 
46 
	
WALK ROLL 
	
3.15 
47 
	
FLOAT THROW 
	
3.37 
48 
	
ROLL JUMP 
	
3.37 
SCORE 4 - VERY DIFFERENT (3 DIFFERENCES) 
2 
	
PUSH JUMP 
	
2.72 
4 
	
FALL CARRY 
	
3.82 
8 
	
WALK2 FALL 
	
3.7 
16 
	
FALL FLY2 
	
3.67 
22 
	
THROW FALL 
	
3.52 
23 
	
PUSH FLOAT 
	
3.35 
25 
	
CARRY FLY 
	
3.3 
26 
	
FLY2 THROW 
	
3.22 
33 
	
FLOAT WALK2 
	
3.52 
34 
	
FALL PUSH 
	
3.52 
36 
	
WALK2 THROW 
	
3.2 
37 
	
FLOAT FLY2 
	
2.82 
42 
	
FLOAT CARRY 
	
3.4 
50 
	
FLY ROLL 
	
3.32 
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Table VI.3: Comparison of theoretical score with average value of 10 year olds 
responses. 
SCORE 1- VERY ALIKE (0 DIFFERENCE) 10 YEAR OLD 
PUPILS 
RESPONSES 
EXAMPLE 
NUMBER 
FLY2 FLY2 
	
1.47 
FLOAT FLOAT 
	
1.95 
WALK2 WALK2 
	
1.37 
ROLL ROLL 
	
1.7 
FLY1 FLY2 
	
2.3 
JUMP JUMP 
	
1.52 
WALK1 WALK2 
	
2.82 
CARRY CARRY 
	
3.47 
WALK1 WALK1 
	
2.05 
FALL FALL 
	
2.55 
PUSH PUSH 
	
1.85 
THROW THROW 
	
1.45 
FLY1 FLY1 
	
1.2 
SCORE 2 - A BIT ALIKE (1 DIFFERENCE) 
ROLL THROW 
	
1.9 
WALK 2 FLY 
	
3.37 
THROW JUMP 
	
2.37 
ROLL PUSH 
	
2.47 
PUSH WALK 
	
2.42 
FALL FLOAT 
	
3.35 
SCORE 3 - A BIT DIFFERENT (2 DIFFERENCES) 
CARRY ROLL 
	
2.95 
ROLL FALL 
	 3.22 
PUSH FLY 
	
3.55 
JUMP FLY2 
	
3.35 
CARRY PUSH 
	
2.62 
WALK CARRY 
	
2.8 
JUMP FALL 
	
3.42 
THROW PUSH 
	
3.1 
JUMP WALK2 
	
3.47 
FLOAT ROLL 
	
3.15 
CARRY THROW 
	
2.32 
JUMP CARRY 
	
3.22 
JUMP FLOAT 
	
3.02 
WALK ROLL 
	
2.97 
FLOAT THROW 
	
3.32 
ROLL JUMP 
	
3.07 
SCORE 4 - VERY DIFFERENT (3 DIFFERENCES) 
PUSH JUMP 
	
3.1 
FALL CARRY 
	
3.57 
WALK2 FALL 
	
3.65 
FALL FLY2 
	
3.3 
THROW FALL 
	
2.55 
PUSH FLOAT 
	
3.35 
CARRY FLY 
	
3.25 
FLY2 THROW 
	
2.75 
FLOAT WALK2 
	
3.47 
FALL PUSH 
	
3.57 
WALK2 THROW 	 3.05 
FLOAT FLY2 
	
2.72 
FLOAT CARRY 	 3.32 
FLY ROLL 
	
3.3 
5 
11 
14 
17 
20 
24 
27 
31 
32 
38 
40 
41 
45 
13 
19 
28 
29 
43 
49 
3 
6 
7 
9 
10 
12 
15 
18 
21 
30 
35 
39 
44 
46 
47 
48 
2 
4 
8 
16 
22 
23 
25 
26 
33 
34 
36 
37 
42 
50 
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Table VI.4: Comparison of theoretical score with average value of 12 year olds 
responses. 
EXAMPLE SCORE 1- VERY ALIKE (0 DIFFERENCE) 12 YEAR OLD 
NUMBER 
	
PUPILS 
RESPONSES 
5 
	
FLY2 FLY2 
	
1.21 
11 
	
FLOAT FLOAT 
	
2.00 
14 
	
WALK2 WALK2 
	
1.07 
17 
	
ROLL ROLL 
	
1.78 
20 
	
FLY1 FLY2 
	
2.1 
24 
	
JUMP JUMP 
	
1.43 
27 
	
WALK1 WALK2 
	
2.89 
31 
	
CARRY CARRY 
	
2.92 
32 
	
WALK1 WALK1 
	
1.83 
38 
	
FALL FALL 
	
2.18 
40 
	
PUSH PUSH 
	
1.65 
41 
	
THROW THROW 
	
1.38 
45 	 FLY1 FLY1 
	
1.2 
SCORE 2 - A BIT ALIKE (1 DIFFERENCE) 
13 
	
ROLL THROW 
	
1.56 
19 
	
WALK 2 FLY 
	 3.41 
28 
	
THROW JUMP 
	
2.45 
29 
	
ROLL PUSH 
	
2.14 
43 
	
PUSH WALK 
	
2.85 
49 
	
FALL FLOAT 
	
3.45 
SCORE 3 - A BIT DIFFERENT (2 DIFFERENCES) 
3 
	
CARRY ROLL 
	
2.65 
6 
	
ROLL FALL 
	
3.07 
7 
	
PUSH FLY 
	
3.72 
9 	 JUMP FLY2 
	
3.47 
10 
	
CARRY PUSH 
	
2.7 
12 
	
WALK CARRY 
	
3.16 
15 
	
JUMP FALL 
	
3.25 
18 
	
THROW PUSH 
	
2.9 
21 
	
JUMP WALK2 
	
3.63 
30 
	
FLOAT ROLL 
	
3.18 
35 
	
CARRY THROW 
	
2.25 
39 
	
JUMP CARRY 
	
3.2 
44 
	
JUMP FLOAT 
	
3.1 
46 
	
WALK ROLL 
	
3.00 
47 
	
FLOAT THROW 
	
3.23 
48 
	
ROLL JUMP 
	
3.6 
SCORE 4 - VERY DIFFERENT (3 DIFFERENCES) 
2 
	
PUSH JUMP 	 2.81 
4 
	
FALL CARRY 
	
3.52 
8 
	
WALK2 FALL 
	
3.45 
16 
	
FALL FLY2 
	
3.41 
22 
	
THROW FALL 
	
2.6 
23 
	
PUSH FLOAT 
	
3.7 
25 
	
CARRY FLY 
	
3.32 
26 
	
FLY2 THROW 
	
2.8 
33 
	
FLOAT WALK2 
	
3.63 
34 
	
FALL PUSH 
	
3.45 
36 
	
WALK2 THROW 
	
3.1 
37 
	
FLOAT FLY2 
	
2.47 
42 
	
FLOAT CARRY 
	
3.16 
50 
	
FLY ROLL 
	
3.61 
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Table VI.5: Comparison of theoretical score with average value of 14 year olds 
responses. 
EXAMPLE SCORE 1- VERY ALIKE (0 DIFFERENCE) 14 YEAR OLD 
NUMBER 
	
PUPILS 
RESPONSES 
5 
	
FLY2 FLY2 
	
1.53 
11 
	
FLOAT FLOAT 
	
1.69 
14 
	
WALK2 WALK2 
	
1.00 
17 
	
ROLL ROLL 
	 1.47 
20 
	
FLY1 FLY2 
	
2.12 
24 
	
JUMP JUMP 
	
1.57 
27 
	
WALK1 WALK2 
	
3.02 
31 
	
CARRY CARRY 
	
2.9 
32 
	
WALK1 WALK1 
	
1.92 
38 
	
FALL FALL 
	
2.12 
40 
	
PUSH PUSH 
	
1.88 
41 
	
THROW THROW 
	
1.47 
45 
	
FLY1 FLY1 
	
1.18 
SCORE 2 - A BIT ALIKE (1 DIFFERENCE) 
13 
	
ROLL THROW 	 1.55 
19 
	
WALK 2 FLY 	 3.16 
28 
	
THROW JUMP 	 2.57 
29 
	
ROLL PUSH 	 2.18 
43 
	
PUSH WALK 	 2.27 
49 
	
FALL FLOAT 	 3.14 
SCORE 3 - A BIT DIFFERENT (2 DIFFERENCES) 
3 
	
CARRY ROLL 
	
2.35 
6 
	
ROLL FALL 
	
3.02 
7 
	
PUSH FLY 
	
3.65 
9 
	
JUMP FLY2 
	
3.35 
10 
	
CARRY PUSH 
	
2.69 
12 
	
WALK CARRY 
	
3.02 
15 
	
JUMP FALL 
	
3.61 
18 
	
THROW PUSH 
	
2.61 
21 
	
JUMP WALK2 
	
2.39 
30 
	
FLOAT ROLL 
	
3.1 
35 
	
CARRY THROW 
	
2.41 
39 
	
JUMP CARRY 
	
3.2 
44 
	
JUMP FLOAT 
	
3.49 
46 
	
WALK ROLL 
	
3.12 
47 
	
FLOAT THROW 
	
3.33 
48 
	
ROLL JUMP 
	
3.31 
SCORE 4 - VERY DIFFERENT (3 DIFFERENCES) 
2 
	
PUSH JUMP 
	
2.65 
4 
	
FALL CARRY 
	
3.55 
8 
	
WALK2 FALL 
	
3.49 
16 
	
FALL FLY2 
	
3.47 
22 
	
THROW FALL 
	
3.06 
23 
	
PUSH FLOAT 
	
3.76 
25 
	
CARRY FLY 
	
3.51 
26 
	
FLY2 THROW 
	
3.27 
33 
	
FLOAT WALK2 
	
3.67 
34 
	
FALL PUSH 
	
3.37 
36 
	
WALK2 THROW 
	
3.02 
37 
	
FLOAT FLY2 
	
2.39 
42 
	
FLOAT CARRY 
	
3.53 
50 
	
FLY ROLL 
	
3.65 
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Table VI.6: Comparison of theoretical score with average value of 16 year olds 
responses. 
EXAMPLE SCORE 1- VERY ALIKE (0 DIFFERENCE) 16 YEAR OLD 
NUMBER 
	
PUPILS 
RESPONSES 
5 
	
FLY2 FLY2 
	
1.7 
11 
	
FLOAT FLOAT 
	
1.72 
14 
	
WALK2 WALK2 
	
1.15 
17 
	
ROLL ROLL 
	 1.52 
20 
	
FLY1 FLY2 
	
2.1 
24 
	
JUMP JUMP 
	
1.05 
27 
	
WALK1 WALK2 
	
2.82 
31 
	
CARRY CARRY 
	
2.25 
32 
	
WALK1 WALK1 
	 1.25 
38 
	
FALL FALL 
	
1.5 
40 
	
PUSH PUSH 
	
1.42 
41 
	
THROW THROW 
	
1.1 
45 
	
FLY1 FLY1 
	
1.05 
SCORE 2 - A BIT ALIKE (1 DIFFERENCE) 
13 
	
ROLL THROW 	 1.12 
19 
	
WALK 2 FLY 	 2.97 
28 
	
THROW JUMP 	 2.65 
29 
	
ROLL PUSH 	 2.02 
43 
	
PUSH WALK 	 2.85 
49 
	
FALL FLOAT 	 3.12 
SCORE 3 - A BIT DIFFERENT (2 DIFFERENCES) 
3 
	
CARRY ROLL 
	
2.05 
6 
	
ROLL FALL 
	
2.67 
7 
	
PUSH FLY 
	
3.7 
9 
	
JUMP FLY2 
	
3.42 
10 
	
CARRY PUSH 
	
2.25 
12 
	
WALK CARRY 
	
3.47 
15 
	
JUMP FALL 
	
3.15 
18 
	
THROW PUSH 
	
2.5 
21 
	
JUMP WALK2 
	
3.1 
30 
	
FLOAT ROLL 
	
3.4 
35 
	
CARRY THROW 
	
2.17 
39 
	
JUMP CARRY 
	
3.5 
44 
	
JUMP FLOAT 
	
3.25 
46 
	
WALK ROLL 
	
3.02 
47 
	
FLOAT THROW 
	
3.02 
48 
	
ROLL JUMP 
	
3.27 
SCORE 4 - VERY DIFFERENT (3 DIFFERENCES) 
2 
	
PUSH JUMP 
	
2.72 
4 
	
FALL CARRY 
	
3.05 
8 
	
WALK2 FALL 
	
3.7 
16 
	
FALL FLY2 
	
3.6 
22 
	
THROW FALL 
	
2.77 
23 
	
PUSH FLOAT 
	
3.67 
25 
	
CARRY FLY 
	
3.37 
26 
	
FLY2 THROW 
	
2.92 
33 
	
FLOAT WALK2 
	
3.7 
34 
	
FALL PUSH 
	
3.32 
36 
	
WALK2 THROW 
	
3.15 
37 
	
FLOAT FLY2 
	
2.77 
42 
	
FLOAT CARRY 
	
3.02 
50 
	
FLY ROLL 
	
3.55 
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Table VI.7: Examples from 7, 10 and 12 year olds showing the computed value 
of standard deviation/maximum standard deviation 
Example 
Number 
Example Name Standard Standard Standard 
deviation/ deviation/ deviation/ 
Standard Standard Standard 
max. 	 max. 	 max. 
seven 	 ten 	 twelve 
year olds 	 year olds 	 year olds 
1 PUSH THROW 0.95 0.55 0.56 
2 PUSH JUMP 0.59 0.71 0.59 
3 CARRY ROLL 0.57 0.71 0.51 
4 FALL CARRY 0.76 0.67 0.75 
5 FLY2 FLY2 0.62 0.61 0.68 
6 ROLL FALL 0.93 0.55 0.58 
7 PUSH FLY1 0.76 0.66 0.66 
8 WALK2 FALL 0.67 0.59 0.63 
9 JUMP FLY2 0.64 0.71 0.64 
10 CARRY PUSH 0.71 0.67 0.62 
11 FLOAT FLOAT 0.66 0.62 0.54 
12 WALKI CARRY 0.60 0.71 0.59 
13 ROLL THROW 0.66 0.63 0.56 
14 WALK2 WALK2 0.75 0.57 0.73 
15 JUMP FALL 0.61 0.77 0.64 
16 FALL FLY2 0.60 0.57 0.65 
17 ROLL ROLL 0.75 0.60 0.55 
18 THROW PUSH 0.80 0.54 0.60 
19 WALK2 FLY1 0.88 0.70 0.63 
20 FLY1 FLY2 0.61 0.60 0.53 
21 JUMP WALK2 0.54 0.62 0.59 
22 THROW FALL 0.61 0.57 0.54 
23 PUSH FLOAT 0.83 0.68 0.50 
24 JUMP JUMP 0.77 0.69 0.65 
25 CARRY FLY1 0.64 0.57 0.50 
26 FLY2 THROW 0.68 0.65 0.62 
27 WALK1 WALK2 0.73 0.65 0.62 
28 THROW JUMP 0.69 0.49 0.41 
29 ROLL PUSH 0.66 0.68 0.59 
30 FLOAT ROLL 0.62 0.57 0.62 
31 CARRY CARRY 0.74 0.68 0.72 
32 WALK1 WALKI 0.83 0.64 0.55 
33 FLOAT WALK2 0.67 0.59 0.68 
34 FALL PUSH 0.57 0.70 0.65 
35 CARRY THROW 0.67 0.60 0.56 
36 WALK2 THROW 0.69 0.68 0.52 
37 FLOAT FLY2 0.67 0.54 0.61 
38 FALL FALL 0.79 0.76 0.83 
39 JUMP CARRY 0.69 0.60 0.52 
40 PUSH PUSH 0.70 0.71 0.64 
41 THROW THROW 0.74 0.62 0.58 
42 FLOAT CARRY 0.69 0.65 0.62 
43 PUSH WALKI 0.73 0.68 0.64 
44 JUMP FLOAT 0.71 0.63 0.63 
45 FLY1 FLY1 0.82 0.55 0.79 
46 WALK1 ROLL 0.56 0.46 0.48 
47 FLOAT THROW 0.63 0.63 0.61 
48 ROLL JUMP 0.65 0.60 0.61 
49 FALL FLOAT 0.74 0.59 0.59 
50 FLY1 ROLL 0.69 0.69 0.54 
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Table VI.8: Examples from 14 and 16 year olds showing the computed value 
of standard deviation/maximum standard deviation 
Example 
Number 
Example Name Standard 
deviation/ 
Standard 
max. 
fourteen 
year olds 
Standard 
deviation/ 
Standard 
max. 
sixteen 
year olds 
1 PUSH THROW 0.66 0.62 
2 PUSH JUMP 0.74 0.78 
3 CARRY ROLL 0.67 0.64 
4 FALL CARRY 0.71 0.92 
5 FLY2 FLY2 0.68 0.80 
6 ROLL FALL 0.70 0.80 
7 PUSH FLY1 0.66 0.82 
8 WALK2 FALL 0.72 0.79 
9 JUMP FLY2 0.69 0.67 
10 CARRY PUSH 0.68 0.68 
11 FLOAT FLOAT 0.63 0.72 
12 WALK1 CARRY 0.67 1.38 
13 ROLL THROW 0.56 0.66 
14 WALK2 WALK2 0.00 0.72 
15 JUMP FALL 0.74 0.65 
16 FALL FLY2 0.66 0.61 
17 ROLL ROLL 0.58 0.70 
18 THROW PUSH 0.61 0.57 
19 WALK2 FLY1 0.70 0.83 
20 FLY1 FLY2 0.60 0.65 
21 JUMP WALK2 0.65 0.63 
22 THROW FALL 0.75 0.74 
23 PUSH FLOAT 0.74 0.61 
24 JUMP JUMP 0.62 0.55 
25 CARRY FLY1 0.62 0.53 
26 FLY2 THROW 0.73 0.58 
27 WALK1 WALK2 0.73 0.62 
28 THROW JUMP 0.61 0.62 
29 ROLL PUSH 0.68 0.69 
30 FLOAT ROLL 0.73 0.67 
31 CARRY CARRY 0.73 0.80 
32 WALK1 WALK1 0.60 0.64 
33 FLOAT WALK2 0.79 0.67 
34 FALL PUSH 0.65 0.69 
35 CARRY THROW 0.63 0.72 
36 WALK2 THROW 0.68 0.67 
37 FLOAT FLY2 0.54 0.59 
38 FALL FALL 0.81 0.80 
39 JUMP CARRY 0.68 0.66 
40 PUSH PUSH 0.74 0.77 
41 THROW THROW 0.71 0.56 
42 FLOAT CARRY 0.59 0.75 
43 PUSH WALK1 0.68 0.62 
44 JUMP FLOAT 0.86 0.55 
45 FLY1 FLY1 0.80 0.55 
46 WALK1 ROLL 0.60 0.5 
47 FLOAT THROW 0.74 0.68 
48 ROLL JUMP 0.72 0.69 
49 FALL FLOAT 0.60 0.73 
50 FLY1 ROLL 0.69 0.62 
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Table VIM: Theoretical scores with animacy allowance compared with actual 
responses obtained from pupils aged 7 and 10 years plus mean score 
Example 
Number 
Name of 
Example 
Theoretical 
Score 
Mean 
Score 
Seven 
Score 
Ten 
Score 
5 FLY2 FLY2 1 1.53 1.72 1.47 
11 FLOAT FLOAT 1 1.97 2.47 1.95 
14 WALK2 WALK2 1 1.17 1.25 1.37 
17 ROLL ROLL 1 1.74 2.25 1.70 
24 JUMP JUMP 1 1.50 1.90 1.52 
32 WALK1 WALK1 1 1.91 2.52 2.05 
40 PUSH PUSH 1 1.74 1.92 1.85 
41 THROW THROW 1 1.47 1.95 1.45 
45 FLY1 FLY1 1 1.26 1.67 1.20 
20 FLY1 FLY2 2 2.23 2.52 2.30 
7 WALK1 WALK2 2 2.87 2.80 2.82 
31 CARRY CARRY 2 2.88 2.87 3.47 
38 FALL FALL 2 2.23 2.80 2.55 
13 ROLL THROW 2 1.67 2.22 1.90 
29 ROLL PUSH 2 2.32 2.80 2.47 
19 WALK2 FLY I 3 3.31 3.62 3.37 
28 THROW JUMP 3 2.44 2.15 2.37 
43 PUSH WALK1 3 2.63 2.75 2.42 
49 FALL FLOAT 3 3.62 3.25 3.35 
3 CARRY ROLL 3 2.60 3.00 2.95 
6 ROLL FALL 3 3.17 3.87 3.22 
10 CARRY PUSH 3 2.64 2.95 2.62 
12 WALK1 CARRY 3 3.15 3.32 2.80 
18 THROW PUSH 3 2.92 3.50 3.10 
30 FLOAT ROLL 3 3.22 3.30 3.15 
35 CARRY THROW 3 2.38 2.75 2.32 
46 WALK1 ROLL 3 3.05 3.15 2.97 
47 FLOAT THROW 3 3.25 3.37 3.32 
7 PUSH FLY1 4 3.68 3.77 3.55 
9 JUMP FLY2 4 3.45 3.67 3.35 
15 JUMP FALL 4 3.43 3.70 3.42 
21 JUMP WALK2 4 3.45 3.67 3.47 
39 JUMP CARRY 4 3.30 3.30 3.32 
44 JUMP FLOAT 4 3.19 3.10 3.02 
48 ROLL JUMP 4 3.32 3.37 3.07 
2 PUSH JUMP 4 2.80 2.72 3.10 
4 FALL CARRY 4 3.50 3.82 3.57 
8 WALK2 CARRY 4 3.60 3.70 3.65 
16 FALL FLY2 4 3.50 3.67 3.30 
22 THROW FALL 4 2.90 3.52 2.55 
23 PUSH FLOAT 4 3.57 3.35 3.35 
26 FLY2 THROW 4 2.99 3.22 2.75 
33 FLOAT WALK2 4 3.59 3.52 3.47 
36. WALK2 THROW 4 3.11 3.20 3.05 
37 FLOAT FLY2 4 2.63 2.82 2.72 
42 FLOAT CARRY 4 3.29 3.40 3.32 
25 CARRY FLY1 5 3.35 3.30 3.25 
34 FALL PUSH 5 3.45 3.52 3.57 
50 FLY1 ROLL 5 3.48 3.32 3.30 
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Table VH.2: Theoretical scores with animacy allowance compared with actual 
responses obtained from pupils aged 12-16 years 
Example 
Number 
Name of 
Example 
Theoretical 
Score 
Twelve 
Score 
Fourteen 
Score 
Sixteen 
Score 
5 FLY2 FLY2 1 1.21 1.53 1.70 
11 FLOAT FLOAT 1 2.00 1.69 1.72 
14 WALK2 WALK2 1 1.07 1.00 1.50 
17 ROLL ROLL 1 1.78 1.47 1.52 
24 JUMP JUMP 1 1.43 1.57 1.05 
32 WALK1 WALK1 1 1.83 1.92 1.25 
40 PUSH PUSH 1 1.65 1.88 1.42 
41 THROW THROW 1 1.38 1.47 1.10 
45 FLY1 FLY1 1 1.20 1.18 1.05 
20 FLY1 FLY2 2 2.10 2.12 2.10 
7 WALK1 WALK2 2 2.89 3.02 2.82 
31 CARRY CARRY 2 2.92 2.90 2.25 
38 FALL FALL 2 2.18 2.12 1.50 
13 ROLL THROW 2 1.56 1.55 1.12 
29 ROLL PUSH 2 2.14 2.18 2.02 
19 WALK2 FLY1 3 3.41 3.16 2.97 
28 THROW JUMP 3 2.45 2.57 2.65 
43 PUSH WALK1 3 2.85 2.27 2.85 
49 FALL FLOAT 3 3.45 3.14 3.12 
3 CARRY ROLL 3 2.65 2.35 2.05 
6 ROLL FALL 3 3.07 3.02 2.67 
10 CARRY PUSH 3 2.70 2.69 2.25 
12 WALK1 CARRY 3 3.16 3.02 3.47 
18 THROW PUSH 3 2.90 2.61 2.50 
30 FLOAT ROLL 3 3.18 3.11 3.40 
35 CARRY THROW 3 2.25 2.41 2.17 
46 WALK1 ROLL 3 3.00 3.12 3.02 
47 FLOAT THROW 3 3.23 3.33 3.02 
7 PUSH FLY1 4 3.72 3.65 3.70 
9 JUMP FLY2 4 3.47 3.35 3.42 
15 JUMP FALL 4 3.25 3.61 3.15 
21 JUMP WALK2 4 3.63 3.39 3.10 
39 JUMP CARRY 4 3.20 3.20 3.50 
44 JUMP FLOAT 4 3.10 3.49 3.25 
48 ROLL JUMP 4 3.60 3.31 3.27 
2 PUSH JUMP 4 2.81 2.65 2.72 
4 FALL CARRY 4 3.52 3.55 3.05 
8 WALK2 CARRY 4 3.45 3.49 3.70 
16 FALL FLY2 4 3.41 3.47 3.60 
22 THROW FALL 4 2.60 3.06 2.77 
23 PUSH FLOAT 4 3.70 3.76 3.67 
26 FLY2 THROW 4 2.80 3.27 2.92 
33 FLOAT WALK2 4 3.63 3.67 3.70 
36 WALK2 THROW 4 3.10 3.02 3.15 
37 FLOAT FLY2 4 2.47 2.39 2.77 
42 FLOAT CARRY 4 3.16 3.53 3.02 
25 CARRY FLY1 5 3.32 3.51 3.37 
34 FALL PUSH 5 3.45 3.37 3.32 
50 FLY1 ROLL 5 3.61 3.65 3.55 
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Table VII.3: Table to show the standard deviation/standard deviation maximum 
of each group tested for the Matching Task 2 
Example Example Name 
Number 
Sevens' 	 Sixteens' 
Standard 	 Standard 
Deviation/ 	 Deviation/ 
Standard 	 Standard 
Deviation 	 Deviation 
Maximum. 	 Maximum. 
1 "THROW AWAY" 0.93 0.55 
2 CARRY I.I. 0.75 0.73 
3 PUSH I.I. 0.58 0.65 
4 FLY A.A. 0.70 0.55 
5 JUMP I.A. 0.75 0.63 
6 FLY I.A. 0.48 0.73 
7 FALL A.A. 0.68 0.71 
8 THROW A.A. 0.62 0.55 
9 WALK A.A. 0.87 0.72 
10 CARRY I.A. 0.82 0.75 
11 JUMP A.A. 0.82 0.54 
12 WALK I.A. 0.70 0.67 
13 PUSH A.A. 0.57 0.48 
14 FLY I.I. 0.75 0.61 
15 PUSH I.A. 0.67 0.60 
16 FLOAT I.A. 0.69 0.55 
17 ROLL I.A. 0.48 0.62 
18 THROW I.A. 0.72 0.64 
19 JUMP I.I. 0.90 0.54 
20 ROLL I.I. 0.65 0.50 
21 FLOAT I.I. 0.81 0.59 
22 CARRY A.A. 0.89 0.60 
23 FLOAT I.I. 0.63 0.47 
24 WALK I.I. 0.65 0.57 
25 ROLL A.A. 0.63 0.54 
26 FALL I.I. 0.80 0.52 
27 THROW I.I. 0.76 0.57 
28 FALL I.A. 0.74 0.47 
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Table VIII.1: Table to show the mean values of each age group tested for the 
CARRY TASK 
Example 
Number 
Example Name Seven Twelve 
Mean Mean 
Six- 	 Total 
teen Mean 
Mean 
2 CARRY FLY AND WALK 2.90 2.79 2.75 	 2.81 
3 CARRY FALL AND PUSH 3.47 3.52 3.72 	 3.57 
4 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLY 1.63 1.21 1.22 	 1.35 
5 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FLOAT 3.50 2.86 3.44 3.27 
6 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLOAT 2.77 2.72 3.44 2.98 
7 CARRY FALL AND FLOAT 3.23 2.69 3.38 	 3.10 
8 CARRY PUSH AND PUSH 1.77 1.90 1.97 	 1.88 
9 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLOAT 2.63 2.21 2.22 2.35 
10 CARRY FLOAT AND CARRY FLOAT 1.67 1.83 1.81 	 1.77 
11 CARRY FALL AND WALK 3.30 3.38 3.63 	 3.44 
12 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FALL 3.33 3.17 3.84 3.45 
13 CARRY WALK In AND CARRY WALK 2.83 2.90 2.75 	 2.83 
Held 
14 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY WALK 2.50 2.48 2.25 	 2.41 
15 CARRY FLY In AND CARRY FLY 1.70 1.83 1.81 	 1.78 
Held 
16 CARRY PUSH AND WALK 2.17 2.24 2.94 2.45 
17 CARRY WALK AND FLOAT 3.07 3.03 3.47 	 3.19 
18 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FALL 3.17 3.38 3.47 	 3.34 
19 CARRY FALL In and CARRY FALL 2.47 1.86 2.13 	 2.15 
Held 
20 CARRY FLY AND FLOAT 2.33 2.21 2.72 2.42 
21 CARRY PUSH AND FALL 3.57 3.38 3.63 	 3.53 
22 CARRY FLY AMD CARRY FALL 3.27 3.00 3.47 	 3.25 
23 CARRY PUSH AND FLY 3.23 2.76 3.50 	 3.16 
24 CARRY WALK AND FLY 3.23 3.14 3.56 	 3.31 
25 CARRYPUSHIn AND CARRY PUSH 2.50 1.76 1.75 	 2.00 
Held 
26 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLOAT 1.83 1.83 2.09 	 1.92 
27 CARRY WALK AND CARRY WALK 1.23 1.28 1.06 	 1.19 
28 CARRY FLOAT In AND CARRY 1.50 1.52 1.09 	 1.37 
FLOAT Held 
29 CARRY PUSH AND FLOAT 3.33 3.24 3.63 	 3.4 0 
30 CARRY FALL AND FALL 2.30 1.86 1.66 	 1.94 
31 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY PUSH 1.57 1.45 1.25 	 1.42 
32 CARRY WALK AND WALK 1.40 1.52 1.97 	 1.63 
33 CARRY FALL AND FLY 3.17 2.86 3.66 	 3.23 
34 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLY 2.87 1.93 1.84 	 2.21 
35 CARRY FLY AND FLY 2.00 1.83 2.19 	 2.01 
36 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLY 3.40 2.72 2.94 3.02 
37 CARRY WALK AND FALL 3.60 3.31 3.69 	 3.53 
38 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FALL 1.40 1.72 1.41 	 1.51 
39 CARRY FLY AND PUSH 3.43 2.76 3.03 	 3.07 
40 CARRY FLOAT AND FLOAT 1.33 1.34 1.31 	 1.33 
41 CARRY WALK AND PUSH 2.77 2.28 2.38 	 2.48 
42 CARRY FLY AND FALL 3.23 3.14 3.59 	 3.32 
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Table VIII.2: Table to show the standard deviation/standard deviation maximum 
of each age group tested for the CARRY TASK 
Example 
Number 
Example Name Seven Twelve 
Mean 	 Mean 
Six- Total 
teen Mean 
Mean 
2 CARRY FLY AND WALK 0.57 0.52 0.58 0.57 
3 CARRY FALL AND PUSH 0.59 0.74 0.83 0.70 
4 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLY 0.80 0.80 0.61 	 0.71 
5 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FLOAT 0.68 0.56 0.71 	 0.62 
6 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLOAT 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.71 
7 CARRY FALL AND FLOAT 0.70 0.71 0.71 	 0.69 
8 CARRY PUSH AND PUSH 0.58 0.52 0.73 0.61 
9 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLOAT 0.78 0.58 0.75 0.70 
10 CARRY FLOAT AND CARRY FLOAT 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.58 
11 CARRY FALL AND WALK 0.74 0.67 0.66 0.68 
12 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FALL 0.73 0.68 0.53 0.62 
13 CARRY WALK In AND CARRY WALK 0.75 0.64 0.61 	 0.66 
Held 
14 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY WALK 0.80 0.77 0.61 	 0.73 
15 CARRY FLY In AND CARRY FLY 0.82 0.65 0.61 	 0.69 
Held 
16 CARRY PUSH AND WALK 0.68 0.63 0.60 0.62 
17 CARRY WALK AND FLOAT 0.74 0.61 0.79 0.70 
18 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FALL 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.69 
19 CARRY FALL In and CARRY FALL 0.79 0.72 0.64 0.70 
Held 
20 CARRY FLY AND FLOAT 0.70 0.63 0.59 0.66 
21 CARRY PUSH AND FALL 0.72 0.70 0.55 0.66 
22 CARRY FLY AMD CARRY FALL 0.72 0.62 0.58 0.63 
23 CARRY PUSH AND FLY 0.76 0.66 0.74 0.70 
24 CARRY WALK AND FLY 0.80 0.66 0.57 0.68 
25 CARRYPUSHIn AND CARRY PUSH 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.78 
Held 
26 CARRY FLY AND CARRY FLOAT 0.54 0.39 0.53 0.49 
27 CARRY WALK AND CARRY WALK 0.63 0.73 0.83 0.68 
28 CARRY FLOAT In AND CARRY 0.86 0.49 0.57 	 0.61 
FLOAT Held 
29 CARRY PUSH AND FLOAT 0.73 0.66 0.61 	 0.66 
30 CARRY FALL AND FALL 0.89 0.72 0.74 0.77 
31 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY PUSH 0.75 0.67 0.80 0.72 
32 CARRY WALK AND WALK 0.86 0.68 0.68 	 0.71 
33 CARRY FALL AND FLY 0.80 0.56 0.67 0.64 
34 CARRY WALK AND CARRY FLY 0.79 0.71 0.56 0.65 
35 CARRY FLY AND FLY 0.83 0.59 0.75 0.72 
36 CARRY PUSH AND CARRY FLY 0.77 0.56 0.58 0.61 
37 CARRY WALK AND FALL 0.78 0.70 0.58 0.67 
38 CARRY FALL AND CARRY FALL 0.86 0.80 0.87 0.82 
39 CARRY FLY AND PUSH 0.75 0.56 0.61 	 0.61 
40 CARRY FLOAT AND FLOAT 0.84 0.50 0.74 0.70 
41 CARRY WALK AND PUSH 0.73 0.59 0.55 0.61 
42 CARRY FLY AND FALL 0.74 0.54 0.63 0.62 
Sd/Sd Max. = Standard deviation/standard deviation maximum. 
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Table VIII.3: Comparison of similar identities taken from Matching Task 1 
Example Example Sevens' Twelves' Sixteens' 
Number Name Mean Mean Mean 
5 FLY2 FLY2 1.72 1.21 1.70 
11 FLOAT FLOAT 2.47 2.00 1.72 
14 WALK WALK 1.25 1.07 1.15 
40 PUSH PUSH 1.92 1.65 1.42 
38 FALL FALL 2.80 2.18 1.50 
Table VIII.4: XY Pairs from Matching Task 1 to correspond to CARRY XY 
pairs in Matching Task 3 
Example Example Sevens' Twelves' Sixteens' Total 
Number Name Mean Mean Mean Mean 
2 WALK2 FLY1 3.62 3.41 2.97 3.31 
3 FALL PUSH 3.52 3.45 3.32 3.45 
11 WALK2 FALL 3.70 3.45 3.70 3.60 
16 PUSH WALK1 2.75 2.85 2.85 2.63 
21 FALL PUSH 3.52 3.45 3.32 3.45 
23 PUSH FLY1 3.77 3.72 3.70 3.68 
24 WALK2 FLY1 3.62 3.41 2.97 3.31 
33 FLY FALL 3.67 3.41 3.60 3.50 
37 WALK2 FALL 3.70 3.45 3.70 3.60 
39 PUSH FLY1 3.77 3.72 3.70 3.68 
41 PUSH WALK 2.75 2.85 2.85 2.63 
42 FLY FALL 3.67 3.41 3.60 3.50 
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Table VIII.5: XY Pairs from Matching Task 1 to correspond to 
CARRY X CARRY Y pairs from Matching Task 3 
Example 
Number 
Example 
Name 
Sevens' 
Mean 
Twelves' 
Mean 
Sixteens' 
Mean 
Total 
Mean 
5 FALL FLOAT 3.25 3.45 3.12 3.62 
26 FLOAT FLY2 2.82 2.47 2.77 2.63 
9 FLOAT WALK2 3.52 3.63 3.70 3.59 
18 WALK2 FALL 3.70 3.45 3.70 3.60 
22 FLY FALL 3.67 3.41 3.60 3.50 
34 WALK2 FLY1 3.62 3.41 2.97 3.31 
36 PUSH FLY1 3.77 3.72 3.70 3.68 
6 PUSH FLOAT 3.35 3.70 3.67 3.57 
12 FALL PUSH 3.52 3.45 3.32 3.45 
14 PUSH WALK1 2.75 2.85 2.85 2.63 
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FIG.IX.1 SCATTERPLOT OF MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL. 
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FIG.IX.2 SCATTERPLOT OF SEVENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL. 
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SCATTERPLOT OF TENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL. 
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FIG.IX.4 SCATTERPLOT OF TWELVES' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL. 
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SCATTERPLOT OF FOURTEENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST 
THEORETICAL SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF 
THE MODEL. 
FIG.IX.5 
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FIG.IX.6 SCATTERPLOT OF SIXTEENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL. 
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FIG.1 X.7 SCATTERPLOT OF MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL, 
PLUS ANIMACY ALLOWANCE. 
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FIG IX.8 SCATTERPLOT OF SEVENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL, 
PLUS ANIMACY ALLOWANCE. 
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FIG IX.9 SCATTERPLOT OF TENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST THEORETICAL 
SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL, 
PLUS ANIMACY ALLOWANCE. 
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FIG IX. 10 SCATTERPLOT OF TWELVES' MEAN SCORE AGAINST 
THEORETICAL SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE 
MODEL, PLUS ANIMACY ALLOWANCE. 
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FIG. IX.11 SCATTERPLOT OF FOURTEENS' MEAN SCORE AGAINST 
THEORETICAL SCORE OF REVISED VERSION OF THE 
MODEL, PLUS ANIMACY ALLOWANCE. 
4 . 5 - 
8 FRTFY7 
P WI WI 
1 . 5 - 8T 1) 
0 ETV" 
0 w2Y2 
1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 	 6 
THEORETICAL SCORE 
   
 
3 . 8 - 
FO
U
R
TE
E
N
S'
 M
EA
N
 
  
3 . 0 - 
  
 
2 . 2 - 
   
   
 
01.W 
8 4,7,3 
o 
8a Yt  
8 ;.1,7 
8 FT T 
ow23- 
F.R 
0 w2Y 
CC8
WI,W2 
0c, 
0 TY 
-n-q 't 
  
O P'w 
CR 
CT 
 
0 RI 
 
8  R_P FY ,FY2 
0 R.T 
0F 
  
0 IT" 8P41  
8  F.FY2 
FYI,R 
0 J.0 
0` 
8 PA 
8 
tii,V12,T 
OWI,R:FET 
0 FY2,T 
0 FTYY 
OF? 
0 c 
0 P•1 
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MODEL, PLUS ANIMACY ALLOWANCE. 
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APPENDIX X 
FRAME REPRESENTATION OF STEREOTYPICAL MOTIONS 
FOR REVISED VERSION OF THE MODEL 
361 
THE USE OF FRAMES TO DESCRIBE THE NINE CLASSES OF MOTION 
PREDICTED BY THE LATEST VERSION OF THE MODEL OF A 
COMMONSENSE UNDERSTANDING OF CAUSES OF MOTION 
Each class of motion represents a stereotypical action which include a number of expected 
features. These include the place of motion ie the ground or the air or the nature of the source 
of movement i.e. living or nonliving . A frame is an economical method of organizing these 
items or properties allowing the user to make explicit the tacit expectations of a 
stereotypical situation. The slots allow the default value or normal condition to be entered 
first followed by the next most likely occurrences. They also clearly state the excluded 
proprties for each motion. Therefore the frame expresses unambiguously what a series of 
expectations about any particular motion should be. It has the advantage of also referring 
to and of excluding the use of other frames in the series. Therefore the frame system can 
tell you something not only about the moving object itself but what to expect about its source 
of motion in terms of other frames i.e. classes of motion. 
Each frame consists of a number of slots and subslots, with a description of their contents. 
A template frame is described in Figure X. lbelow and its pattern followed to describe all 
nine stereotypical motions. 
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Figure X.1: A frame template to represent the salient features for each 
stereotypical motion as described by the commonsense 
model of motion 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 
Statement 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 
B. Animacy 
Name of Frame. 
Definition of motion. 
Description of feature for named 
motion including default values. 
Type solid/air/carrier. 
Motion of animate or inanimate 
object. 
C. Effort/control. 
D. Original 
Stereotypes. 
i. Source 
ii. Requirement 
iii. Control 
If required then by itself or other. 
Is effort required for this motion 
to take place? Yes/no. 
If effort required - present absent. 
Name of primitive action from 
which this class of motion is 
most likely to have developed. 
The template described in Figure X.1 has been used to provide a more formalised 
description of the nine stereotypical motions predicted by the commonsense model, (see 
figures X.2 - X.11). These make explicit not only whether the moving object is expected 
to be living or non living but also describe certain properties pertinent to the object itself, 
e.g. the object is expected to be light in the frame representation of FLOAT. The frames also 
link one type of motion to another e.g. with CARRY, PUSH, THROW and ROLL type 
motions the effort is provided by an external agent whose motion is expected to belong to 
the Frame known as WALK. This representation not only clearly divides the motions into 
separate units but also provides a means of linking them together when this is appropriate. 
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Figure X.2: Frame representation of the class of motion known as PUSH 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 PUSH 
Statement An object has a continual source 
of motion. The source of this motion 
shares the same support as the pushed 
object. The source of effort has 
autonomous motion and needs to have 
continued contact with the moving 
object and it can be infront or behind it. 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 	 Supported by a solid usually the ground. 
Possible to have solid support above 
the ground e.g. table and shelf. 
Air excluded, source of motion 
excluded e.g. CARRY. 
B. Animacy 
	
Animate. 
Inanimate possible. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 	 External to object with autonomous 
motion. Belongs to WALK class of 
motion. 
FLY and JUMP excluded as motion 
must take place on solid. 
ii. Requirement 
	 Yes 
No impossible therefore FALL and 
FLOAT excluded. 
iii. Control 	 Control 
No control excluded. THROW, ROLL, 
FALL, FLOAT excluded, 
D. Original 	 Grasp/Hold and move. 
Stereotypes. 
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Figure X.3: Frame representation of the class of motion known as FLOAT (A) 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 FLOAT (A) 
Statement 	 The object moves in the air (usually 
slightly falling). 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 	 None - but not needed. This is a very 
light object e.g. feather. 
Support excluded. 
B. Animacy 	 Expect Inanimate. Exception spaceman. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 	 Not required. 
Source of effort impossible, CARRY, 
ROLL, THROW, JUMP, FLY, WALK, 
PUSH. 
ii. Requirement 	 No. 
Source of effort impossible, CARRY, 
ROLL, THROW, JUMP, FLY, WALK, 
PUSH. 
iii. Control 	 None. 
Control impossible, WALK and FLY 
excluded. 
D. Original 
	
Let go. 
Stereotypes. 
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Figure X.4: Frame representation of the class of motion known as FLOAT (B) 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 FLOAT (B) 
Statement 	 The object remains and is moved 
by the air. 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 	 Mover - The object inherits the support 
from the mover which is the AIR. 
Any external source of effort which is 
also not the supported are impossible, 
FLY, WALK, JUMP, THROW, 
ROLL, FALL, PUSH excluded. 
B. Animacy 
	 Inanimate e.g. clouds. 
Animate e.g. bird gliding possible. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 	 External to object but same as 
support AIR. 
Autonomous movement excluded, FLY, 
WALK and the external agent being 
autonomous mover excluded e.g. 
THROW, ROLL, PUSH. 
ii. Requirement 
iii. Control 
D. Original 
Stereotypes. 
No 
Yes impossible FALL excluded. 
None 
Controlled motion impossible. 
FLY and WALK excluded. 
Grasp/Hold and Let go. 
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Figure X.5: Frame representation of the class of motion known as FALL 
FRAME REPRESENTATION OF THE CLASS OF MOTION KNOWN AS FALL 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 FALL 
Statement 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 
A motion which takes place in the air 
in the downward direction. It occurs 
because there is nothing to stop it 
happening i.e. through "lack of 
prevention". (There is no adequate 
support present). 
None 
Support impossible. CARRY, FLY, 
WALK, JUMP, THROW, ROLL, 
PUSH excluded. 
B. Animacy 
	 Inanimate. 
Animate possible. 
(The latter gives rise to distinctions 
between accidental and purposeful 
motion). 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 	 Not required. 
Active effort (internal or external) 
impossible, CARRY, FLY, WALK, 
JUMP, THROW, ROLL, PUSH 
excluded. 
ii. Requirement 
	 None 
Effort impossible, CARRY, FLY, 
WALK, JUMP, ROLL, PUSH excluded. 
iii. Control 	 None. 
Control impossible. FLY, WALK, 
excluded. 
D. Original 	 Let-go 
Stereotypes. 
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Figure X.6: Frame representation of the class of motion known as ROLL 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 ROLL 
Statement 
Features of 
the motion: 
The object has been set in motion 
by an external source and usually 
moves along the ground. 
A. Support 	 A solid - usually the ground. 
Possible: ice, or other solids. 
Above the ground such as on tables 
or shelves. 
Air EXCLUDED. FLY, JUMP, 
FLOAT, FALL, excluded. 
B. Animacy 
	 Inanimate. 
Animate possible. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 	 External autonomous agent 
satisfies conditions for WALK. 
FLY and JUMP excluded as motion 
on ground. 
ii. Requirement 
	 Yes 
Lack of effort impossible, FLOAT 
and FALL excluded. 
iii. Control 	 None. 
Control impossible, FLY, WALK 
excluded. 
D. Original 
Stereotypes. 
 
Let go and move. 
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Figure X.7: Frame representation of the class of motion known as THROW 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 
	 THROW 
Statement 
Features of 
the motion: 
The object has been set in motion by 
an external agent and takes place in 
the upward direction in the air. 
A. Support 
	 None 
Ground or in air support impossible, 
FLY, WALK, CARRY, PUSH, ROLL 
excluded. 
B. Animacy 
	 Inanimate. 
Animate possible but unusual. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 
ii. Requirement Yes 
iii. Control 
D. Original 
Stereotypes. 
External agent. 
Own effort impossible, FLY, JUMP, 
WALK excluded. 
No effort impossible, FALL, FLOAT 
excluded. 
None. 
Control impossible, FLY, WALK 
excluded. 
Let go and move. 
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Figure X.8: Frame representation of the class of motion known as WALK 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 WALK 
Statement 
Features of 
the motion: 
The motion is achieved on a solid 
support usually the ground by an 
autonomous source of motion. 
A. Support 
	 Solid - usually the ground. 
Other solids above ground as long 
as they are strong enough are 
possible, e.g. floors of buildings. 
AIR impossible. FLY, FLOAT, FALL, 
THROW, JUMP excluded. 
B. Animacy 
	 Animate and Inanimate. 
C. Effort /control 
i. Source 
ii. Requirement 
iii. Control 
Itself 
External agent impossible. THROW, 
ROLL, CARRY, PUSH excluded. 
Yes 
Lack of effort impossible. FALL 
and FLOAT excluded. 
Yes. 
Lack of control impossible. 
JUMP, THROW, ROLL, FALL, 
FLOAT, CARRY, PUSH excluded. 
D. Original 
	
Self movement. 
Stereotypes. 
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Figure X.9: Frame representation of the class of motion known as JUMP 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 JUMP 
Statement 
	
The object moves by itself i.e. 
up through its own effort into the air. 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 	 None. 
Support impossible. CARRY, PUSH, 
ROLL, FLY, WALK excluded. 
B. Animacy 
	 ANIMATE. 
Some inanimate possible e.g. 
Jack-in-box but exceptions. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 	 Itself 
External agent impossible. THROW, 
ROLL, CARRY, PUSH excluded. 
ii. Requirement 
	 Yes 
No effort impossible, FALL and 
FLOAT excluded. 
iii. Control 
	 None. 
Control impossible. FLY, WALK, 
excluded. 
D. Original 
	
Self movement. 
Stereotypes. 
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Figure X.10: Frame representation of the class of motion known as FLY 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 FLY 
Statement 	 The motion is achieved in the air with 
the source of effort in the object itself. 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 	 Itself - (has recognisable 
agents of support). 
External solid support e.g. 
ground impossible. 
ROLL, PUSH excluded. 
Lack of recognised agents of support 
impossible, therefore JUMP, 
THROW, FLOAT, FALL, WALK 
excluded. 
B. Animacy 
	 Animate and inanimate. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 
ii. Requirement 
iii. Control 
D. Original 
Stereotypes. 
Itself 
External agent impossible. THROW, 
ROLL, PUSH, CARRY excluded. 
Yes 
Lack effort impossible. FALL, 
FLOAT excluded. 
Yes. 
Lack of control impossible. 
CARRY, PUSJ.H, FALL, FLOAT, 
JUMP, THROW, ROLL excluded. 
Self movement/Hold 
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Figure X.11: Frame representation of the class of motion known as CARRY 
SLOT 	 SUBSLOT 	 CONTENT 
Header 	 CARRY 
Statement 
Features of 
the motion: 
A. Support 
A carried object is one which 
inherits its support and 
motion from the same source. 
This is provided by the source of 
motion, which has autonomous 
movement. Go to this frame. 
The source of support can only be 
selected from the WALK or FLY 
classes. (See its frame). 
PUSH, FLOAT, FALL, ROLL, 
THROW, JUMP are excluded sources 
of motion. 
B. Animacy 
	
The source of motion is usually 
a living thing for lighter objects. 
An inanimate source of motion is 
possible for heavier objects 
or for higher speed movement. 
C. Effort/control 
i. Source 	 Effort from another. 
Selected from WALK or FLY classes 
of motion. 
PUSH, FLOAT, FALL, ROLL, 
THROW, JUMP, are excluded sources. 
ii. Requirement 	 Yes 
No impossible, therefore FALL and 
FLOAT A excluded. FLOAT B 
is a possibility. 
iii. Control 
	 The carried object has no control 
over its carried motion. 
Exception is the driver of a 
source of autonomous motion, e.g. car. 
D. Original 	 Grasp/Hold 
Stereotypes. 
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APPENDIX XI 
PUBLISHED PAPER 
BLISS J., OGBORN J., AND WHITELOCK D.(1989). 
SECONDARY PUPILS'COMMONSENSE THEORIES OF MOTION, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENCE EDUCATION VOL.11, NO.3 
My contribution to this paper is the empirical data, which I collected on separate 
occasions from two groups of secondary school pupils, (as described in chapter 5 and 
also found in unpublished M.Ed. report.) 
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